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Abstract
Motivated by the recent 2007/2008 Financial Crisis, this dissertation identifies endogenous risk
in the German insurance sector during the Interwar sector. In the context of principal agent theory,
endogenous risk is the result of a company reacting to shocks that are generated and amplified
within the financial system by shifting risk from shareholders to policyholders. This dissertation
provides analytical support for this interdependence on the basis of established financial as well as
actuarial models and assumptions. The empirical analysis considers the German insurance sector
during the Interwar period due to the presence of a pronounced business cycle, the absence of
exogenous low-probability high-cost events, a consistent regulatory framework as well as available
quantitative data. The econometric analysis is based on four newly compiled datasets that collect
the 1924 gold account opening balances, company- as well as line-specific financial information,
and stock price quotations for all publicly traded German insurance companies during the Interwar
period. The dissertation finds that during the Interwar period in the German insurance sector
(Ch.2), the risk of getting discontinued prior to default (3) led companies to cater dividend payout
(Ch.4) and reinsurance operations (Ch.5) to an optimistic investor clientele (Ch.6), yet in contrast
to the underwriting cycle (Ch.7).
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1 Introduction: identifying endogenous risk in non-life insur-
ance
Endogenous risk as connection between systemic risk and insurance
The then-largest global insurance group, American Insurance Group (AIG), was at the epicentre of the
2007/2008 Financial Crisis. The company received the largest ever bail-out when the U.S. Treasury
provided emergency funds totalling USD 182.3 billion. This financial emergency funding had been
necessitated by the exposure of AIG to credit default swaps (CDS) on collateralised debt obligations
that its London-based unit AIG FS Ltd. had sold in the years prior to 2007. Securities lending activities
also played an important role. Overall losses accumulated from these two activities to a total of USD
50 billion.1 The fact that an insurance company was at the centre of the crisis came as a surprise to the
industry. This phenomenon motivated substantial research into the relevance of the insurance sector
within the internal economic and financial system as a source for instability - commonly referred to as
systemic risk. Eling & Pankoke (2014) provide a meta analysis of 43 relevant academic and practitioner
studies of relevance. The first finding is that there is no generally accepted definition of systemic risk.
Second, the authors conclude that [t]raditional underwriting and funding and investing activities in
the life, non-life, and reinsurance business make very little contribution to systemic risk and do not
increase insurer vulnerability to impairments of the financial system.”2 It is found that non-traditional
insurance activities “increase the vulnerability of insurance companies to the impairment of the financial
system.”3 This also includes the trade in CDS contracts in which AIG had been active.
None of the analysed studies inquired into the motivation of AIG to engage in non-traditional
insurance activities. A possible explanation is inferred from the 2006 annual report of AIG that provides
an uncommented summary of total shareholder return generated from 2001 until 2006. This information
is reproduced in Table (1).4 This information indicates that AIG was underperforming relative to the
S&P 500 as well as two peer groups. At the same time, AIG started its activities in the CDS market.
This coincidence purports that senior management sought to increase shareholder returns by engaging
in new business activities in the then-thriving securities markets. An additional suggestion is that
1See McDonald & Paulson (2015) for a recent analysis of the case. An exhaustive description of AIG business
operations is provided in the “Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic
Crisis in the United States” by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - the FCIC Report (2011).
2See Eling & Pankoke (2014, p.29).
3Ibid.
4This measure is defined as the ratio
Total Shareholder Return =
PriceT+1 − PriceT +Dividends
PriceT
,
where T denotes the point in time at which the investment has been made. It is further assumed that dividends are
reinvested. Total shareholder return thus needs to be regarded as a measure of capital accumulation for investors that
followed a buy-and-hold with dividend reinvestment strategy and not as a direct measure of return, see Rappaport (2006).
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Table 1: Cumulative total shareholder returns AIG, 2001 to 2006
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
AIG 100.00 73.07 84.04 83.61 87.67 92.97
S&P 500 100.00 77.90 100.25 111.15 116.61 135.03
New Peer Group 100.00 86.49 109.07 126.05 155.01 179.36
Old Peer Group 100.00 88.84 111.14 134.80 164.51 196.58
Note: Cumulative total shareholder returns include received dividend payout as well
as increases in the share prices. The new peer group consists of ACE Limited , Aflac
Incorporated , The Chubb Corporation, The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.,
Lincoln National Corporation, MetLife, Inc., Prudential Financial, Inc., The
Travelers Companies, Inc. (formerly The St. Paul Travelers Companies, Inc.) and
XL Capital Ltd . The old peer group consists of The Allstate Corporation, The Chubb
Corporation, CNA Financial Corporation, The Hartford Financial Services Group,
Inc., Lincoln National Corporation, MetLife, Inc., Prudential Financial , Inc. and The
Travelers Companies, Inc.
Source: AIG Annual Report 2006 Form 10-K, p.23
decision makers expected core insurance business operations to not provide the funds necessary to meet
the market and benchmark performances. AIG thus exposed itself intentionally to non-core risk due to
its motivation to conform to relative shareholder expectations. This link is referred to as “endogenous
risk” in the following.
The case study of AIG is neither representative nor sufficiently objective to draw general conclusions
from it. The intention of this analysis is to provide a general identification of endogenous risk in non-life
insurance operations. It combines an analytical discussion with an empirical assessment based on data
from the German insurance market during the Interwar period. The conducted analysis confirms the
hypothesis of the dissertation that is stated as follows.
Hypothesis: Joint-stock non-life insurance companies are indirectly exposed to systemic
risk via endogenous risk.
The remainder of the introduction starts with a general definition of endogenous risk. Second, the
particular relevance of the German insurance market during the Interwar period in this context is
explained. Third, the structure of the dissertation is provided. Fourth, general contributions of the
dissertation, limitations of the chosen approach as well as potential future research are outlined.
Definition: endogenous risk in corporate finance
Definition in the context of business cycles The concept of endogenous risk is introduced by
Danielsson & Shin (2003) and “refers to the risk from shocks that are generated and amplified within
the system”.5 It contrasts so-called exogenous risk, i.e. potential costs associated with earthquakes or
other catastrophes that are not related to financial markets. The actors in this setting are traders who
5Danielsson & Shin (2003, p.297).
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interact with each other. The price formation therefore contains a feedback mechanism of collective
action and individual reaction as traders react to prices which in turn are defined by the collective
action of traders.6 The generation and realisation of endogenous risk is put into the context of business
cycles by Danielsson et al. (2012). Based on an analytical model of pro-cyclical volatility, this study
provides an intuitive explanation of the “leverage effect” as per Black (1976b) and Schwert (1989). Both
studies find that episodes of high volatility are pre-dated by declines in asset prices. This phenomenon
is explained by Danielsson et al. (2012, p.31) with traders unwinding positions in assets with decreasing
price. This in turn triggers a vicious cycle of further decreases in market prices and deleveraging, thus
causing an endogenous debt-deflation shock within the financial system. 7The basic model of Danielsson
et al. (2012) directly considers the effect of the interplay of active and passive traders within financial
markets on asset returns. They show that asset prices are subject to endogenous risk and due to the
pro-cyclical behaviour of active traders.
Endogenous risk in the context of principal agent theory The implicit assumption of Daniels-
son & Shin (2003) is that traders only consider asset returns as relevant for decision-making purposes.
Changing the perspective to long-term equity investors - as current or future shareholders - moves the
subject of endogenous risk into the context of principal agent theory. In this setting the management
of the invested company (agent) interacts with current holders of common shares8 and provides it
with dividend payout as compensation for providing capital. A particular conflict arises from the fact
that the latter group holds the right to vote in favour of discontinuing the joint-stock company given
the required provisions and prerequisites in corporate bye-laws. A potential motivation for doing so
would be to liquidate paid-in capital in order to refinance the investment in alternative investment
opportunities. This puts the agent under the pressure to meet the expectations of the principal. The
prospect of earning relatively better alternative investment returns directly translates into an increased
risk for the company of being discontinued. Endogenous risk occurs in this setting if the agent increases
the exposure of the company to risk in order to provide for the expected compensation. This effectively
shifts discontinuation risk from shareholders to policyholders. The fact that the company is itself an
alternative investment opportunity for shareholders of other companies creates the feedback process
6“Endogenous risk appears whenever there is the conjunction of (i) individuals reacting to their environment and (ii)
where the individual actions affect their environment.” See Danielsson & Shin (2003, p.302).
7A concept closely related to the debt-deflation explained by endogenous risk is the “Minsky financial instability
hypothesis”, see Minsky (1986). This model consists of three categories of borrowers: “hedge” borrowers cover debt
payments by current income. “Speculative” borrowers can meet liabilities only by continuously rolling over debt. “Ponzi”
borrowers expect future increases in asset value that are required to repay outstanding debt. With continuing economic
expansion expectations become more optimistic. This leads to an increase of “speculative” and “Ponzi” borrowers in the
economy. This causes an asset bubble. When asset prices fail to continue increasing, the latter types of borrowers will
face difficulties meeting their obligations. They will start to deleverage their positions in order to limit exposure and
meet current liabilities. The turning point is colloquially referred to as “Minsky Moment”. The result is a vicious cycle of
debt-deflation and further asset price decreases. This feedback process is dependent on the presence of endogenous risk
that captures the effect introduced by the excessive leverage that is realised after the “Minsky Moment”.
8Preference shares are not considered.
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that is inherent to endogenous risk. Facing potential discontinuation, companies will seek to meet
investor expectations that react to dividend payout and vice versa. This defines endogenous risk as the
risk that is shifted from shareholders to fixed claimants due to endogenous causes.
Non-life insurance and endogenous risk - a simple model case The described principal-agent
problem is of particular interest in the case of an unlisted private joint-stock non-life insurance company:
assuming that the insurer provides a joint-stock manufacturer with insurance protection, an upswing
in the business cycle will lead to increased manufacturing. This increases the profitability of the
manufacturing company and allows the company to provide additional dividend payout. Increased
production nevertheless also causes a faster wear and tear of machinery. Insured costs associated
machines breaking down lead to decreased earnings for the insurance company. Yet, reducing dividend
payout in accordance would incentivise shareholders to disinvest from the insurance company and
buy shares of the manufacturer, the alternative investment opportunity. The insurer may thus adjust
dividend payout to the level of the manufacturer and refinance the incurred additional costs of the cash
dividend by increasing the riskiness of its operations. An insurance company can for example utilise
available free reserves or seek to align earnings performance towards that of the manufacturer. This
leads to a shifting of (endogenous) risk from shareholders to policyholders.
Identifying endogenous risk in non-life insurance The example provides an intuitive roadmap
for the analysis of endogenous risk in non-life insurance: first, it is necessary to test whether not meeting
investor expectations was indeed a possible way for companies to exit the market. Second, it requires
analysis as to whether companies did adjust dividend payout to external market conditions and shifted
risk from shareholders to policyholders. This, third, raises the question whether the characteristics
of investor expectations - or more generally market sentiment - justify the assumption that indirect
pressure was exerted on companies. The second and third question jointly identify the feedback process
that is integral to endogenous risk. Fourth, the relationship between external economic conditions
and the performance of non-life insurance business - expressed by the underwriting cycle - requires
identification. This is necessary to establish that dividend payout strategies were indeed disjunct from
the actual business performance. Fifth, corporate specific risk management offers relevant insight into
the internal management of solvency. This helps to identify the way in which endogenous risk led to
immediate consequences for the policyholders.
The relevance of the German insurance sector during the Interwar period
This dissertation bases the analysis of endogenous risk within insurance operations on source material
and data from the German insurance market during the Interwar period, 1924 to 1935. This period is
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Table 2: Market characteristics required for reduced bias in data
Required characteristic
United States Germany
Contemporary Historical Historical
Pronounced business cycle fluctuation Yes Yes Yes
Coherent regulatory regime No (harmonised) No Yes
Absence of exogenous shocks No Yes Yes
Data availability Ambiguous Unknown Yes
Note: “Contemporary” refers to the period predating and including the 2007/08 financial crisis. “Historical”
refers to the Interwar period.
Source: Own considerations
chosen in accordance with Kurtz (1937), a contemporary study of the underwriting cycle between the
years 1924 and 1935. The use of this market and period is justified by the advantages offered relative to
possible alternatives. The differences between the German insurance sector during the Interwar period
and the U.S. market, first in the recent financial crisis and second in the Interwar period as well, are
summarised in Table (2).
It shows that along for relevant aspects, the historical case study of the German insurance sector
provides characteristics that are necessary for reducing bias in an empirical assessment of endogenous
risk.
Pronounced business cycle fluctuation The years between 1919 and 1939 feature both, a period
of economic boom during the 1920s - the “Roaring Twenties” - and the economic crisis of the 1930s that
is colloquially known as “Great Depression”. This term relates in principal to the economic conditions in
the United States. Especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, a number of studies
has highlighted similarities between the present downturn and the Great Depression. Almunia et al.
(2009) for example show empirically that the structural breaks between the periods of economic boom
and bust, 1929/1930 respectively 2007/2008, had similar effects on an international scale, including
Germany. This does not consider the responses following the individual crises since decision-makers in
the recent crisis were able to derive substantial lessons-learned from the Great Depression. This is a
further motivation to limit the period under consideration to the years until 1935.
In addition, the historical German insurance market features company-specific case studies that share
similarities with the case of AIG. The first case, the market exit of the then-second largest insurance
group, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs AG (FAVAG), in August 1929 led to fundamental
legal that introduced mandatory external audits for joint-stock companies. A second case study is
the loss of independence of the then-oldest specialised reinsurance company, the Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, in
1932/1933. Whilst the former case is well established within the relevant literature, the latter is a novel
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contribution of this dissertation.
Consistent insurance regulatory regime Although the case of AIG is predominantly seen from
within the U.S. financial market, its business operations that ultimately led to its exposure to CDS
contracts were transacted by its UK subsidiary. An empirical analysis of the recent 2007/2008 financial
crisis hence requires a detailed analysis of individual insurance regulatory regimes and the potential
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. This is beyond the scope of identifying endogenous risk. To
focus on one single regulatory system is preferred in order to avoid introducing bias due to international
differences in accounting standards and regulatory regimes. This rules out the U.S. insurance market,
where insurance companies were subject to state supervision. The empirical examination of the U.S.
insurance market as a whole would therefore require a detailed assessment of the different state regulatory
systems during the Interwar period. The German insurance market in contrast features the necessary
centralised regulatory system that was codified by the 1901 Act on the Supervision of Insurance
Undertakings (German: “Gesetz u¨ber die Beaufsichtigung von privaten Versicherungsunternehmen,
(Short:) “Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz” (VAG)). This allows to rule out potential bias introduced by
unconsidered differences in regulation. Although some changes were made throughout the period under
consideration, the regulatory framework generally remained unchanged. This also allows to rule out
exogenous shocks from sudden changes in regulation as a potential source of bias.
Absence of exogenous shocks An important empirical requirement is that the observability of any
effect caused by endogenous risk. This requires the absence of bias introduced into the financial system
by exogenous shocks. In non-life insurance, such shocks can originate from insured low-probability
/ high-cost events such as natural or man-made catastrophes. Thomann (2013) analyses the impact
of the ten most expensive catastrophes in the period from 1988 to 2006 on the share prices of U.S.
non-life insurance companies. Six out of ten took place in the years 2004 and 2005 and thus in the
period during the financial boom period.9 The study applies time-series methodology and finds first
that catastrophes increased the expected distribution and the volatility of insurance stock returns. It
second shows that the correlation with the financial market decreases (increases) if the catastrophe
has no (an) effect on the overall economy. This confirms that the study of insurance share prices in
this period is systematically biased by low-probability / high-cost events. Table 3 provides a list of
mentionable hazards.
Although the 1923 “Great Kanto” earthquake10 and the 1926 “Great Miami” hurricane11 caused
9The covered catastrophes are Hurricane Hugo (1989), Hurricane Andrew (1992), the Northridge earthquake (1994),
the 9/11 terrorist attacks (2001), Hurricane Charley (2004), Hurricane Frances (2004), Hurricane Ivan (2004), Hurricane
Katrina (2005), Hurricane Rita (2005), Hurricane Wilma (2005). See Thomann (2013, Table 1).
10Yoneyama (2009) is a concise study of the effects the earthquake had on the Japanese insurance market.
11The 1926 Great Miami hurricane, which devastated large areas in Florida, is probably best known for causing the real
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Table 3: Natural and man-made disasters, 1906-1934
Year Name Location Characteristic
1906 Courrie´res France Mining accident
1906 San Francisco United States Earthquake / fire
1908 Messina Italy Earthquake
1912 Titanic Northern Atlantic Naval accident
1915 Bergen Norway Naval accident
1920 Kansu China Earthquake
1921 Spanish Flu Global Pandemic
1923 Great Kanto, Tokyo Japan Hurricane
1926 Great Miami, Florida United States Flood
1927 Mississippi United States Fire
1928 Alcazar Teatro, Madrid Spain Hailstorm
1929 Southern Germany Germany Mining accident
1930 Alsdorf Germany Fire
1931 Glaspalast, Munich Germany Fire
1933 Reichstag, Berlin Germany Fire
1933 Neunkirchen Germany Explosion
1934 Hakodate Japan Conflagration
Source: Koch (1995, p.45)
widespread destruction, there is no evidence that German (re-)insurance companies were liable for losses
incurred. No clear conclusion can be made for the 1919 Spanish flu pandemic, which happened during
a period of great political and economic instability in Germany.12 In order to take this uncertainty into
account, data were collected starting from the year 1924. The records of the largest German reinsurance
company, Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck, mention only two catastrophes: In the case of the 1931 Glaspalast Fire,
most damages were compensated by British reinsurance companies. Due to the 1934 Hakodate Fire,
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck paid Japanese Yen (JPY) 95,252 out of a total JPY 20 to 30 million in total losses
incurred.13 In addition to this evidence, the Gerling Gruppe reported a total cost of RM 3 million for
the 1933 Neunkirchen Explosion.14 These, however, are individual cases of limited scope.
Data availability Whilst market data is readily available for the recent financial crisis, access to
relevant company-internal information is limited due to legal considerations. This is not the case for
the source material from the Interwar period that is - if still existing - available from corporate archives.
For the particular case of Germany, accounting information as well as market data is available from
so far unrecognised source material that was collected from the historical archives of Allianz, AXA,
GenRe (formerly Cologne Re in Germany), Swiss Re (in Switzerland as well as formerly Bavarian Re
estate bubble in Florida, see Galbraith (1961). It ranks as the hurricane that caused the 10th largest insured property
losses, see Cummins (2007, p.180).
12This event had a particular impact on the leading Swiss reinsurance company, Schweizer Ru¨ck, leading to a deficit of
CHF 9.2 million in its life portfolio and an unreported loss of CHF 6.4 million for the business year 1921. This is the
second worst internal annual result of the company after the financial losses incurred during the Great Depression in
1931. See Guggenbu¨hl (1939, p.147), Borscheid et al. (2013, p.iv) as well as Ch.4.
13See Herzog (no year, p.195).
14This is based on information provided by Gerling on https:/www.hdi.de/docs/ueber uns/gerling chronik.pdf (last
accessed 27 June, 2014).
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in Germany), Munich Re as well as the German Insurance Association (German: “Gesamtverband
der deutschen Privatversicherung” (short: GDV)). Further sources were collected from Sal.Oppenheim,
Lloyd’s of London and Cre´dit Agricole but were found to be beyond the scope of the present dissertation.
Empirical data was collected for the years from 1924 to 1935, where available. Two sources are
used two establish four new and innovative datasets. The first source is the annually published
collection of insurance data “Neumanns Jahrbuch der Privatversicherung im Deutschen Reich”. This
is the predecessor of the current annual statistics compendium published by GDV.15 Amongst other
information, this source collected all annual reports and profit-and-loss statements published by German
insurance companies. It also provided sorted information on individual lines or sectors. Three datasets
are based on this source: Dataset I “Gold Account” contains information on 1924 gold account financial
statements, Dataset II “Company” company-specific accounting as well as profit-and-loss information
and Dataset III “Line” per-company line-specific accounting and profit-and-loss information. Given the
same unbalanced panel data structure, Datasets II and III are compatible.
The second source is the weekly published magazine “Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r das Versicherungswe-
sen” (from 1927 onwards: “Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r Versicherungswesen”) It provides collect stock
market information and the dates for annual general meetings. It was chosen due to its outstanding
reputation amongst contemporaries.16. Dataset IV “Share Price” contains data from this source together
with relevant benchmark data obtained from other sources that are specified where appropriate.
Structure, chapter-specific findings and contributions
This dissertation is organised in the form of a monograph that features self-contained chapters in the
form of research papers. Although every chapter in this dissertation offers additional insight into to
multidimensional aspects of endogenous risk, they also provide individual insights as stand-alone papers.
The structure of the dissertations follows the following line of argument:
Endogenous risk is the result of shocks that are generated and amplified within the system.
During the Interwar period in the German insurance sector (Ch.2), the probability of getting
discontinued prior to default (Ch.3) led companies to cater dividend payout and reinsurance
operations (Ch.5) in line with the business cycle (Ch.4) to an optimistic investor clientele
(Ch.6), yet in contrast to the underwriting cycle (Ch.7) .
The abstract summaries of the individual chapters are:
Chapter 2 introduces the historical development, organisation and regulation of the German insurance
market before and during the Interwar period. It additionally provides insights into the contemporary
15See Ko¨lmel (2000, p.20).
16See Koch (1995, p.47) and Koch (1998, p.118).
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exposures and challenges present in the German insurance market based on the case study of Ko¨lnische
Ru¨ck. It further supports the choice of this particular market to analyse the presence of endogenous risk
in insurance operations. The chapter contributes substantial insights into the relevance of accounting
principles for insurance companies, especially prior to the Great Depression period. This illustrates the
limitations of asset-side analyses during the Interwar period. Second, it establishes the 1924 currency
reform as an integral watershed for corporate business strategies during the Interwar period.
Chapter 3 examines the interdependence of insurance failures and the decision of shareholders to
discontinue from companies. This is analysed in the context of a case-control analysis that investigates
the reasons why German insurance companies exited the market during the period 1925 to 1935. An
American option model for credit risk modelling provides the theoretical foundation. This approach
utilises two probit regression models based on the novel hand-collected Dataset I “Gold Account”. The
chapter finds that the relatively modest number of insurance failures during the Great Depression
is subject to “endogenous survivorship bias”. In addition, a direct relationship between company
discontinuations and the franchise value of a company is identified. The major contribution of this
chapter is the theoretical derivation and empirical validation of this concept. Utilising an econometric
approach based on insights from signal detection theory, it discusses the assessment of model fit in the
case of varying dependent variables.
Chapter 4 discusses the dividend distribution decision of German insurance companies based on
Dataset II “Company”. During the Interwar period, insurance companies actively administered dividend
payout. It is hypothesised that the actual payout pattern depended on the state of the economy.
This caused a direct shift of risk from shareholders to policyholders as evidenced by a case study of
Schweizer Ru¨ck. The chapter defines a new model of a dividend payout strategy based on the so-called
dual risk model. The empirical analysis utilises the Lintner partial adjustment model on the basis of
the Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator. It finds that companies engaged in risk shifting during the late
1920s as companies increased their respective target dividend payout rates in line with the economic
conditions. The chapter contributes the development of an analytical process that allows to model
dividend smoothing in insurance operations. In addition, the use of the Lintner partial adjustment
model in the context of risk shifting.
Motivated by previous results of Abdul Kader et al. (2010), Chapter 5 addresses the ability of
an insurance company to shift risk from shareholders to policyholders by means of reinsurance. The
interdependence between reinsurance decision-making and shareholder value maximisation is established
theoretically within the extended risk exchange model due to Borch (1986). The chapter argues that the
German Interwar period provided optimal conditions for risk shifting in Germany due to the exemption
of reinsurance from supervision. The properties of the dependent variable motivate an empirical
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two-model approach: first, a discrete choice panel model is used to identify structural determinants
of the decision not to use reinsurance. Second, a mixed model is used to analyse differences in the
determinants of reinsurance demand between the Golden Twenties and the Great Depression period.
Data is taken from Datasets II “Company” and from Dataset III “Line”. The chapter contributes the
first multi-line analysis of historical insurance operations in a major market. Econometrically, it raises
awareness to the statistical properties of fractional dependent variable.
Chapter 6 tests whether insurance companies were catering to a specific optimistic investor clientele.
It utilises the first hand-collected dataset of German stock market prices during the Interwar period,
Dataset IV “Share Price”. The chapter discusses the observed differences in insurance share prices and
the Berlin stock exchange index during the Interwar period. It utilises event study methodology to
analyse whether investors were first using dividend announcements as signals and second generally
optimistic during the late-1920s period. Both hypotheses are confirmed by empirical estimates. The
chapter contributes the first empirical analysis of share price information in Germany during the
Interwar period. It also contains the first sector-specific and Germany-wide share price index of the
Interwar period.
Chapter 7 discusses the internal cost of capital of German non-life insurance companies during the
Interwar period. It is argued that internal costs depend on the insurance-technical performance, which
motivates to focus on the relationship of the underwriting with the business cycle as a cost-determining
factor. The chapter incorporates information from the novel hand-collected Datasets II “Company”
and III “Line” in order to test the results of the contemporary dissertation Kurtz (1937). The chapter
questions how German insurance companies were exposed to market risk during the “Golden Twenties”
as well as the Great Depression of the 1930s. It shows a clear correlation between individual insurance
lines and the state of the economy. In addition, it provides evidence that insurance key performance
indicators suggests a negative correlation between insurance profitability and the business cycle. The
chapter contributes a detailed discussion of potential bias in cost-of-capital estimates that do not
take into account the specific nature of insurance-technical operations. In addition, the first empirical
analysis of the correlation between the underwriting and the business cycle is provided for the period of
the Interwar period.
General contribution, limitations and future research
General contributions of the dissertation This dissertation is the first to provide a detailed
empirical analysis of insurance operations in Germany. From a qualitative perspective, it takes into
account the contemporary regulatory environment as well as prevailing accounting standards. The
scope of analysis is made possible by the collection of new quantitative datasets as well as new source
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material from corporate archives of German insurance companies. In addition, this dissertation is to the
knowledge of the author is the first empirical analysis of the Great Depression period in Germany that
is based on disaggregated sector-specific stock market data. The overarching topic, endogenous risk,
introduces new aspects to principal-agent theory. The present approach does for instance not directly
focus the classical principal-agent problem of limited liability. Instead, this dissertation addresses the
voting rights of shareholders as a potential cause for conflict.
Joint limitations of individual chapters This dissertation features two general limitations of
particular relevance. Any chapter-specific considerations are considered in the relevant context. The
first general limitation is due to the absence of contemporary benchmarks. This dissertation provides a
cross-sectional analysis within the German insurance market, but is limited in providing cross-sectoral
comparisons both for insurance as well as stock market analyses. With the notable exception of the
Swedish fire insurance sector provided by Abdul Kader et al. (2010), there is no comparable study of
other historical domestic insurance markets. When collecting empirical it was found that for example
annual data on international reinsurance markets provided by the British insurance newspaper “The
Review” featured substantial differences in accounting practice between countries. In order to avoid
potential bias introduced from structural differences in regulatory or accounting regimes, the analysis
was restricted to the German private insurance market.
Following on, the second limitation is that only German private non-life insurance companies were
considered. Also, international activities of German insurers were not directly addressed given that
this was not reported. Foreign companies were not considered in order to avoid potential bias from
differences in regulatory regimes.17 In addition, public-sector insurance companies were not included
given that these had been subject to a different contemporary regulatory framework. Lastly, life
insurance companies were not considered due to fundamental differences in the business model.
Future research This dissertation offers different motivations for future research. The concept of
endogenous risk opens up a range of follow-up research paths: it offers new trajectories in actuarial
ruin theory, motivates new detailed case studies such as i.e. AIG, suggests empirical research on a
sector / or macro-economic national or international level. It nevertheless also motivates more practical
considerations that directly follow from some of the findings in the following chapters. Ch.3 on the
one hand provides new insights into credit risk modelling by the conceptualisation of “endogenous
survivorship bias”. Ch.7 on the other hand motivates to discuss whether current models for insurance
cost of capital provide appropriate estimates.
17Compare Ch.4 where it is for example explained that Swiss insurance companies had to use mark-to-market valuation
for accounting purposes during the Great Depression period, whilst German and U.S. companies had been provided with
crisis-related specific approaches. A direct comparison would thus not be informative.
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In addition, the used sources provide additional information with relevance for further research in the
context of principal-agent theory. For example, data on executive and supervisory board compositions
are readlily available from “Neumanns Jahrbuch der Privatversicherung im Deutschen Reich”. This
allows to analyse potential effects of multi-board membership or management compensation in the
context of control and principal-agent theory. In addition, the analysis of changes in the ratio of
paid-to-unpaid capital suggests promising insights into the role of shareholder liabilities in the context
of insurance. The statistical information indicates that insurance companies used shareholder liability
as an alternative source for shareholder compensation. This is similar to the observation of Froehlicher
(2013, p.67) that the Swiss insurance company Zurich used capital dynamically in order to control a
maximum dividend payout rate. This offers a new perspective on the use of partially paid share capital
in general. Although highly relevant in the present context, both aspects were left for future research
due to the complexity of the associated empirical analyses.
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2 The German insurance market and Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck during
the Interwar period
2.1 Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck as case study for endogenous risk
At the end of the year 1932 and in the midst of the Great Depression, the then-oldest specialised
reinsurance company, Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, was facing imminent default. Only a take-over by the German
insurance interest group Rheinische Gruppe (English: Rhinian Group) ensured the survival of the
company. This is in particular a noteworthy case study as the Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck had been the second
largest German reinsurance company. The developments surrounding these events necessitate a closer
analysis and motivate a general discussion of the historical development of the German insurance
market during the Interwar period. Making direct inferences from historical case studies posits relevant
caveats. Turner (2014, pp.13-15) discusses three potential dangers
1. “to remove the poetry out of financial history”,
2. to “ignore or place less emphasis on the cultural, economic, legal, social, and political environment
in which financial institutions and markets have operated in the past”,
3. “applying modern finance theories to historical episodes can be anachronistic.”
The following chapter directly considers (2) by discussing the idiosyncratic characteristics of the period.
The first part provides a general discussion of the history of the Germany insurance sector. The second
part establishes the case study of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck based on yet unresearched primary source material.
Accompanying data is either taken from Dataset I “Gold Account”, Dataset II “Company”, from the
data appendix provided in Kluge (2006) or from primary sources as referenced. This is based on the
case study of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck..18 The chapter is structured into two main parts: first, the general
historiographical course of events is described, starting with a discussion of relevant historiographical
literature. This is followed by a description of the current knowledge of the general development of
the German insurance market during the Interwar period. The case study of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck forms
the second main part of this chapter: it begins with providing the events surrounding its loss of
independence in 1932/1933. Following on, the effects of missing external auditing requirements as well
as changes to accounting standards in the wake of the Great Depression are reflected. Finally, the case
study points out the long-run costs of promoting prestige in the 1924 currency reform as an important
structural cause of the company’s financial distress in late-1932.
18The following analysis expands on this more general preliminary introductory work Werner (2009) that placed
particular emphasis on the analysis of the company’s performance as a part of Rheinische Gruppe.
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The main contribution of this chapter to the existing historiography is the introduction of the case
study of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck. More generally, the importance of the 1924 currency reform is established in
a consistent. It is highly probable that other sectors were affected by the same circumstances. With
respect to the Great Depression it is shown that key performance indicators asset portfolios of insurance
companies were systematically biased. This arose from changes to accounting standards as a response
to the 1931 financial crisis.
2.2 The historical development of the German insurance sector during the
Interwar period
2.2.1 German insurance historiography
The historical development of the German insurance sector has found detailed consideration in a
large number of historical studies, Festschriften and other publications. Comprehensive reviews of
the abundant literature are provided by Wandel (1998) and more recently Wa¨ltermann (2008). The
main references for the historical development of the German insurance sector are the narrative
historiographies by Ludwig Arps, Arps (1965) for the period up to 1914, Arps (1976a) for the period
from 1914 to roughly the early 1920s and Arps (1976b) for roughly the early 1920s until the outbreak
of World War II. Additionally, Borscheid (2007) provides an analysis of the international expansion of
German insurance companies following the 1924 currency reform. More recent surveys are Borscheid
(2012), a collection of the accounts of global insurance history and Koch (2012), a book that collects
short summaries of relevant key events as well as relevant topics of German insurance history. A
detailed historical account of the German Insurance Association (German: “Reichsverband deutscher
Privatversicherung”) is provided by Ehlers (2009). The standard reference for the history of the German
insurance sector during the Nazi regime and World War II, 1933 to 1945, is Feldman (2001), a study of
Allianz Group during the Interwar period as well as World War II. In addition, selected historiographical
case studies of individual companies are provided in Table (4). A summary of the large number of
available but mostly placative Festschriften is available in Wandel (1998).
In the context of the present dissertation it is also necessary to incorporate contemporary secondary
literature that provides information regarding business conduct and practices. The associated large body
of literature is reviewed in detail by Koch (1976). The usability, however, depends on the availability of
the relevant literature. One internal and undated manuscript is of particular relevance in the present
context: Herzog (no year) is a collection and commentary of internal sources at Munich Re, which was
produced by former Allianz member of the board Martin Herzog until the end of the 1970s. Following
the production of this source the senior management decided to destroy a large amount of primary
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Table 4: Selected historical insurance case studies with relevance for the German market
Company Period Focus Reference
Allianz 1919 - 1945 Relationship with German Nazi
regime
Feldman (2001)
Allianz /
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck
1910 - 1929 Relationship between companies Kluge (2006)
Allianz 1910 - 2006 Co-operation with Bankhaus
Merck, Finck & Co. and
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck
Pohl (2011, p.47-52)
Agrippina, Colonia
Feuer
1817 - 2007 Historical formation of AXA
Germany
Pohl (2011, p.53-65)
Aachener Feuer 1824 - 2009 Historical formation of Generali
Germany
Pohl (2011, p.66-73)
Frankfurter
Allgemeine
(FAVAG)
1865 - 1929 Company profile Eggenka¨mper et al. (2004)
FAVAG 1924 - 1929 Bankruptcy scandal and
take-over by Allianz
Feldman (2002)
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck 1924 - 1935 Quantitative performance and
business strategy
Werner (2009)
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 1880 - 1997 U.S. business operations Ko¨lmel (2000, pp.227-268)
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 1924 - 1935 Quantitative performance and
business strategy
Werner (2009)
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 1880 - 2003 Co-operation with Bankhaus
Merck, Finck & Co. and Allianz
Pohl (2011, p.39-46)
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 1880 - 1980 General historiography Ba¨hr & Kopper (2015)
Mutzenbecher
Insurance Group
1870s - 1930s Historical development and
ultimate failure of insurance
group run by Hermann
Mutzenbecher
Schro¨der (2008)
Wiener Phoenix ca.1920s - 1937 Bankruptcy scandal and political
crisis in Austria
Feldman (2002)
Wiener Phoenix 1822 - 1937 Historiography of the
then-largest European life
insurer, defaulted in 1937 due to
fraud
Lembke (2016)
Note: Although Wiener Phoenix was a Austrian life insurance company, it featured substantial business
operations in Germany.
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source material under the assumption that the historical analysis was concluded.19
Six contemporary studies are of particular relevance in the present study: a concise introduction to the
general business circumstances is provided by the contemporary textbook Manes (1935). Contemporary
accounting principles and practices are discussed in Lengyel (1927), a detailed contemporary guidance to
insurance accounting written by the editor of the internationally renowned Austrian insurance yearbook
“Assekuranz-Jahrbuch”, Professor Samuel Lengyel20. A commentary on the German regulatory system
is given by Moldenhauer (1903). The special aspects of reinsurance regulation and operations are
provided in Hermannsdorfer (1931) respectively von Hollitscher (1931). Additionally the contemporary
doctoral dissertation Kurtz (1937) provides relevant insight by analysing the underwriting cycle of the
Interwar period using statistical arguments.
2.2.2 The general development of the German insurance market from 1919 to 1935
The following paragraph provides a concise overview of the historical developments affecting the German
insurance market during the Interwar period. References are made to more detailed historiographical
analyses where relevant. The general course of events is provided in Table (5).
The end of World War I and the 1924 currency reform The onset of World War I had a
lasting impact on the German insurance sector. German insurance companies in general and especially
the globally leading reinsurers were affected by the conflict as they were locked out of international
markets.21 At the end of 1923, the German economy was in general turmoil due to a quickly accelerating
devaluation of the domestic currency, the Papermark.22 This implied an artificially low cost of capital,
which triggered a wave of foundations of private joint-stock insurance companies. In the two years 1922
and 1923 alone, a total of 192 reinsurance companies were founded, only a fraction of which survived
the highly successful currency reform of 1924, which almost immediately ended the inflationary period
in Germany.23
Increased market pressure during the“Roaring Twenties” Following the 1924 currency reform
the German economy experienced a short spell of recovery colloquially referred to as the “Golden
Twenties”.24 The German insurance sector entered a period of intense competition and the development
of many new insurance products as described by Arps (1976b). Premium income and overall profitability
remained at an unprecedented low level.25 Persisting general market pressures promoted consolidation
19See Ba¨hr & Kopper (2015, p.11).
20See Koch (1998, p.235) as well asFroehlicher (2013, pp.25-27).
21Compare in particular Borscheid (2007), Borscheid (2012, p.106) Arps (1976b, pp.16;19;34) and for the case studies
Allianz and Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck Ko¨lmel (2000).
22A detailed account of this episode is provided in Feldman (1997) and Holtfrerich (1986).
23See Gilles (1987, p.99) and for a contemporary analysis Hermannsdorfer (1931).
24Ritschl (2002) provides a thorough analysis of the macro-economic development in Germany until 1934.
25Compare with Kurtz (1937).
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Table 5: Schematic chronological development of the German insurance market, 1901-1935
Year Event Relevance for insurance sector
1901 Insurance supervisory law Consistent regulatory framework,
applicable throughout period
under consideration.
1914 to 1918 World War I Lock-out from international
markets.
1919 to 1924 Inflationary period Devaluation of
Mark-denominated investments,
wave of speculative reinsurance
foundations
1924 1924 currency reform Introduction of new Reichsmark,
leads to immediate economic
stabilisation
1924 to 1928 Golden Twenties Market consolidation,
amalgamation.
1929 FAVAG collapse Collapse of second-largest
German insurance group leads to
mandatory external auditing
1931 German banking crisis Large-scale financial crisis -
exposure of insurance limited by
regulatory changes
1931 to 1933 World economic crisis Global economic downturn, also
known as “Great Depression” in
the United States
1933 to 1935 “Machtergreifung” National Socialist Party seizes
political power
1934-1939 Cartellisation Reorganisation of the German
insurance sector
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and amalgamation within the sector.26 The German supervisory office was actively promoting take-overs,
especially of companies that had been founded after 1919.27 Whether acquisitions were motivated by
rational considerations or by the sole intention to prevent competitors from acting first remains unclear.
The largest merger occurred in 1927 when the expanding Allianz took over the largest German accident
and liability insurer, Stuttgarter Verein.28
Prestigious company failures prior to the Great Depression period Even larger insurance
groups were affected by pressure arising from rampant competition. Kluge (2006) provides evidence for
distress in the prominent case of the Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck and Allianz und Stuttgarter Verein. This study
shows in particular that the largest German reinsurer was effectively cross-subsidising losses in other
business arrangements by the highly profitable strategic reinsurance treaty it had with Allianz. The
default of the second largest group, FAVAG, in 1929 predated the similar but uncorrelated later failures
of prominent German corporations and banks during the financial crisis of 1931. This failure was mostly
attributed to management mistakes and fraud29, which in turn also caused the German legislation to
introduce the requirement of external audits for joint-stock companies in 1932.30 Although constituting
the largest and most prominent, the case of FAVAG was not the only failure of an insurance company
prior to the Great Depression. Vaterla¨ndische und Rhenania had provided credit insurance via its
subsidiary Vaterla¨ndische Kredit and was acquired by Nordstern Allgemeine in 1929 at the brink of
insolvency and after a pronounced decrease in premium volume. The banking crisis of 1931 led to
further record losses, which caused Rheinische Gruppe - a group of insurance companies led by the
Nordstern Allgemeine, Aachen-Mu¨nchener and Colonia Feuer - to fully take over the share capital
of Vaterla¨ndische und Rhenania.31 Another insurance group of particular size, Mutzenbecher Gruppe,
which had mostly been active in marine and transport insurance, succumbed to financial distress in 1932.
The group holding company Versicherungs-Gesellschaft Hamburg was liquidated in this year and the
second-largest company, Albingia, sold to the British insurer Guardian Assurance.32 The founder and
General Director until 1932, Franz Mutzenbecher, did nevertheless not refer to the Great Depression
as the main reason for the default but to mistakes made during the 1920s by his brother in marine
insurance operations.33 The oldest reinsurance company, Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, also lost its independence to
Rheinische Gruppe in 1932, under circumstances that suggest closer analysis.
26Case studies are provided in Arps (1976b, pp.51-54), Wa¨ltermann (2008), Pohl (2011) and Koch (2012).
27See Ruge (2001, p.35).
28See Borscheid (2012, p.107).
29This most prominent case study is examined in detail by Feldman (2002) and Modert (2004).
30Compare Alsheimer (1988).
31Compare Striezel (1976).
32See Koch (1995, p.279).
33See Mutzenbecher (1941).
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The Great Depression period and beyond Although the German economy had entered into
recession in 1928, it was not until a major banking crisis in summer 1931 that the Great Depression
started in Germany.34 As a response to the financial crisis the government issued a number of emergency
decrees. German insurance companies were especially affected by the Fourth emergency decree of 8
December 1931 ((German original, translated by the author:) “Vierte Notverordnung vom 8. Dezember
1931”), which reduced the nominal interest rate on all outstanding governmental debt from 8% to
6%. It also extended the protection against enforcement of payments and increased the maturity of
mortgages. Especially the latter led to sharp criticism from the insurance sector.35
Further crisis legislation also affected the insurance sector in a positive way. The Decree about
the Simplification of Accounting Standards of 15 December 1931 ((German original, translated by
the author:) “Bilanzierungserleichterungs-Verordnung vom 15. Dezember 1931”) changed the general
accounting principles.36 It enabled insurance companies to value strategic assets by the purchasing price
and not by the market value. All long-term investments in the asset portfolios of insurers were hence
not affected by the substantial drop in market prices. Companies in countries where mark-to-market
valuation remained in use, such as Switzerland, faced a much larger exposure to the financial turmoil of
the Great Depression period.
There is no consensus regarding the question as to how the Great Depression affected insurance
companies. Arps (1976b, pp.60-62) as well as Borscheid (2012, p.51) argue that the onset of the Great
Depression especially led internationally operating companies to lose market shares. With respect to
the actual performance, Gerathewohl (1982, p.748), however, postulates that insurance companies
were in general performing exceptionally well in Germany. This is backed by the finding of Kurtz
(1937) that the general underwriting performance was not correlated with the business cycle during the
1930s. This is contrary to the opinion expressed by Ba¨hr & Kopper (2015, p.140), who state that the
Great Depression period was marked by an increase in the number of insurance defaults. This lack of
consensus indicates that further research is required.37
When the Nazi Party seized political power in 1933, the German insurance sector became gradually
integrated into a new German economic order. The most relevant case study of insurance operations
during the Nazi regime is provided by Feldman (2001) for Allianz. The market leader took over the
implicit patronage for the whole sector. The German insurance market was ultimately reorganised from
34The 1931 financial crisis and the Great Depression in Germany have found considerable research attention. A selection
of important general treatises not covering insurance are James (1987), Eichengreen (1996) and Ritschl (2002).
35The General Director of Gotha Versicherung, Hans Ullrich, outlined and commented on the recent developments at
the 2nd annual general meeting of the German Insurance Association on 15 December 1931. Compare Ullrich (1931).
36The decree temporarily repealed §56 of the German Insurance Supervisory Law (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz) that
dealt with the valuation of assets. It was overridden by §261 of the German Code of Commerce (Handelsgesetzbuch) that
itself had been changed on 19 September 1931.
37Compare Ch. 3 and Ch.7.
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1935 onwards, along the paradigms set out by the new regime.38
2.3 Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck during the Interwar period
2.3.1 The loss of independence of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck in 1932/1933
The oldest active reinsurer, Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, lost its independence at the turn of the years 1932 and
1933. The first indicator for potential financial distress at Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck nevertheless dated back to
summer 1931, when a shareholder revision of the company’s books was conducted.39 The 1931 financial
report had disclosed a reduction of RM 500,000 in free reserves together with a decreased dividend rate
of 6% relative to 14% in the previous year. This caused suspicion amongst shareholders40 and motivated
the review. The results were in particular critical of how the company had accounted for the share
buy-back activities that had been exercised by the company in the previous year. Due to their nature
as partly paid-in name shares, the revisors argued that the buy-backs should have been accompanied
with reductions in shareholder liabilities. Furthermore, it was noted that the financial statement of
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck did not comply with the accounting rules detailed in the Decree about the Simplification
of Accounting Standards. These issues were forwarded to the directors and the Supervisory Board of
the Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck on 22 August 1931. The Directors Gru¨nwald and Bloch were able to dispel any
criticism41, although it would be found out in the later course of events that the concerns addressed by
the shareholders were of detrimental relevance.
In summer 1932 the supervisory board of the company became aware of the reduced credit worthiness
of one of the main shareholders of the company, the investment trust Iduna-Holding. It held partly
paid-in shares of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck in the nominal value of RM 1.128 million with a pay-in rate of
25%. This amounted to 11% of all shares issued 42 as shown in Figure (1), or to callable shareholder
liabilities of RM 846,000. The business model of the trust, however, was to raise capital in order
to invest in other companies. Its dividend payout therefore was a direct derivative of the returns
generated from underlying stocks. Following the financial crisis of 1931, Iduna-Holding had to reduce
its capital stock from RM 23 million to RM 2 million.43 These circumstances put the company’s
38See Feldman (2001, p.196).
39See Historical Archive of General Re Germany. Rechungswesen Bilanzierungsunterlagen 1930 II.4 No.5040/1, File
note regarding the commission of the shareholder revision of 22 June 1931, no page.
40“The concerns, which had already been expressed amongst business insiders against the business strategy of Ko¨lnische
Ru¨ck for years, increased following the publication of the statement of account disclosing the reduction of free reserves by
RM 500,000 and recommended a dividend of only 6% relative to 14% in the previous year.” [German original, translation
by the author:] “Die Bedenken, welche in Fachkreisen schon seit Jahren gegen die Gescha¨ftspolitik der Ko¨lnischen Ru¨ck
laut wurden, versta¨rkten sich nach Herausgabe des Rechnungsabschlusses, der eine Minderung der offenen Reserven um
500.000 RM auswies und eine Dividende von nur 6 v.H. gegenu¨ber 14 v.H. im Vorjahre vorschlug.” See Historical Archive
AXA Germany. Internal Memoirs Christian Oertel, p.159.
41See Historical Archive of General Re Germany. Letter Gru¨nwald to Hans C. Leiden of 24 June 1931. Subject:
remarks of the Misters der of the shareholder revision commission, no page. See also Werner (2009, pp.56-57).
42Including the shareholding of the affiliated non-life insurance company Iduna-Germania Sachversicherung.
43See Historical Archive of General Re Germany. Protokollbuch Ko¨lnische Ru¨ckversicherungs-Gesellschaft vom
05.03.1926 bis 07.12.1933, No. 5005/1. File note regarding Supervisory Board Meeting on 30 June 1932, p.167 (attached).
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Figure 1: Shareholder composition Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, 1932
Note: Composition as of 29 November 1932.
Source: Historical Archive of General Re Germany. Einlage Protokollbuch Ko¨lnische
Ru¨ckversicherungs-Gesellschaft, Notes regarding the meeting of the President of the German Insurance
Supervisory Office with General Director Oertel of Colonia on 29 December 1932 , p.3
ability to meet its liabilities in the case of a call of capital by Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck into serious question
and led the supervisory board of the company to conduct another special internal revision into the
financial situation.44 This report concluded that the company was effectively illiquid as well as insolvent.
Its available cash deposits of RM 300,000 - some of which were held abroad - did not match RM
970,000 in short-term bank liabilities. Additional debts of RM 5,328,993.68 were also getting due in
the medium run, effectively causing the company to be insolvent.45 It especially revealed a number of
highly unprofitable reinsurance arrangements in domestic casualty and liability but especially in French
motor reinsurance contracts. 46 Director Robert Pferdmenges of Sal.Oppenheim - house bank as well
as important stakeholder - immediately informed the executives of the insurance group Rheinische
Gruppe47 about the situation. 48 This group decided to avert the default of the company due to two
reasons: first, Colonia Feuer was exposed to the default of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck given that it was invested
in 12% of the reinsurer’s capital as evidenced by Figure (1). Second, it was assumed that an important
direct competitor, Schweizer Ru¨ck, was interested in increasing its market share in the German direct
44See Historical Archive of General Re Germany, Protokollbuch Ko¨lnische Ru¨ckversicherungs-Gesellschaft. Record of
the Supervisory Board meeting of 30 June 1932, no page.
45See Historical Archive AXA Germany. Ko¨ln. Ru¨ck Akte National. Report regarding the revision of Ko¨lnische
Ru¨ck, no page.
46See Historical Archive of General Re Germany. Einlage Protokollbuch Aufsichtsratssitzungen der Ko¨lnischen Ru¨ck.
Nr. 5005/4. Notes regarding the meeting of the President of the German Insurance Supervisory Office with General
Director Oertel of Colonia on 29 December 1932, p.3.
47The most important companies within this very heterogeneous insurance interest group were the composite insurance
companies Colonia in Cologne, National in Stettin and Aachener und Mu¨nchener in Aachen.
48See Historical Archive of General Re Germany. Notes regarding the meeting of the President of the German
Insurance Supervisory Office with General Director Oertel of Colonia on 29 December 1932, Einlage Protokollbuch
Aufsichtsratssitzungen der Ko¨lnischen Ru¨ck. Nr. 5005/4, p.2.
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life insurance sector. The senior management at Rheinische Gruppe therefore expected the Swiss
competitor to take over the life insurance company Concordia Leben in the subsequent liquidation of
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck.49 Representatives of Rheinische Gruppe met with the Insurance Supervisory Office on
30 November 1932 and successfully obtained the approval for the recapitalisation.50 Four days later a
financial action plan was finalised, the Directors of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck notified and put on leave on the
very same day. Walther Schmitt of Aachen-Mu¨nchener, one of the revisors in 1932, became the new
interim Director of the company.51 The recapitalisation plan was presented to the shareholders at an
extraordinary general meeting on 29 December, 1932. A total of RM 5,070,000 was used for necessary
adjustments to the asset portfolio as well as to set up new free reserves of RM 505,085. The new
nominal capital of RM 8 million with a pay-in rate of 25% was fully provided by Rheinische Gruppe.
This restructuring plan thus meant that current shareholders would trade the nominal value of their
investment against the ability to walk away from their existing shareholder liabilities. Faced with this
choice, shareholders accepted the proposed restructuring plan. This caused the company to become a
dependent subsidiary of Rheinische Gruppe.
2.3.2 The realisation of financial distress at Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
The restructuring plan of December 1932 required asset value adjustments for outstanding depreciation
on real estate investments (RM 250,809.12) as well as write-downs on open claims (RM 1,303,216.17)
respectively for other assets (RM 669,127.38).52 The following sub-paragraph takes into consideration
the write-downs conducted in the course of the restructuring in December 1932. It is shown that
financial distress had not been due to immediate effects of the Great Depression. First, the relevance of
the FAVAG default on changes in accounting standards is established. Second, changes to accounting
principles in response to the 1931 Financial Crisis are introduced and discussed. Fourth, the dependence
of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck on shareholder liabilities is shown to have originated from the new requirement for
external auditing as well as correctly applying new accounting principles.
The case of FAVAG and the absence of external auditing in Germany until 1932 This
build-up of hidden liabilities at Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck had been promoted by the absence of external auditing
and unanticipated changes to accounting standards. Regarding the former, external auditing for German
49Ibid.
50Following the circular of 10 March 1927 by the Supervisory Office, every purchase of more than 10% of share capital
in an insurance company had to be approved first. See Lengyel (1927, p.44). During this period the Supervisory Office
nevertheless actively promoted take-overs. See Ruge (2001, p.35).
51See Historical Archive of General Re Germany. Protokollbuch Ko¨lnische Ru¨ckversicherungs-Gesellschaft vom
05.03.1926 bis 07.12.1933, No. 5005/1, Protocol of the board meeting of 3 December 1932 and Protocol of a meeting
between the Chairmen of the Board of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck with the Directors of the company on Saturday, 3 December 1932,
no page.
52Additional revaluation requirements originated from impaired mortgages of RM 27,040.75 and from restructuring
costs of RM 95,067.10. See Historical Archive of General Re Germany. No.5283/9. Preliminary report of profit and loss
account Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck as of 29 December 1932, p.5.
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joint-stock companies had been under discussion since the 1924 currency reform. The introduction of a
new stable currency in 1924 had led to an increase in the cost of equity. The U.S. financial market with
its strict requirement for external auditing was perceived as a potential additional source of capital. One
of the discussed measures to increase the appeal of German insurance companies was the introduction
of similar external auditing.53 A commission was formed in order to assess the necessity and potential
realisation of a reform. It nonetheless decided against such a reform, arguing first that the careful
auditing of a larger German corporation would require an excessive amount of additional work and
associated costs. Second, the number of trained auditors was assumed to be insufficient to meet the
demand generated by introducing compulsory auditing requirements.54
The default of FAVAG in 1929 finally led to a shift in paradigms. Following the death of the
company’s long-term General Director Paul Dumcke, the new management conducted an internal
revision of the financial position. Information was leaked to newspapers that the company had
systematically published incorrect balance sheet information by hiding debt from insurance-unrelated
risky business operations, which finally caused the take-over by Allianz.55 As a consequence, three
senior executives and members of the management board were put on trial and convicted to long prison
sentences in February 1932.56 Additionally, German insurance companies were made subject to external
auditing by Art. 55 VAG as augmented by the Law to change the law regarding private insurance
companies of 3o March 1931 ((German original, translated by the author:) “Gesetz zur A¨nderung des
Gesetzes u¨ber die privaten Versicherungsunternehmen vom 30. Ma¨rz 1931”.57 Insurance companies
that had been exempt from supervision were now made subject to the accounting standards required
by the VAG, together with the necessity for external auditing and the adherence to the accounting
rules detailed in the Decree regarding the supervision of domestic private reinsurance companies of 2
December 1931 ((German original, translated by the author:): “Verordnung u¨ber die Beaufsichtigung
der inla¨ndischen privaten Ru¨ckversicherungsunternehmen vom 2. Dezember 1931”).58 External auditing
finally became mandatory on 19 September 1931 with the passing of the Decree of the President
regarding stock corporation law, banking supervision and a tax amnesty of 19 September 1931 ((German
original, translated by the author: “Verordnung des Reichspra¨sidenten u¨ber Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht
und eine Steueramnestie vom 19. September 1931”). This suggests that, even if the supervisory board
had not conducted a special internal revision given the reduced quality of shareholder liabilities, the
shortfall in asset valuation would nevertheless have become obvious at latest during the new mandatory
53These discussions took place in 1924 at the 33rd Annual Meeting of Lawyers ((German original, translated by the
author: “33. Deutscher Juristentag”). See Alsheimer (1988, p.16).
54See Alsheimer (1988, p.18).
55See for a general account Modert (2004).
56See Feldman (2002, p.62) and Modert (2004, p.33).
57See Alsheimer (1988, p.23).
58See Modert (2004, p.35).
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external revision of the company in 1933 for 1932 accounts. From this perspective, the timing of events
was therefore indirectly dependent on the earlier default of FAVAG, but independent from the 1931
Financial Crisis.
Accounting requirements for insurance companies before and during the Great Depression
The banking crisis of summer 1931 led the legislator to change accounting rules for the asset portfolios
of insurance companies. This practice was intended to limit the debt deflation pressure of falling market
prices on insurers as typical hold-to-maturity investors. It had found its first successful application in
the United States during the 1907 Financial Crisis and was again used in 1914 as well as during the
economic recession from 1918 until 192159. U.S. state insurance supervisory offices, co-ordinated by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), again temporarily applied accounting
changes in 1931. U.S. insurance companies were, for instance, allowed to use a stock market index of
103.2 points instead of actual 57.7 points and a bond price index of 95.1 points instead of an actual
72.5 points on 31 December 1931. This measure proved to be highly successful.60
Until 1923 all German private joint-stock companies active in commerce and industry were subject
to the accounting requirements detailed in §40 and §261 of the German Code of Commerce ((German:)
“Handelsgesetzbuch” (HGB)).61 The purchasing price was defined as the minimum and the market
price as the maximum accounting value. This implied that insurance companies could report profits
if market prices were high, but could limit losses if otherwise given that the value was bounded by
the purchasing price. This approach caused artificially inflated exchange prices especially during the
German hyperinflation period until 1923. Consequently, an amendment to VAG Art. 55(a) of 16 July
1923 required insurance companies to use the average market price of the last six calendar months of
the business year, excluding the highest and lowest quotation. The use of the last quoted market or
purchasing price was permitted only if this resulted in a lower valuation compared to the standard
method.62 This change exposed companies to fluctuations in their mark-to-market valuation and
59See Magrath (1934, p.281).
60See Magrath (1934, pp.289-290).
61Art. 40 HGB: “When establishing the inventory and the balance, all assets and debts are to be set to the value at the
point in time for which this accounting takes place.” (German orginal, translated by the author:) “Bei Aufstellung des
Inventars und der Bilanz sind sa¨mtliche Vermo¨gensgegensta¨nde und Schulden nach dem Wert anzusetzen, der ihnen in
dem Zeitpunkt beizulegen ist, fu¨r welchen die Aufstellung stattfindet.” See Lengyel (1927, p.116).
Art. 261 HGB: “Financial assets and other investment products that feature an exchange or transaction value are
to be accounted using the exchange or selling price realised at the point in time for which the balance applies. The
accounting is to take place in two separated balance positions. The first balance position (“purchasing values”) is to report
the amount of purchasing or production prices of financial assets and other investment products. The second balance
position (“excess values”) is to report the excess amount of the exchange or selling price at the point in time relevant for
the production of the accounts exceeding the purchasing and production price of financial assets and other investment
products.” (German orginal, translated by the author:) “Wertpapiere und sonstige Vermo¨gensanlagen, die einen Bo¨rsen-
und Verkehrswert haben, sind zu dem Bo¨rsen- und Verkaufspreise des Zeitpunktes, fu¨r den die Aufstellung der Bilanz
erfolgt, in die Bilanz einzustellen. Die Einstellung in die Bilanz hat in zwei getrennten Bilanzposten zu erfolgen. Der
eine Bilanzposten (Beschaffungswerte) hat den Betrag der Anschaffungs- und Herstellungspreise der Wertpapiere und
sonstigen Vermo¨gensanlagen und der zweite Bilanzposten (U¨berwerte) denjenigen Betrag auszuweisen, um den der Bo¨rsen-
oder Verkaufspreis des Zeitpunktes fu¨r den die Aufstellung der Bilanz erfolgt, den Anschaffungs- und Herstellungspreis
der Wertpapiere und sonstigen Vermo¨gensanlagen u¨bersteigt.” See Lengyel (1927, p.86).
62§ 55(a) VAG: “Securities featuring an exchange or market price may not be valued within the statement of accounts
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Table 6: Asset portfolio valued as strategic, 1932
Valuation of asset
portfolio as
strategic
Companies Full Partially Not
Life 53 30 14 9
Non-Life incl.
reinsurance
34 7 8 19
Note: The survey was anonymous and not representative.
Source: Ullrich (1931, pp.16-18)
to the 1931 banking crisis in Germany. The supervisory office limited contagion via this accounting
transmission channel by the Decree about the Easing of Accounting Standards of 15 December 1931
((German original, translated by the author:) “Bilanzierungserleichterungs-Verordnung”). It temporarily
reinstated the requirements of the original HGB §261 for strategic investments and thus reduced the
pressure of decreasing market values on the balance sheets.63 The condition that assets had to be
“strategic” was, however, not clarified. This caused considerable confusion amongst insurers. Based on
a small survey, 30 out of 53 life insurance companies declared the whole asset portfolio as strategic due
to the nature of life insurance as buy-and-hold investment in illiquid assets. Given the increased need
for liquid funds, only seven out of 34 non-life insurers declared the complete asset portfolio as strategic.
Table (6) provides the results of a short internal survey presented to the 1931 general assembly of
the German Private Insurance Association (German: “Reichsverband der Privatversicherung”) and
illustrates the general confusion amongst companies.64 Ullrich (1931, p.22) further recommended that
it should be avoided to rest the calculation of annual balances on inappropriate politics
on prestige, but rather to ensure the intrinsic strength of the corporation by means of
substantial write-offs, strong reserves and a careful dividend policy.65
This uncertainty regarding appropriate accounting requirements together with the absence of external
revisions therefore provided companies with unintended opportunities to hide losses.
using a higher price than the exchange or market prices of the point in time for which the balance applies. If the price
exceeds the average price derived from the first exchange quotations of the last six calendar months of the business
year, only the average price may be used as a maximum, or the purchasing price if it does not exceed the exchange or
market price. The highest as well as the lowest price are not to be taken into account when calculating the average
price.” (German original, translated by the author:) “Wertpapiere, welche einen Bo¨rsen- oder Marktpreis haben, du¨rfen
in dem Rechnungsabschluß in keinem Falle zu einem ho¨heren Preis eingesetzt werden, als dem Bo¨rsen- oder Marktpreise
des Zeitpunktes, fu¨r welchen die Bilanz aufgestellt war. U¨bersteigt dieser Preis den Durchschnittspreis, welcher sich
aus den ersten Bo¨rsenpreisen der letzten sechs Kalendermonate des Gescha¨ftsjahres ergibt, so darf ho¨chstens dieser
Durchschnittspreis eingesetzt werden, oder der Anschaffungspreis, insoweit dieser den Bo¨rsen- oder Marktpreis nicht
u¨bersteigt. Bei der Berechnung des Durchschnittspreises ist der ho¨chste und der niedrigste Preis unberu¨cksichtigt zu
lassen.” See Lengyel (1927, p.33).
63See in general Ullrich (1931, p.13).
64See Ullrich (1931, pp.16-18).
65(German original, translated by the author:) “Des weiteren mo¨chte ich dringend dazu raten, bei der Aufstellung der
Jahresbilanzen keine unangebrachte Prestigepolitik zu treiben, sondern durch kra¨ftige Abschreibungen, starke Ru¨cklagen
und eine vorsichtige Dividendenpolitik fu¨r die innere Sta¨rkung der Gesellschaften zu sorgen.” See Ullrich (1931, p.22).
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Table 7: Reported and market value asset portfolio Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, 1924 to 1935
Year Market value Reported value Difference
1924 4,053,368.14
1925 4,252,253.48
1926 4,479,403.52
1927 5,363,492.48 5,043,562.20 + 319,930.28
1928 14,090,714.27 13,439,921.71 + 650,792.56
1929 9,314,743.68 8,790,186.36 + 524,557.32
1930 11,216,370.60 10,602,351.84 + 614,018.76
1931 10,514,259,91 12,733,914.39 - 2,219,654.48
Note: All values in Reichsmark.
Source: Dataset II “Companies”, Historical Archive AXA Germany. Ko¨ln. Ru¨ck Akte National, Germany
Report regarding the revision of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
Increased dependence on shareholder liabilities - the approach of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck to asset
valuation Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck was amongst the seven non-life companies that valued its whole asset
portfolio as strategic. This caused the demand for write-downs of approximately RM 2 million in 1932
and also wiped out the hidden reserves of the company. Much in contrast to Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck, the
company had not made use of the 1924 currency reform to build up hidden reserves. 66Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
built up relevant hidden reserves throughout the late 1920s in its securities portfolio. Reported and
market values for the year 1924 to 1935 are provided in Table (7). This indicates that the company
had maintained a relatively constant amount of at least RM 500,000 as hidden reserve from 1928 until
1930. This was nevertheless lost due to the decrease in market values of non-strategic assets, which
ultimately increased the dependence of the company on shareholder liabilities as a source-of-last-resort
for liquid funds.
2.3.3 Reasons for structural distress - the role of prestige
The default of the second largest German insurance group, Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs AG
(FAVAG) in August 1929 marked a decisive development in the German insurance sector. Contemporary
commentators as well as later researchers stressed the relevance of a business strategy that rested upon
the promotion of prestige. The following line of argument shows that the failure of FAVAG shares
similarities with the motivations for the business decisions that ultimately led to Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck losing
its independence in 1932. This established in particular the relevance of the 1924 currency reform on
which later business strategies depended upon.
66In 1920, the largest German reinsurance company had invested 6 million Goldmark, followed with an additional 25
million Goldmark in 1921. In 1924 it owned a total of 48 residential and commercial property units in Munich alone.
When faced with the question of how to value this, it was decided to account investments at only 60 per cent of the total
value of commercial and 25 per cent of residential real estate in the 1924 gold account statement. See Herzog (no year,
pp.812-813).
35
“Putting prestige first” at FAVAG The earlier failure of FAVAG was related to a business strategy
that was “putting prestige first”.67 From 16 August until 19 August 1929, a series of newspaper articles
had made public the dire financial situation of the group. These articles made well-informed accusations
of reporting fraud and mismanagement. Kurt Schmitt, General Director of Allianz, and Wilhelm
Kisskalt of Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck agreed to take over the complete direct underwriting portfolio of FAVAG on
20 August 1929 and founded Neue Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG on 21 August 1929. This
averted a substantial crisis within the German insurance sector.68 The main reason for the company’s
distress was found in the fact that FAVAG had been heavily engaged in business outside of its core
competence:
FAVAG had collapsed because of a speculative mix of bad decisions in the field of indirect
insurance, banking, activities inappropriate for an insurance company, an inorganic concern
structure, and conflation of the concern’s interests with the personal enterprises of the
directors. In the process FAVAG had accumulated very high debts - including short-term
debts in Switzerland, England, and the Netherlands - for the financing of long-term projects.
German supervisory institutions, both governmental and private, had obviously failed to do
their job.69
An expert commission investigated the causes of the collapse and concluded that one motivation for the
company to engage in non-core business activities originated from an undercapitalisation that could be
traced back to the 1924 currency conversion. Director Kurt Schmitt of Allianz explicitly mentioned the
relevance of the 1924 gold conversion in the collapse of the company:
The excessively high demands on the capital resources of the company necessarily arose
from the exaggerated conversion to gold of Frankfurter Allgemeine. The decision to enter
into dangerous financial engagements also arose from the effort to master these difficulties,
which in the last analysis led to the collapse of the Frankfurter.70
In conclusion, contemporary commentators traced the later financial distress back to the interest of the
senior management to “put prestige first.71
67Feldman (2002) and Modert (2004) examine the course of events in detail, whereas Gerathewohl (1982, p.746 Fn.444)
and Koch (2012, p.273) are exemplary for how the case of the FAVAG is generally perceived as a historically singular
event in the literature.
68Ba¨hr & Kopper (2015, pp.37-38) argues that the take-over by Allianz illustrated the relative strength of the German
insurance sector given that event the default of the second largest group had not necessitated the intervention by the
regulator.
69See Feldman (2001, p.22).
70See Feldman (2001, p.22).
71“There was only one gold currency reform. Later the very same process was called recapitalisation. Those who
forewent in 1924 to “put prestige first”, those who chose reason as the first option proven right in subsequent years. Favag
did not choose this path. Many went with it. This is the reason for us to conclude that the gold account balance should
have featured five million Reichsmark less than what actually was reported.” (German original, translated by the author:)
“Eine Goldumstellung gab es nur einmal. Weiterhin hieß der gleiche Vorgang Sanierung. Wer 1924 darauf verzichtete das
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“Putting prestige first” at Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck This link between the 1924 currency conversion,
questionable business practices and later financial distress was also attributed to Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck.
Contemporary commentators blamed the financial distress of the oldest reinsurance company on the
business strategy of the executive management. Both Director Wilhelm Kisskalt of Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck72
and Director Christian Oertel of National Versicherungs AG73 stressed the personal responsibility of
the Directors. In addition, Wilhelm Kisskalt was generally critical of the internal financial conditions
of reinsurance companies. He rested his opinion on the take-over of Du¨sseldorfer Ru¨ck in 1929 as
a subsidiary of FAVAG by Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck in concert with Allianz.74 Christian Oertel described
especially Gruenwald as not well regarded amongst colleagues. He especially pointed out the role of
prestige in the decision surrounding the currency conversion in 1924 that turned out to be a defining
moment for the structural problems of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck :
If Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck continued to lose out on its German business throughout the previous
years and was about to lose its reputed position, then this was in first place due to the
personality of Mr Gruenwald, who was not well regarded amongst the German colleagues
due to his exalted behaviour and who engaged into the mistake of a fateful prestige policy.
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck for instance believed that it had to disclose its share capital as high as
possible in the gold conversion (1:1), even if the necessary intrinsic values were not present
due to loss of business during the inflationary period and the losses incurred during the
war years. It was hoped that a rapid business recovery would set in that would allow to
align balance values with actual actual time values. Instead, business disappointments
materialised. Some connections and interests abroad as well at home turned out to be
unsatisfying and very expensive. In any case, the gap caused by the gold conversion could
not be filled.75
This motivates to analyse the direct effect of the 1924 currency conversion on the business operations
of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck during the Golden Twenties period.
’Prestige voranzustellen’, wer dem Verstand die Vorhand gab, dem gab die spa¨tere Zeit recht. Die Favag wa¨hlte diesen
Weg nicht. Mit ihr gingen viele. Deswegen wollen wir uns mit der Feststellung begnu¨gen, dass die Goldbilanz ein um
etwa 5 Millionen GM [Goldmark] niedrigeres Kapital ausweisen musste.” See Modert (2004, p.32).
72See Ba¨hr & Kopper (2015, p.142).
73See Historical Archive AXA Germany. Internal Memoirs Christian Oertel, pp.156-190.
74Compare Herzog (no year, p.793).
75(German original, translated by the author:) “Wenn die Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck vor allem im deutschen Gescha¨ft in den
letzten Jahren mehr und mehr ins Hintertreffen kam und im Begriff stand, ihre angesehene Position zu verlieren, so war
das in erster Linie der Perso¨nlicheit von Herrn Gruenwald zuzuschreiben, der sich infolge seines gezierten Benehmens im
Kreise der deutschen Kollegen allgemeiner Unbeliebtheit erfreute und in den Fehler einer verha¨ngnisvollen Prestigepolitik
verfiel. So glaubte die Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, bei der Goldumstellung (1:1) ein mo¨glichst hohes Aktienkapital ausweisen zu
mu¨ssen, auch wenn dafu¨r nach dem Gescha¨ftsschwund der Inflationszeit und den Gescha¨ftsverlusten der Kriegsjahre
die entsprechenden materiellen Innenwerte nicht vorhanden waren. Man hoffte, daß rasch eine Wiederanreicherung der
Gescha¨fte eintreten werde, womit dann die Bilanzbewertungen mit den tatsa¨chlichen Zeitwerten in U¨bereinstimmung
gebracht werden ko¨nnten. Statt dessen kamen gescha¨ftliche Entta¨uschungen. Manche Verbindungen und Interessen im
Ausland wie im Inland erwiesen sich als unbefriedigend und sehr kostspielig. Jedenfalls konnte der bei der Goldumstellung
entstandene Hohlraum nicht ausgefu¨llt werden[.]” See Historical Archive AXA Germany. Internal Memoirs Christian
Oertel, p.158.
37
Accounting the value of pre-1924 assets and capital following the 1924 currency reform
In line with the 1924 currency reform the Decree regarding the gold accounts of 28 December 1923
((German original, translated by the author:) “Verordnung u¨ber die Goldbilanzen vom 28. Dezember
1923”required German companies to set up a specific balance of accounts denominated in Goldmark – the
Goldmark opening balance ((German original, translated by the author:) “Goldmarkero¨ffnungsbilanz”).
The main problem was that the market value of assets held by German corporations was uncertain after
four years of war and another four years of political instability and inflation. This was in particular
true for the valuation of the capital stock of joint-stock companies. The decree required that it be
calculated as the total asset value net of liabilities denominated in Dollar-pegged Goldmark (GM) or
post-reform Reichsmark (RM). This practice was far from accurate and gave joint-stock companies the
implicit freedom to deliberately choose the value of the respective capital stock.76 Joint-stock insurance
companies were required to evaluate the book value of assets purchased before the war or during the
hyperinflation period. Although the devaluation of the Papermark had caused artificially low cost of
capital, capital raised between 1914 and 1923 was not by definition worthless in 1924. This is further
supported by the case of Gerling Gruppe, which came into existence during the immediate years after
World War I and established itself as one of the strongest German insurance groups due to aggressive
M&A activities prior to 1924.77
Promoting prestige through the 1924 currency reform - the example of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck had not increased its capital during the inflation period. In addition, senior management
had decided to keep its capital stock constant by following a conversion rate of 1:1 against 1923 as
well as 1913 values.78 It is of specific interest that the Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck was the only reinsurance or
transport insurance company of considerable size applying this conversion rate. The decision to apply
a 1:1 conversion was only followed by eight companies out of a sample of 271 as shown by Table (8).
It shows that Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck was the oldest as well as the largest company to apply this rate. It
was followed by Friedrich Wilhelm Leben, a life insurance company that had been taken over by the
Gerling Konzern in 1922. It can be assumed that this company was still in possession of pre-war
assets. The third largest, Agrippina, was a specialised transport insurance company that most likely
had access to foreign currencies during the inflationary period. Two other companies, Kraft VAG and
Brandenburger Spiegelglas, were both subsidiaries of Allianz and highly specialised companies - the
former on motor, the latter on glass insurance - of limited size. Three other specialised reinsurance
companies, Minerva, Mercur and Bayerische Ru¨ck, also applied this conversion rate. The first two
were subsidiaries of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck and and were merged into the latter in 1928. The last company,
76See Opel (2007, pp.142-143).
77See Koch (2012, p.269).
78Data is taken from Dataset I “Gold Account”.
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Table 8: German companies applying a 1:1 conversion rate, by size
Year of
Foundation
Total asset value Name Line
Capital stock
Group affiliation
1913 1923 1924
1846 28,837,630 Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck Reinsurance 9 9 9 Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
1866 (1922) 26,124,839 Friedrich Wilhelm Life 6 6 6 Gerling
1844 11,388,001 Agrippina Transport 3 3 3 Agrippina
1886 9,266,599 Minerva Reinsurance 4 4 4 Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
1911 4,763,744 Mercur Reinsurance 2.4 2.4 2.4 Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
1918 2,685,266 Kraft VAG Motor - 1 1 Allianz
1911 2,523,257 Bayerische Ru¨ck Reinsurance 1 1 1 Schweizer Ru¨ck (1924)
1864 1,469,454 Brandenburger
Spiegelglas
Glass 0.6 0.6 0.6 Allianz
Note: Total asset value in GM and of year 1924. Capital stock in GM.
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”
Figure 2: Development market share Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, 1880 - 1913
Note: German market share in gross premiums earned relative to total market premiums.
Source: Kluge (2006, p.238 Table II)
the specialised reinsurer Bayerische Ru¨ck was soon to be taken over by Schweizer Ru¨ck in 1924. This
suggests that Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck was amongst the few companies that chose to promote its reputation
through the decision to value its pre-1924 capital.79
Comparing pre-war to post-war business development The pre-1914 prestige of Ko¨lnische
Ru¨ck rested upon its excellent market share and profitability. Before 1914, the company had established
itself as the second strongest reinsurer in the German market. It maintained a constant market share
of roughly 10%, even when its main competitor started to lose market share after 1903 as shown in
Figure (2). The onset of World War I meant that the formerly leading German companies were locked
79Conversion rates deemed too optimistic were not limited to the 1:1 rate. This was merely the most extreme case.
FAVAG, for instance, chose a conversion rate of 12.5:1.
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Table 9: Premium income French reinsurance companies, 1928
Company name Foundation Gross premium
income
Soc. An. de Re´assurances 1884 173,083,270
Atlantide Re´assurances 1890 443,566
La Re´assurances Nouvelle 1904 55,602,909
Havraise de Re´assurances 1905 84,557,516
Cie Europe´enne 1913 113,507,023
Franc¸aise de Re´assurances 1916 173,282,647
Parisienne de Re´assurances 1916 17,967,927
La Polaire 1917 28,946,688
Seine et Rhoˆne 1917 13,400,100
National Re´assurances 1918 102,542,865
Oce´anide 1918 32,293,800
Les Re´assurances 1919 130,601,21
Ge´ne´rale de Re´assurances 1920 33,862,360
La France Re´assurances 1921 22,855,735
Le Consortium M.D.P. 1924 1,091,460
National Cre´dit et Re´. 1924 69,598,180
Cie de Co. & de Re´assurance 1926 8,469,669
Sum founded pre-1914 427,194,293
Sum founded post-1914 634,912,642
Sum Total 1,062,106,935
Note: Gross premium volume in French Franc for business year 1928.
Source: The Review, 8 November 1929, p.1126
out of international markets.80 For Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck this development led to an immediate decrease in
underwriting profits from over GM 60,000 in 1913 to the value of GM 20,000 in 1924. The lock-out of
the dominating German companies motivated the foundation of specialised reinsurance companies in
countries that had relied on reinsurance protection from Germany. As shown in Table (9) for example,
of the 17 French companies active in reinsurance in 1928, 12 had been founded after 1914. These new
companies collected approximately 60% of gross premium volume in France. This stands evidence for
the problems of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck to reclaim its pre-war position in the now highly competitive French
market.
The response on the domestic market was an expansion in premium volume from 1924 onwards.
Profitability did not follow this trend, indicating that now contracts were underwritten that yielded
higher incurred losses relative to pre-war standards as shown in Figure (3). Whilst gross premium
volume increased substantially during the 1920s, the profitability of the underwriting business - expressed
as the underwriting return - did not return to the high pre-war trend which had only been temporarily
interrupted by the expenses necessitated by the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Even in the absence of
low-probability / high-cost events, underwriting returns remained close to an average of about 2% with
a drop in 1929, probably associated with the failure of FAVAG.
80Compare in particular Borscheid (2007).
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Figure 3: Changes in business performance Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, 1900 - 1934
Source: Kluge (2006, p.240 Table II)
The follow-up costs of the 1924 currency conversion decision The ex-ante decision to maintain
pre-war capital levels was not matched by a a return to the profitable business conditions of the pre-
World War I period. It is therefore of particular interest to measure the cost of the decision to maintain
pre-war capital levels. This is done by comparing the actual payout to shareholders with a counterfactual
scenario, in which - all else equal - Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck followed the same conversion strategy as its main
competitor, Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck. Starting from GM 30 million in 1913 the latter company raised capital so
that it featured a total of PM 120.75 million at the end of 1924. It decided to apply a 10:1 conversion
rate to reduce its capital to RM 12.075 million with a pay-in rate of 25%. This translates into a
conversion rate of 2.5 from pre-1914 to post-1924 capital. This ratio is more comparable to the case of
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck since the company had not chosen to increase its capital between 1913 and 1924.
Comparing actual historical payout to shareholders with the theoretical amount based on the
counterfactual scenario that the company had applied a 10:1 conversion rate instead allows to quantify
the opportunity costs of the decision to use a 1:1 conversion rate. Two relevant key performance
indicators also warrant consideration. The first is the return on equity (ROE) that measures the
dividend payout received per initial capital employed per period, or
ROE =
Dividend payout
Capital employed
. (2.1)
Only the paid-in amount is considered in case of partly paid-up name shares. This indicator was
commonly reported in the annual statement and is therefore considered as an important indicator.
It measures the shareholder return on investment and therefore the nominal cost of capital rate of
the insurance company. The Denominator and the numerator both depend on the discretion of the
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Table 10: Counterfactual analysis divided payout by Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck, 1926 to 1931
Year Earnings ROE
Actual (1:1) Counterfactual (12:5.1) Absolute difference
Capital Paid-in Dividend ROE DPR Capital Paid-in Dividend DPR Dividend DPR
1926 320 12% 9,000 1,800 216 12% 68% 3,600 720 86 27% 130 41%
1927 576 20% 9,000 1,800 360 20% 63% 3,600 720 144 25% 216 38%
1928 1,207 15% 12,200 3,050 458 15% 38% 4,880 1,220 183 15% 275 23%
1929 558 12% 12,200 3,050 366 12% 66% 4,880 1,220 146 26% 220 39%
1930 560 12% 12,200 3,050 366 12% 65% 4,880 1,220 146 26% 220 39%
1931 353 6% 10,000 2,500 150 6% 42% 4,000 1,000 60 17% 90 25%
Total 3,574 1,916 54% 765 21% 1,151 32%
Note: Surplus, capital, capital paid-in and dividend paid are denominated in thousand RM. The assumed
conversion rate reports the exchange of 1913 capital into 1924 capital. The chosen counterfactual rate was
applied by Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck in 1924. The counterfactual dividend paid amount is rounded. Totals are
undiscounted.
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”, Dataset II “Company”
company and its shareholders who agree on the proposed dividend payout or new capital raises at the
annual general meeting.
The second KPI is the dividend payout ratio (DPR), which expresses the amount of dividend payout
per net earnings per period, or
DPR =
Dividend payout
Net earnings
. (2.2)
It measures the utilisation of net earnings for shareholder compensation and features a stochastic
element in the form of net earnings that is absent in the case of the purely deterministic ROE.
If the management board of a company is interested in maintaining a stable and consistent ROE,
i.e. in excess of the 8% nominal interest offered by contemporary German sovereign debt, any changes
to the employed capital need to be matched by a likewise change in dividend payout. These changes
become directly observable in the DPR as the company expends more (less) on dividend payout relative
to net earnings in the case of increased (decreased) capital employed. Applying different conversion
rates during the 1924 Currency Reform featured the same effect: companies applying a lower conversion
rate decreased the reported level of capital employed and thus required a lower DPR to finance a
desired ROE, i.e. in excess of 8%. In the present case, the opportunity cost of choosing a 1:1 conversion
rate can be measured by comparing the performance indicators reported for Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck with
the counterfactual values based on the hypothesis that the company had - all else equal - used the
conversion rate of Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck. The results are provided in Table (10). Between 1926 and 1931,
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck disclosed total undiscounted earnings of RM 3.57 million. It utilised RM 1.9 million
or a DPR of 54% for dividend payout cashflows. If the company had applied the conversion rate of
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck whilst maintaining the actual ROE rate, it would have distributed only RM 756,000
or a DPR of 21%. This shows a difference of RM 1.151 million - or an absolute difference in DPR of
32% - that had been paid in excess. Hence, Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck spent nearly a third of its total earnings
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between 1926 and 1931 due to its application of the 1:1 conversion rate. This is even more relevant
as dividends were paid out in cash, meaning that the company was subject to a constant drain on
liquidity throughout the late 1920s. The counterfactual comparison shows the substantial impact the
1924 decision had on the business operations of the company during the Golden Twenties.
2.4 Similarities of FAVAG and Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck
The first part of the present chapter outlined the historical developments in the German insurance
sector during the Interwar period. It provided an overview over relevant historiographical work. With
particular relevance in the present context, a prevailing disagreement regarding the effect of the Great
Depression on German insurers was identified.
The second part was dedicated to the case study of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck. It first showed the historio-
graphical circumstances of its take-over in December 1932 / January 1933. The identified demand for
write-downs was associated with the absence of external revisions as well as the wrongful application of
new accounting principles in the wake of the 1931 Financial Crisis. It was also demonstrated that the
overall liquidity shortage of the company was dependent on its intention to promote prestige during
the 1924 currency reform. This mirrored identical considerations at FAVAG. This company defaulted
in August 1929 and led to the introduction of mandatory external revisions for insurance companies.
The application of an overly optimistic conversion rate in 1924 was shown to fall short of the actual
market conditions in Germany as well as France, a market where Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck was especially active
in. In contrast, it caused a total undiscounted aggregate opportunity cost of RM 1.151 million in cash
dividends. Of the recommendations made by Ullrich (1931, p.22) to avoid “inappropriate politics of
prestige” in favour of promoting “the intrinsic strength of the corporation by means of substantial
write-offs, strong reserves and a careful dividend policy”, Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck effectively violated all. The
immediate of the 1931 Financial Crisis appeared to be of less relevance for the insurance market in
general and the cases of FAVAG and Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck in particular. First, the emergency accounting
changes - a proved method to counter debt-deflatory processes in insurance - biased reported asset
portfolio values. Second, although Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck lost its independence during the Great Depression,
this can not be immediately associated to the economic crisis. Although doubts regarding the credit
worthiness of an important shareholder motivated the internal revision, it is very likely that the
questionable liquidity and solvency position would have also been identified in the then-mandatory
external revisions. This allows to conclude from a business historical perspective that the German
insurance sector was more negatively affected by the conditions of the Golden Twenties than the Great
Depression period.
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3 Determinants of market exit in the German insurance sector
during the Interwar period
3.1 Measuring default in the German Interwar insurance market
Ensuring the ability to meet policyholder liabilities is one of the main paradigms in insurance supervi-
sion.81 Monitoring companies on a continuous basis is nevertheless a complex task even during period
of relative economic stability.82 Further complexity is introduced by the finding of Hayn (1995) that
losses are less likely to be perpetrated in accounting data due to shareholder activities. This occurs
if shareholders pre-emptively discontinue companies before losses can be realised. This leads to the
hypothesis that market exit statistics of companies feature a similar “endogenous survivorship bias”.
This is in particular relevant for the German insurance market during the Interwar period given that this
might explain the relatively low number of actual defaults during the Great Depression. The econometric
assessment is conducted on the basis of a two-step case-control study that features an unconditional and
a conditional generalised linear model specification applying a probit link function (probit regression).
Data is taken from the 1924 Goldmark opening balance ((German original, translated by the author:)
Goldmarkero¨ffnungsbilanz) of insurance companies as reported in Neumanns Versicherungsjahrbuch.
This dataset is referred to as Dataset I “Gold Account” in the following. Default information is collected
from the dedicated sections in the editions from 1925 to 1935 of Neumanns Versicherungsjahrbuch.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, the historical background statistics of insurance market
exits are presented. Second, the concept of “endogenous survivorship bias” is introduced in the context
of structural as well as first-passage credit risk models. Third, the econometric model is specified
including a detailed discussion of the selected predictor variables as well as an introduction. Fourth, the
novel hand-collected dataset is described that provides the empirical foundation of the analysis. Fifth,
model estimates are provided and discussed. The following conclusion provides a connection between
the findings and modern credit risk modelling approaches.
This analysis contributes new empirical, methodological and theoretical insights to the present
literature. First, it establishes the relevance of 1924 Gold opening account balance data for the analysis
of the Interwar period as a whole. This motivates a further cross-sectional analysis covering different
industrial and commercial sectors during the same period. Second, a new econometric approach is
introduced that is based on the use of different specifications of predicted variables in the context of a
pre-defined predictor model. This is motivated by similar approaches in signal detection theory and
81See in general Farny (2006, p.100) and for a contemporary analysis Moldenhauer (1903, pp.69-75).
82Cummins et al. (1995) analyse the accuracy of the risk-based capital formula for non-life insurance companies that
was adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in the United States during the early
1990s. Based a large data set covering the United States in the period from 1989 to 1993 the study examined potential
determinants of default. The main finding is that the predictive accuracy of the formula is low.
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offers a new interpretation of the receiver-operating characteristics curve, or C-statistic. Third, this
chapter provides relevant insight on structural credit risk modelling.
A main limitation in empirical terms is that time-dependent variables could not be included due to
data concerns. This further motivates similar studies on different sectors during the Interwar period.
3.2 Historical background: corporate defaults during the Interwar period
The economic history of the German Interwar period can be broadly classified into two sub-periods:
starting with the 1924 currency reform, the German economy experienced a short spell of economic
expansion that was fuelled by foreign lending. Starting in 1928, the economy started to slip into a
recession. Until Summer 1929, the German insurance industry underwent a strong amalgamation
process, which ended with the de facto default of the then-second largest German insurance group,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs AG (FAVAG). It was taken over by the largest, Allianz, in order
to avoid a substantial crisis in the insurance market. In 1931, a major banking crisis triggered an
economic depression that was comparable in magnitude with the U.S. Great Depression. In 1933, slow
recovery set in and with the seizure of political power by the German National Socialist Party a gradual
centralisation of the German market economy was initiated.
Market statistics indicated that only few German insurance companies defaulted during the Interwar
period including the Great Depression. Table (11) reports the absolute amount of market exits from
the German insurance sector from 1925 until 1935. During the period from 1925 to 1935, only 17
companies defaulted. Of these eight companies defaulted before the take-over of FAVAG and nine
afterwards. In addition, only one company was liquidated by the German insurance supervisory office,
in 1925. This suggests that insurance companies did not face an increased default risk during the Great
Depression period. In contrast to the number of 17 defaults in total, however, the total number of
market exits nevertheless amounted to 124 during the Interwar period. This means that only 13.7% of
all company market exits can be explained by default. 68 companies were taken over and 43 companies
were voluntarily discontinued. Both event types predominated during the late 1920s with 54 companies
being taken over and 34 being discontinued. A total of 14 respectively 9 exited the market during
the Great Depression period of the 1930s and after the default of FAVAG. Overall, the number of
market exits peaked in 1926, a year that was marked by economic expansion. Only 1931, the year of
the banking crisis, stands out with a post-1930s maximum of 12 companies. Comparing the per-period
default ratio shows that the occurrence of company defaults was evenly distributed across both periods.
Take-overs and discontinuations, however were more than three times more likely to occur during
the pre-1931 period than during the following Great Depression years. This raises the question as to
whether there is a causal link between defaults and discontinuations / take-overs. Companies that had
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Table 11: Market Exits by Year and Event
Year N (Sample) Default Liquidation Taken over Discontinuation Market Exit
1925 271 2 1 14 6 23
1926 248 3 0 15 11 29
1927 219 0 0 15 7 23
1928 196 1 0 6 8 15
1929 181 2 0 4 2 8
1930 173 1 0 2 0 3
1931 170 4 0 4 4 12
1932 158 2 0 0 1 1
1933 157 0 0 0 0 0
1934 157 2 0 4 3 9
1935 148 0 0 4 1 1
Total 17 1 68 43 124
GT 8 1 54 34 98
GD 9 0 14 9 26
Ratio 0.89 N/A 3.86 3.78 3.77
Note: Count data of market exits are reported by year and type of exit. “GT” denotes the Golden Twenties
period from 1925 to 1929 whilst “GD” represents the Great Depression period from 1930 to 1935. “Total”,
“before 1931”, “1931 onwards” are the sum of all events taking place either in the full period, Golden Twenties
and or Great Depresson. The per-period default ratio ist defined as the event count before 1931 relative to the
event count including and after 1931.
Source: von Neumanns Versicherungsjahrbuch, 1926 to 1936.
exited the market during the “Roaring Twenties” due to other reasons than default would not show
up in any statistic during the Great Depression period, thus implying that contemporary statistics of
market exits were systematically biased. This hypothesis motivates an empirical analysis of potential
interdependences between the different types of market exit and the underlying determinants. The
hypothesis of the following chapter therefore is that companies that either were discontinued or taken
over share determining characteristics with companies that defaulted.
3.3 Endogenous survivorship bias
3.3.1 The structural credit risk model by Merton (1974)
An important question arising from the hypothesis is how company defaults and discontinuations
are interrelated. This is analytically explored on the basis of credit risk modelling in general and of
structural default models in particular. The latter were originated by Merton (1974) and define the
default event as the point in time when the value of assets drops to a pre-defined barrier level relative
to the value of the company’s liabilities. Under a set of additional assumptions,83 Given the probability
83The assumptions are:
“A.1 there are no transaction costs, taxes, or problems with indivisibilities of assets.
A.2 there are a sufficient number of investors with comparable wealth levels so that each investor believes that he can
buy and sell as much of an asset as he wants at the market price.
A.3 there exists an exchange market for borrowing and lending at the same rate of interest.
A.4 short-sales of all assets, with full use of the proceeds, is allowed.
A.5 trading in assets takes place continuously in time.
A.6 the Modigliani-Miller theorem that the value of the firm is invariant to its capital structure obtains.
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space (Ω,P,F) Merton (1974) assumes that the asset value of a company follows a geometric Brownian
motion under the real-world probability measure, or
dAt = (µAAt −Dt) dt+ σAAtdWAt , (3.1)
where A ∈ R+0 denotes the log-normally distributed non-negative asset value, µA the instantaneous
expected rate of return on the firm per unit of time, D ∈ R+0 the non-negative payout to shareholders
per unit of time, σA the volatility of the asset value and W
A the increments of a standard Brownian
motion. Merton (1974) furthermore assumes that companies are funded by capital c ∈ R+0 as well as
non-positive debt or liabilities L ∈ R−0 so that
At = ct + Lt. (3.2)
In the case of insurance companies, L is represented by the actuarially fair premium income representing
the expected net present value of future insurance losses. In contrast to a standard bond, where the
company is paid the notional at the beginning of the contract, insurance companies receive the notional
in regular instalments as insurance premiums. In accordance with Garven & Pottier (1995)84, the
non-negative face value of a bond K ∈ R+0 with strictly positive maturity T ∈ N+0 is equal to the
expected future insurance losses incurred L under the real-world probability measure with maturity T ,
which in turn is equal to the (undiscounted) insurance premium p earned continuously until T under
the real-world probability measure, or
K = L (t, T ) = EP
 Tˆ
t
pdt
 .
The maturity of the option is equal to the maturity of the liability until which the company earns
premiums. If the asset value is below the value of liabilities at maturity T the company is defined to be
in default. Any potential earlier default is not taken into account by the model. The value of liabilities
at time t < T can be inferred as the value of a risk-free bond minus the value of a shortened European
put option, or
L (VT , t) = min (AT ,K)
+
= AT − (AT −K)+ . (3.3)
A.7 the Term-Structure is “flat” and known with certainty. I.e., the price of a riskless discount bond which promises a
payment of one dollar at time T in the future is P (T ) = exp [−rT ] where r is the (instantaneous) riskless rate of interest,
the same for all time.”
See Merton (1974, p.450).
84Garven & Pottier (1995, p.253) postulates that strategies optimising the risk-return profile for principals, in this case
shareholders, might lead to inefficient risk-return profiles for policyholders as the agents of the company. This analysis is
based on a model identical to Merton (1974) without explicitly refering to it. The main difference is the definition debt
as the liabilities of the company towards policyholders.
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The value of the put option thus captures the credit risk component of the debt / liability relative
to an identical but risk-free alternative debt. If the asset value falls below the value of face value of
outstanding debt / liabilities at maturity T the company is in default.
3.3.2 Extensions: the Black & Cox (1976) first-passage model and the Crame´r-Lundberg
model
The basic specifications laid out in Merton (1974) are extended and generalised by a number of
important studies. Sundaresan (2013) provides an exhaustive summary of the large body of related
literature. Black & Cox (1976) introduce the concept of debt covenants into the model, which are based
on published accounting data of a company. This allows for the implementation of a stochastic default
time τ in addition to the pre-determined debt / liability maturity T . This non-negative default time
τ ∈ N+0 is a stopping time, is conditional on a pre-defined non-negative barrier level b ∈ R+0 and defined
as
τ = inf {t ∈ [0;T ] |At < b} , (3.4)
or the point in time t, at which the asset value At for the first time falls below the barrier level b.
This so-called first-passage model approach uses European barrier options to model the credit risk
component.
In the particular case of insurance companies, it needs to be taken into account that premiums are
earned over time. In the insurance-related analysis of default - or ruin - probabilities, Equation 3.2 is
changed to
At = c+ pt+ Lt, (3.5)
where capital c = At=0 is constant and premiums p ∈ R+0 are earned at a constant rate per time
unit. Assuming that Lt ∈ R−0 is a non-positive random variable following a compound Poisson
process, equation 3.5 represents the standard Crame´r-Lundberg model of actuarial ruin theory.85 Both
parameters are based on accounting information. Adding dividend payout D (t, T ) leads to the dividend
maximisation problem under the first-order condition of a constant ruin probability.86
3.3.3 The results of Hayn (1995) and the abandonment option
In this context default solely depends on the fundamentals of the company and not on any decision
taken by the shareholders. Hence, the empirical finding of company discontinuations in the German
Interwar insurance market can not be analysed in the context of structural default modelling, as default
85The model itself is developed by Lundberg (1903) / Lundberg (1909) and Crame´r (1930). The historical development
of the Crame´r-Lundberg model is provided by see Borch (1967).
86Shareholder compensation in the form of dividend payout is introduced by De Finetti (1957) into the context of ruin
theory.
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is solely conditional on the ratio of assets to liabilities. The discontinuation of a company at time
ω ∈ N+0 can, however, be thought of as an American option model, where the put option is prematurely
exercised by shareholders. Company defaults can hence only take place if the American put option
is not exercised prior to technical default at time T or τ . This interpretation goes back to Robichek
& Van Horne (1967) who understand the abandonment of a project as an option to end it. From an
accounting perspective, Hayn (1995) investigates the informational content of balance sheet losses, which
are assumed to be biased by this “liquidation option”. Based on the analysis of U.S. Compustat and
CRSP data for the years 1962 to 1990 it is found that effects associated with shareholders disinvesting
from a company lead to a downward bias on the return-to-earnings ratio. This is due to the fact that
losses in earnings are less likely to be perpetrated, thus leading to bias in the informational content of
accounting data. The use of the American option model is first suggested in this context by Myers &
Majd (1990). An empirical test of the validity of the model is conducted by Berger et al. (1996). Their
analysis of 20 years of U.S. balance sheet data taken from Compustat shows strong evidence that the
option is considered by investors and priced into the equity value of companies.
3.3.4 Endogenous survivorship bias
The findings of Hayn (1995) relate to the accounting information observed from surviving companies.
This limits the analysis of why investors made use of the abandonment option. The early exercise of an
American option is only rational if the stock is paying dividends and if the execution leads to a pay-off
that is larger than the value of the option.87 For simplicity it is assumed that the company does not
default in the time interval (t, T ). If the shareholder exercises the put option, the right to earn dividends
D (t, T ) from the underlying asset is lost in favour of earning returns r ∈ R on an alternative risk-free
investment opportunity P (r (t, T )) ∈ R+0 = exp [r (T − t)].88 This suggests that the net present value
of dividend income should be less than the net present value of alternative investment returns89 The
resulting definition of the discontinuation time ω ∈ N+0 is
ω = min [t ∈ [0;T ] |D (ω, T ) < K (1− P (ω, T ))] , (3.6)
where the return on the strike price K invested in the risk-free investment alternative P ((t, T )) =
exp [−r (T − t)] is defined asK
[
P (1− P (ω, T ))−1 − 1
]
. The present value follows as P (t, T )K
[
P (t, T )
−1 − 1
]
=
K [1− P (t, T )].90 It follows that dividends have to be qual or larger than alternative income in order
87See for example Hull (2006, Ch.11).
88This generalises the concept of the risk-free interest rate to any type of return generated by alternative assets perceived
as risk-free. This follows the rationale of Margrabe’s formula as per Margrabe (1978).
89See Deutsch (2009, p.91).
90Note that for simplicity of notation the added value of the right to not exercise the option is assumed to be exogenous.
See Deutsch (2009, p.91).
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to ensure ω = 0, or
ω = 0|D (ω, T ) ≥ K (1− P (ω, T )) .
This establishes the direct trade-off between risky dividend payout and alternative risk-free investment
return. The equation changes in accordance if the assumption is relaxed that the company does not
default in the time interval (t, T ). In the context of Hayn (1995), shareholders discontinue companies
experiencing losses. This is consistent under the assumption that unobserved losses are associated with
companies failing to provide sufficient dividend payout, which leads to discontinuation. Thus, a direct
link between accounting data and observed company exits is established.
3.3.5 State-dependent numeraire dynamics
The decision to exercise early also depends on the dynamics of the risk-free alternative investment
opportunity set. Assuming a constant dividend payout D, a risk-neutral shareholder would disinvest
during times of relatively high alternative investment opportunities, which in turn is usually attributed
to periods of economic expansion. This requires to relax the assumption A.7 of Merton (1974) 91 and
to allow for a time-varying alternative risk-free alternative investment return rt that is directly related
to the possuible states of the world. Assume that the dynamics of the risk-free stochastic return rt are
described by a continuous-time one-factor Vasicek model 92 as
drt = κ (E [r]− rt) dt+ σrW rt , r (0) = r0, (3.7)
where κ ∈is the speed of mean reversion, E [r] is the expected long-term through-the-cycle interest
rate known to shareholders, σr the instantaneous constant volatility of the return on the alternative
investment. This process is assumed to define the state-dependent interest rate r (s) and the world to
take states s ∈ S with possible realisations S ∈ [0, 1, 2]. The states s = 1 and s = 2 denote economic
expansion and depression and s = 0 represents economic periods of relative moderation. Let the states
be fully described by the dynamics of the alternative investment return rt so that
s =

0 if rt ≡ E [r]
1 if rt  E [r]
2 if rt  E [r]
, (3.8)
91This assumption allows for an exclusive focus on the dynamics of the risk instead of the term structure and its
relaxation does not lead to a loss of generality. See Merton (1974, p.455).
92See Brigo & Mercurio (2006, Ch. 3.2.1) as well as Wu¨thrich & Merz (2013, pp.41-64) for a discrete-time one-factor
specification.
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indicating that r (1) denotes a state of relatively large alternative investment returns such as the Golden
Twenties. In contrast, r (s) = r (2) denotes a state of relatively low alternative investment returns such
as the Great Depression. It follows that the price of the investment opportunity is P (1) > P (0) > P (2).
Alternative investment returns close to the long-term through-the-cycle expectation r (s) = r (0) identify
periods of relative moderation such as the for example more recent periods. It follows that the stopping
time ω increases (decreases) if the world moves from state r (0) to state r (1) (decrease: r (2)), or
∂ω
∂r

> 0 if r (0)→ r (1)
< 0 if r (0)→ r (2)
.
The dynamics of this state transition solely depend on the stochastic alternative investment return that
can be offset by the deterministic dividend decision of the company. In addition, the variance of rt
until maturity T is defined as
V ar(r) =
σ2r
2κ
(
1− e−2κ(T−t)
)
,
where the first term on the right-hand side denotes the long-term variance given that limT→∞
[
1− e−2κ(T−t)] =
0. Assuming a direct relationship between investment opportunity set and the business cycle, the speed
of mean-reversion κ represents the persistence of the state transition process - or the business cycle -
and σr the intensity of the maximum in state r (1) as well as the minimum in state r (2).
Therefore, the stopping time ω is a function of the returns earned on the investment opportunity
set and are state-dependent. This represents that shareholders value investments in relative terms
and respond to changes in alternative investments, i.e. by exercising the American put option on an
investment that is relatively underperforming.
3.3.6 The disparity of defaults and discontinuations
The underlying stochastic dynamics are not empirically observable. The only information available is the
nature of the market exit. This event is represented by the indicator function 1EV E (i) = {0; 1}taking
the value 1 for company i. Let the sample space be defined as Ω ∈ {¬EV E;EV E}, where EV E denotes
all observations associated with a company market exit and ¬EV E observations with a non-exit. This
will occur if a company leaves the market.
In accordance, the analysis of company discontinuations in the context of credit risk modelling yields
two important insights: it is shown first that the event “default”DEF ∈ EV E can only take place if
no prior discontinuation DIS ∈ EV E has happened. This also holds true for the event “liquidation”,
LIQ ∈ EV E, representing the revoking of the operating concession by the supervising office due to the
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company breaching regulatory debt covenants. A company can hence only default or become liquidated
if shareholders have not wound-up the company first. Given the order of market exit types this
introduces “endogenous survivorship bias” since only companies that were not previously discontinued
by shareholders can default. Second, the default of company directly depends on the fundamentals of
the company, which are the asset value At including the liability value L (t, T ) = K. In contrast, a
company discontinuation depends on the set of investment opportunities for the shareholders, namely
the deterministic dividend payout D (t, T ) and the state-dependent alternative investment opportunity
P (r (t, T )). The relevance of the latter shows that the decision to discontinue a company is endogenous
to market dynamics. This illustrates the “endogeneity” of the survivorship bias. Lastly, the observed
event “take-over”, M&A ∈ EV E, is also related to shareholder decision-making. In this case, current
shareholders are assumed to be presented with a price for the investment cT ∗ that exceeds the net
present equity value until maturity cT so that Goodwill = c
?
T − c > 0.
It is thus possible to assign every observed type of market exit to a particular defined state of the
Merton / first-passage model, or
1EV E (i) = 1 if

1DEF (i) = 1, if ω > τ ≥ T |At < K (Mertonmodel)
1DEF (i) = 1 ∪ 1LIQ (i) = 1, if ω > τ < T |At < b (Black&Coxmodel).
1DIS (i) = 1, if ω < τ ≥ T
1M&A (i) = 1, if cT ∗ > cT
(3.9)
The same logic applies to the absence of an event, represented by the indicator function 1¬EV E (i) =
{0; 1}taking the value 1, or
1¬EV E (i) if = ω > τ ≥ T |At < K. (3.10)
This mapping allows to make general inferences on the underlying dynamics causing the different types
of market exits and to circumvent the problem that important variables, such as the asset value At, are
unobservable in reality. The following empirical analysis directly considers the reported types of market
exits as realisations of the latent dynamics in order to show statistically significant differences in the
determinants for defaults, discontinuations, take-overs as well as survival.
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3.4 Model specification: forecasting insurance market exit
3.4.1 Related literature
The study of market exit determinants is subject to managerial research. Amongst others, Balcaen et al.
(2012) argue that a voluntary liquidation - or discontinuation - is the more efficient market exit strategy
for companies. It reduces direct and indirect opportunity costs arising from bankruptcy filings and
associated court proceedings. Based on a dataset of 6,118 distress-related market exits in Belgium during
the period 1998 to 2000, this study applies a two-step nested logit regression approach. Determinants
for in-court (involuntary) and out-of-court (voluntary) defaults were analysed first. Second, the study
focuses on voluntary market exits exclusively to identify determinants of two possible types of market
exit: discontinued or take-over. The study finds that voluntary exits are more probable for companies
with higher cash provisions, lower leverage, unsecured debt and group affiliation. Voluntary liquidations
conditional on not defaulting increase in probability with higher cash provisions or secured debt as
well, smaller size and no group affiliation. Balcaen et al. (2012) is in part motivated by Bhattacharjee
et al. (2009), who consider the relationship between defaults or take-overs and the business cycle. No
other forms of market exit find consideration. Based on a dataset of all listed UK companies from
1965 to 2002 the study concludes that firm age and size are important determinants for survival, whilst
higher liquidity promotes acquisitions and increased leverage determines defaults. When using the U.S.
business cycle it is furthermore shown that company take-overs are more probable during periods of
economic expansion, whereas contraction leads to an increased probability of default. This is the first
study to take into account macroeconomic factors in this context.
Several studies consider market exit in the insurance sector. Ranger-Moore (1997) analyses the
effect of ’age’ and ’size’ on the failure rate of New York life insurance companies in the period from 1813
until 1985. It is found that the ’size’ reduced the risk of failure in general, whilst ’age’ increased the
probability that market exits occurred especially during times of economic turmoil. It is argued that
these negative effects are attributable corporate “obsolescence” whereby “internal processes increase
organizational inertia.”93 The fact that ’age’ does not have to be equivalent with ’size’ has also been
debated and confirmed within actuarial ruin theory.94 BarNiv & Hathorn (1997) focus on the difference
between take-overs and defaults and compare characteristics of U.S. non-life insurance companies that
had exited the market during the period 1984 to 1992. It is found that 54 to 80 percent of all companies
that had been taken over were of sound solvency. Companies that defaulted were smaller and performed
less well. This finding is confirmed by Cummins & Xie (2008), who consider the take-over decision
from the perspective of the acquiring company in the U.S. property / liability insurance market during
93See Ranger-Moore (1997, p.904).
94See Borch (1967) for a thorough discussion of the discourse.
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the period 1994 to 2003. The relevance of size implies that the available surplus of a company plays a
particular role in differentiating between the possible outcome of shareholders disinvesting.
3.4.2 Model specification
Two generalised linear models employing a probit link function (probit regression) are used in the
present context to analyse the probability for market exit. This two-model approach is comparable
to Balcaen et al. (2012) with the exception that data on companies not exiting the market are also
considered. The first model takes into account the unconditional probability of market exit. The second
model focuses on the determinants for the different forms of market exits conditional on having exited
the market. Hence, a conditional probit regression model finds application.95 The general advantages
of probit / logit regression analyses in the present setting are described in de Haan & Kakes (2012). An
ordered probit model is not applicable due to the violation of the necessary proportionality assumption.
This also rules out the use of a multinomial probit model.96 Due to the properties of the indicator
function 1EV E (i), its expectation is equal to the probability of exiting the market, or
1
N
N∑
i=1
1EV E (i) = E (1EV E (i)) (3.11)
= P (1EV E (i) = 1) ∈ P.
The probability of a non-event is due to proportionality
1− E (1EV E (i)) = P (1EV E (i) = 0) ∈ P,
thus defining the probability set P. The empirical event probability can then be calculated by integrating
over all i. This motivates the use of a generalised linear model employing a probit link function. The
likelihood function follows from the typical form97
P [1EV E (i) = 1] = P?(zi > 0)
= Φ(β0 + βx + i),
95This approach is comparable to a conditional logit regression model as per Greene (2012, Ch.18.2.3).
96The underlying assumption for the application of a multinomial probit model is that all events may happen to all of
the sample companies. This, however, contrasts the chosen two-stage set-up by implying that surviving companies could
feature an estimated positive probability of experiencing a form of market exit. See also Balcaen et al. (2012, p.959) for a
similar line of argument.
97The model specification is taken from Koop et al. (2007, p.204).
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where β0 denotes the intercept, x the set of predictor variables with the associated coefficients β and
 the normally distributed error term, with E [] = 0 . The dependent variable is the probability of
a predicted event EV E? given that company i has experienced an event and is represented by the
indicator function 1EV E? (i) . The continuous latent variable zi ∈ R is introduced so that
1EV E?(i) =

1 if zi ≥ 0
0 if zi < 0
. (3.12)
The error term is assumed to be independent and normally distributed and E () = 0. It is not
individually calculated but embedded in the company-specific variance of the prediction. This implies
that a larger error term would likewise increase the standard error of the prediction. The normal
cumulative distribution function Φ (·) indicates that zi is normally distributed98 and can thus be
interpreted as a z-score, which allows to derive the predicted probability P(EV E?). We can thus
redefine Equation (3.12) in terms of probabilities, or
1EV E∗(i) =

1 if P(EV E?) ≥ 50 per cent
0 if P(EV E?) < 50 per cent
,
where an event is predicted if its probability is equal to or larger than 50%, or zi = 0.
The first unconditional probit model directly considers the probabilities of the company-specific
events{LIQ,DEF,DIS,M&A,¬EV E}. The model seeks to differentiate between exiting and surviving
companies. The second conditional probit model estimates the probabilities of the conditional events
{LIQ,DEF,DIS,M&A}. This approach seeks to separate the different ways of market exit given
that the company had experienced an event. The model fit is assessed on the basis of the area under
the receiver-operating characteristics curve also known as concordance or c-statistic, see Hosmer &
Lemeshow (2013, pp.173-181). This approach is motivated by signal detection theory, where the
c-statistic is regarded as an indicator of how well a model can differentiate between signal (events) and
noise (non-events). Percentage results are rated based on an ordinal system as proposed by Hosmer &
Lemeshow (2013, p.177), which is reproduced in Table (12). The scale suggests that results ranging
from 50% to 100% indicate the increased ability to separate exiting from surviving companies.
98This differentiates the probit from the logit model, where a logistic distribution is used. In general it can be said that
“other distributions, particularly the logistic, could be used just as easily. We assume the normal purely for convenience.
The logistic and normal distributions generally give similar results.” See Greene (2012, Fn.9, p.828). The probit regression
was chosen due to its prevalent use within signal detection theory, compare Wickens (2002).
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Table 12: Interpretation of c-statistic
c-Statistic Discrimination
= .500 None
.500− .700 Poor
.700− .800 Acceptable
.800− .900 Excellent
.900 ≤ Outstanding (extremely rare)
Source: Hosmer & Lemeshow (2013, p.162)
3.4.3 Exiting the insurance market: dependent variables
Market exit A company is said to exit the market if it is delisted from the German trade register. This
event is represented by the set variable EV E ∈ Ω. The set variable ¬EV E denotes the absence of an
event or the survival of the company. The possible events leading to market exit are defaultDEF ∈ EV E
or liquidation LIQ ∈ EV E, take-over M&A ∈ EV E as well as (voluntary) discontinuation DIS ∈ EV E.
In line with the above theoretical considerations, default can only occur if a company was neither
taken-over or discontinued.
Default or liquidation The ultimate ruin as the cause of market exit is denoted by DEF ∈ EV E.
A default has occurred if the company has filed for bankruptcy and was delisted as a result. In contrast,
the involuntary liquidation of a company, denoted by LIQ ∈ EV E, occurs if the supervisory office
assumes that the default of a company is imminent, i.e. because regulatory debt covenants have been
violated.
Take-over If the company ensures its ability to meet its liabilities towards policyholders but fails
to provide for shareholder compensation it falls short of generating sufficient shareholder value. Not
meeting investor-specific profitability expectations can cause shareholders of a company to disinvest
from the company. If the company is sold and purchased by other investors, it is said to experience the
event take-over or M&A ∈ EV E. In this case it is assumed that the taken-over company’s liabilities is
also purchased, indicating that no credit event is taking place.
A potential reason for a take-over is that the underwriting portfolio of the taken-over can be
integrated into the existing portfolio of the acquiring company, thus promoting economies of scale and
scope.99 Alternatively, Jensen (1986), Jensen (1988) and Shleifer & Vishny (1988) argue in the context
of corporate control theory that a potential take-over motivation is a current relative under-performance
of the affected company. This is attributed to managerial inefficiency and could be optimised by a
change of ownership.100
99A thorough discussion of take-over motivations is presented in Cummins & Xie (2008).
100This is less obvious in the life insurance sector, where profitability was correlated with the probability of being taken
over. See Cummins & Xie (2008, p.32).
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Discontinuation If company shareholders decide to disinvest from the company they have the
option to wind up - or discontinue - the company. This is also referred to as voluntary liquidations or
discontinuations. Provided that the statutes of the respective joint-stock company contain the relevant
legal foundation, shareholders have the authority to pass a resolution that the company be wound
up orderly. If the necessary majority of shareholders is found, the company will be discontinued and
the excess of assets over liabilities paid out to the shareholders. The market exit “discontinuation” is
denoted by DIS ∈ EV E and associated with the failure of the company to provide current or expected
profitability given sufficient solvency. This requires that the company still features sufficient assets that
can be liquidated and distributed to debtors and lastly shareholders.
The determinants of voluntary liquidations by shareholders have so far not found wide-spread
recognition in related research. Balcaen et al. (2012, p.951 Fn.3) attribute this to the “difficulty to
obtain the necessary data for a large sample of exiting firms.”
3.4.4 Independent variables
Focusing on observable company determinants for market exit is required given that the dynamics
leading to the default of an insurance company are unobservable. Time-invariant variables are used
since counts of market exist are collected over the whole period from 1925 to 1935 without taking
into account time effects. The chosen set of predictors is assumed to be relevant for shareholders and
consists of the franchise value FRV of a company, the (time-invariant) size CAP and the line-specific
regulatory framework a company LINE.
Franchise value The age of a company is found to be an important determinant for market exit
by Bhattacharjee et al. (2009) and Ranger-Moore (1997). It does not have direct and quantifiable
relevance for the solvency of a company from an accounting perspective. This follows the reasoning of
Ranger-Moore (1997). Age is a non-monetary value and can be associated with other factors such as
brand recognition or reputation. In general, the non-monetary corporate franchise value is defined as
“any element of market capitalisation in excess of statutory net assets” by Exley & Smith (2006, p.238).
This study argues that the non-quantifiable value is seldom considered in the perception of insurance,
which in turn leads to a downward bias in commonly applied performance indicators. This motivates
the inclusion of franchise value as denoted by FRV .
Comparable considerations played a detrimental role in the undercapitalisation of FAVAG as well as
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck following the 1924 currency reform.101 Due to the notable differences in the perception
of capital raised prior to 1914 and after, the variable FRV ∈ {0, 1} denotes, whether a company was
founded prior to 1914, so that
101Compare Ch.2.
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Table 13: Capital conversion rate
Conversion rate Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
If FRV = 1 98 28.747 10.00 55.965 0 380.25
If FRV = 0 176 333,967 62.50 3,813,279 0 50,000,000
(Conversion 1913 to 1924) 271 213,207 25.00 3,047,795 0 50,000,000
IF FRV = 1
Capital increased
(1913 to 1923)
76 32.002 10.614 60.313 0 380.25
Capital not increased
(1913 to 1923)
22 17.500 3.642 1,304 .6 150
Overall
(1913 to 1924)
98 7.603 2.499 18.804 .24 150
Note: The conversion rate of 0 indicates that the company was either founded between 1923 and 1924 or listed
as mutual before 1924. The observed differences between mean and median value suggest a non-linear effect of
the absolute value converted. This motivates the use of the median in the following. “Conversion 1913 to 1924”
denotes the conversion rate of capital reported in 1931 to capital reported in 1924. RM = Reichsmark
Source: A special edition of “Neumanns Jahrbuch der Privatversicherung im Deutschen Reich” published in 1925
reported the available gold account balances of German private insurance companies. Dataset I “Gold Account”.
FRVi =

1 if company iwas founded before 1914
0 if company iwas founded after 1914
. (3.13)
This approach does not consider that older companies might have raised capital after 1914. The value
FRVi = 0 identifies companies that only had access to post-1914 capital. This choice of a binary
predictor variable is based on the finding that company founded pre-1914 assigned a larger relative
value to its shareholdings than company that had been founded after 1914.
The aggregate conversion rates are provided in Table (13). The reported median rate of 25:1
illustrates that German insurance companies were valuing 1923 capital substantially lower than 1914
capital. Companies founded after the onset of World War I had raised capital denominated in Papermark.
The applied median conversion rate of 63:1 was more cautious. This suggests that post-1914 capital was
considered of inferior quality and contrasts the median conversation rate of 10:1 by companies founded
before 1914. The differences between pre-1914 and post-1914 are further reflected in capital raised
by companies founded before 1914 that raised capital between 1913 and 1924. In this case, a median
conversion rate of 10.6:1 was reported. The 22 companies maintaining pre-war capital levels throughout
the years 1914 to 1924 used a relatively smaller median conversion rate of 3.6:1. The lowest median of
2.5:1 is reported for the conversion of pre-World War I (1913) into post-currency reform (1924) capital.
Firm capital The findings of Balcaen et al. (2012), Bhattacharjee et al. (2009), Ranger-Moore (1997)
and BarNiv & Hathorn (1997) indicate that the size of a company is an important determinant for
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Table 14: Change in capital, 1926 to 1935
Variable Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
∆Capitalit 1,078 .08 .00 .61 0 10
Note: The rate of change in capital, denoted by ∆uit ∈ R, is defined as
∆uit =
Capitalit
Capitalit−1
− 1, t ∈ [1927; 1935] .
Source: Dataset II “Company”
Table 15: Summary statistics EQU1924
Variable Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
Capital (1924) 271 1,563,842 600,000 3,259,451 1,470 30,000,000
Source: Dataset II “Company”
market exit. This is consistent within the context of insurance.102 For the most part of regulatory
history, the absolute size of an insurance company was perceived as an important determinant of its
solvency, with relative risk-related considerations starting to take precedence only in recent years.103
The definition of company size is also the associated with shareholder decision-making in the context of
principal-agent theory. Increased firm capital also increases the amount or face value of shares that are
available for purchase. This increases the cost associated with controlling the required majority of votes
required to discontinue the company due to the relatively stronger and more developed partnerships
with internal and external stakeholders.104
The time-invariant capital endowment is therefore an important predictor for market exits. The
assumption of time-invariance is confirmed in Table (14), showing that capital increases or decreases
were rare events in the German insurance sector during the Interwar period. The disadvantage of this
control variable is that mutual companies can not be considered. The large difference in mean and
median of the resulting non-negative variable, Capital (1924) ∈ R+, provided in Table (15), suggests
that capital was non-normally distributed. The non-negative log-transform, denoted CAP ∈ R+ will
thus be used as predictor variable and is defined as
CAPi = log(Capital (1924)i). (3.14)
Supervision The German regulatory system of the Interwar period distinguished the level of super-
vision between different lines of insurance business. Companies that exclusively engaged in transport
insurance and/or reinsurance were exempt from supervision.105 Furthermore, companies registered
102Compare Borch (1967). Note also that this does not take in consideration any risk associated with holding more
assets.
103Compare Sandstro¨m (2007).
104See Balcaen et al. (2012, p.957).
105Compare Ch.5, Moldenhauer (1903, pp.69-73) and Hermannsdorfer (1931).
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as non-life insurance companies were not allowed to operate in life insurance and vice versa. It was
argued that both had to be separate due to the volatile nature of the former and the relevance as
long-term savings alternative of the latter.106 In order to control for the degree of regulation specific to
line k ∈ K, the ordinal variable LINE is defined by
LINEik =

k = 1 if company i is active inNon− Life insurance
k = 2 if company i is active in Transport
k = 3 if company i is active in Transport+Reinsurance
k = 4 if company i is active inReinsurance
k = 5 if company i is active inLife insurance
. (3.15)
This variable proxies the degree of external control over a company. It attaches qualitative value to the
prudence of its business plan and thus the company’s exposure to insurance risk. Additionally, it proxies
the opportunity costs associated with liquidating the liabilities of an insurance company in the case of a
discontinuation. Life insurance is used as the reference due to the high degree of regulation associated
with it. The model intercept β0 is thus conditional on the coefficient of life insurance. General regulated
non-life insurance companies were subject to a relatively lower level of supervision. The unregulated
reinsurance and transport insurance line of business serve as contrast. Mixed transport and reinsurance
companies are also included to test the qualitative value attached to diversified business operations.
3.5 Data
The study is set up as a case-control study. Company-specific information is taken from balance sheet
information published by German insurance companies after the currency reform of 1924 (“Goldmark-
ero¨ffnungsbilanz”). Accounts for 313 companies were provided in a special issue of “Neumanns Jahrbuch
der Privatversicherung im Deutschen Reich” published in 1925. 42 Companies were not mentioned in
later editions, reducing the total number of companies to 271.107 This sample was tracked over the
period from 1925 until 1935. Companies that remained listed in the 1936 edition of “Neumanns Jahrbuch
der Privatversicherung im Deutschen Reich” were classified as surviving companies or i ∈ ¬EV E. The
source, an annually published compendium, provided an overview of company foundations, fusions,
mergers, discontinuations and defaults ((German original:) “Gru¨ndungen, Verschmelzungen, Bestand-
106Moldenhauer (1903, pp.100-103)
107It should also be noted that Gerling Gruppe operated through subsidiaries that featured individual brand names
but did not declare individual accounts. Those 20 companies were collectively discontinued as individual brands
in 1936 due to purely internal reasons. They are therefore excluded. The shortened names of these companies
are: Baltische, Bayerland, Elbe&Saale, Ko¨ln-Berliner, Ko¨ln-Du¨sseldorfer, Ko¨ln-Bremer, Ko¨ln-Frankfurter, Ko¨ln-
Hagener, Kronprinz, Ko¨ln-Krefelder, Mittella¨ndische Feuer, Mosel und Saar, Niedersa¨chsische Feuer, Oberbadische
Feuer, Sa¨chsisch-Thu¨ringische, Schwa¨bische Feuer, Su¨dwestdeutsche VAG, Zukunft Leben (ex Heracles), Rheinische
Versicherungs-AG and Rheinische Feuer.
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Table 16: Summary Statistics Dataset I “Gold Account”
Variable Name Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
Predicted Variables
EV E Event 271 .458 0 1
DEF Defaulted 271 .055 0 1
LIQ Liquidated 271 .003 0 1
DIS Discontinued 271 .162 0 1
{DEF,LIQ,DIS} 271 .221 0 1
M&A Taken over 271 .240 0 1
Predictor Variables
FRV Franchise value 271 .361 0 1
CAP ln(capital) 271 12.913 13.305 1.974 7.293 17.217
Lines Obs / of total Mean*
k = 1 Non-Life 100 / .369 .390 0 1
k = 2 Trans 55 / .203 .545 0 1
k = 3 Trans & Reins 27 / .099 .519 0 1
k = 4 Reinsurance 50 / .185 .580 0 1
k = 5 Life 39 / .144 .308 0 1
Note: Standard deviation omitted for binary variables. The data reported include the case of FAVAG. *
indicates that mean is conditional on the occurrence of an event, or EV E = 1.
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”
su¨bertragungen, Auflo¨sungen und Konkurse”) as a dedicated section. In addition, the 1930 issue
also contained a special “summary of defaulted companies“ (German: “Verzeichnis der aufgelo¨sten
Versicherungsgesellschaften”) for the years between 1913 and 1928. Companies that exited the market
were listed as either discontinued ((German original:) “Auflo¨sung”), defaulted ((German original:)
“Konkurs”), liquidated ((German original:) “Liquidation”) or merged ((German original:) “U¨bernahme”).
In the latter case, only companies with abandoned brand name were counted. The year of market exit
was chosen as the date when the company was de-listed from the official trade register.
3.5.1 Summary statistics
Summary statistics in Table (16).
A total of 45.8% of the sample companies exited the market, 24.0% of the sample was taken over,
5.5% defaulted, 16.2% was discontinued and 0.3% - one company - was liquidated108. In addition,
36.1% of all companies had been founded before 1914 and 63.9 % after the onset of World War I. The
mean reported 1924 capital value was equal to an absolute amount of RM 1.6 million. In addition, the
relative majority of 39.0% was registered in non-life insurance lines. 20.3% and 18.5% were listed as
specialised transport respectively reinsurance companies and 9.9% as active in both unsupervised lines.
Life insurance was represented by 14.4% of the sample.
Companies active in the registered lines featured a mean probability of market exit of 30.8% in the
108That (compulsory) liquidations are rare events is also evidenced by Balcaen et al. (2012, p.953 Fn.4) who find that
only 4 out of 6,118 observations were associated with this event.
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Table 17: Results unconditional probit model
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* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”
case of life and 39.0% in the case of non-life insurance. Mixed transport and reinsurance companies
featured a relatively lower probability of 51.9% relative to specialised transport with 54.5% as well as
reinsurance with 58.0%. This supports the assumption that regulation increased the resilience of a
company during the Interwar period and that mixed transport / reinsurance companies benefited from
diversification.
3.6 Model results
3.6.1 Unconditional model results
The results of the unconditional probit regression model are provided in Table (17). A direct com-
parison of the c-statistic indicates that the chosen model correctly predicts 83.1 % of all events DIS,
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Table 18: Predicted probability unconditional probit model
Marginal effect
Line DEF + LIQ DIS
Life
.011 -.072
(.019) (.048)
Non-Life
.021 -.099*
(.029) (.048)
Trans
.012 -.240**
(.017) (.081)
Trans & Rein
.009 -.226**
(.017) (.087)
Rein
.044 -.221*
(.058) (.090)
N 270 270
Note: CAP=12.898. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects capture the discrete impact of FRV
changing from FRV = 0 to FRV = 1 on the predicted variable. Observations associated with FAVAG are
excluded from the sample.
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”
independently of the inclusion of FAVAG. This confirms that based on the Hosmer-Lemeshow scale as
per Table (12) FRV , CAP and LINE provide “excellent” predictions for discontinuations. Default and
liquidations are in comparison correctly predicted in 78.8% of the sample. The exclusion of FAVAG from
the sample increases the c-statistic to 83.0 % and above the “excellent” threshold. Overall, 73.8% (74.2%
without FAVAG) of all outcomes can be predicted by the used set of independent variables. In contrast,
only 58.4 % are predicted correctly in the case of a take-over. This leads to the further conclusion that
company discontinuations were relatively well predictable based on 1924 information. The same is found
for company defaults and liquidations, but needs to be rejected in the case of discontinuations. With
the notable difference of take-overs, size CAP features a consistently statistically significant negative
sign. This indicates first that the size of a company was overall reducing the probability of market exit
regardless of type, yet with the expection of take-overs. This directly relates to the second finding
that the overall insignificance of parameter estimates for this type of event suggests that taken-over
companies shared similar determinants with survivors.
The non-linearity inherent to the probit model prohibits a meaningful direct interpretation of
the coefficients. Sign and significance nevertheless postulate that capital was significantly negatively
correlated with the exception of take-overs. This supports the assumption that capital endowment
increased the durability of a company. To analyse the multivariate relevance of franchise value and
insurance line of business, conditional marginal effects of a one-unit increase in FRV on the predicted
probability P(EV E?) - or ∂P(EV E?)/∂1FRV are provided in Table (18). The marginal effects of
franchise value FRV are not significantly different from zero in the case of defaults and liquidations. In
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Table 19: Results conditional probit model
Event M&A DEF + LIQ DIS
FAVAG included No Yes No Yes No Yes
Non-Life
-.313 -.229 .333 .205 .059 .062
(.461) (.467) (.616) (.636) (.504) (.504)
Trans
-.923* -.922 -.426 -.458 1.151* 1.151*
(.469) (.471) (.689) (.700) (.501) (.501)
Trans & Rein
-.890 -.876 -.414 -.478 1.139* 1.139*
(.548) (.553) (.782) (.798) (.569) (.569)
Rein
-.921 -.970* .396 .430 .826 .825
(.481) (.486) (.621) (.631) (.516) (.516)
AGE
.391 .517 .693 .629 -.973* -.968*
(.328) (.343) (.396) (.418) (.393) (.394)
CAP
.194** .228** -.225** -.277** -.073 -.072
(.071) (.074) (.086) (.092) (.073) (.073)
Constant
-1.741 -2.152* 1.254 1.860 -.022 -.029
(.948) (.981) (1.136) (1.198) (.994) (.995)
c-statistic .762 .773 .760 .792 .775 .773
PseudoR2 .154 .185 .118 .147 .183 .179
N 124 123 124 123 124 123
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Life insurance treated as reference.
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
the case of discontinuations FRV reduced the predicted probability in all lines but life insurance. The
effect ranges from -24.0 (±8.1) % in transport to - 9.9 (±4.8) % in non-life insurance and is in particular
pronounced in unregulated lines. In addition, franchise value is shown to reduce the probability of
discontinuations across lines. At the same time no statistically significant effect can be measured in the
case of defaults / liquidations. This confirms that franchise value FRV was relevant for shareholders,
but did not directly increase the solvency of the company. Differences in the magnitude and significance
of the parameter results across lines also suggest that shareholders were substituting regulatory rigor
with franchise value: whilst the effect of franchise value was insignificant and relatively small for life
and non-life insurance, the magnitude increased substantially for unregulated insurance lines.
3.6.2 Conditional model results
The unconditional model fails to provide accurate predictions for take-overs. This is due to the
fact that companies affected shared more similarities with companies that did not experience an
event. Take-overs thus followed a different rationale than other possible events. In order to confirm
this, only the set EV E is considered in the following. The variables of interest are thus 1M&A (i),
1LIQ (i) + 1DEF (i) = 1LIQ+DEF (i) and 1DIS (i). The model is conditional given that all remaining
companies are elements of EV E. Results are provided in Table (19). Again, the omission of FAVAG
from the sample does not lead to substantial differences in the parameter estimates. The c-statistic
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Table 20: Predicted probability conditional probit model
Marginal effect
Line M&A DEF + LIQ DIS
Life
.158 .102 -.216
(.106) (.104) (.119)
Non-Life
.180 .129 -.228*
(.115) (.091) (.101)
Trans
.198 .052 -.358**
(.126) (.046) (.126)
Trans & Rein
.199 .050 -.358**
(.127) (.060) (.126)
Rein
.196 .161 -.350**
(.122) (.100) (.133)
N 123 123 123
Note: CAP = 12.164. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects capture the discrete percentage impact
of FRV changing from 1FRV (i) = 0 to 1FRV (i) = 1. Observations associated with FAVAG were omitted from
the sample.
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
is within the range between 76.2% and 79.2% and thus falls short of the “excellent” threshold. The
signs of the calculated coefficients indicate that capital increased the probability of the event being
a take-over and reduced the probability of default. The signs for the effect of franchise value FRV
confirm a decrease in the probability of discontinuation, but an increase in the case of a take-over or
default. Being active in any line apart from life insurance decreased the probability of a take-over.
Unregulated specialised transport and reinsurance as well as mixed transport/reinsurance companies
were more likely to be discontinued. The effect of company size CAP varies substantially between types
of market exit. It features a statistically significant positive relations with the event take-over. This is
consistent with the results of the unconditional model and confirms that companies subject to M&A
activities shared determining characteristics with survivors. The events default and liquidation feature
a statistically significant negative relation, suggesting that increased size CAP effectively protected
companies from experiencing these types of events.
With respect to franchise value FRV it is necessary to analyse conditional marginal effects as
provided in Table (20). Coefficients associated with experiencing default or take-over are not significantly
different from zero. Increased franchise value led to a substantial reduction in the probability of becoming
discontinued. It ranged from a point estimate of -22.8% (±10.1%) in non-life to 35.8% (±12.6%) in
transport insurance as well as mixed transport and reinsurance. Effects are statistically significant for
all lines except life insurance. Franchise value FRV was an important determinant in the shareholder
decision to discontinue a company. This finding is consistent with the results of the unconditional
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Table 21: Event-specific predicted probabilities, conditional model
Take-over Default & Liq. Discontinuation
1FRV 0 1 0 1 0 1
Life .700*** .923*** .082 .109 .191 .025
(.140) (.074) (.085) (.123) (.119) (.033)
Non-Life .616*** .884*** .117 .152 .208** .029
(.092) (.071) (.061) (.093) (.075) (.028)
Trans .345*** .693*** .032 .046 .609*** .208
(.090) (.130) (.031) (.045) (.093) (.119)
Trans & Rein .363* .709*** .031 .044 .604*** .205
(.141) (.161) (.040) (.060) (.138) (.140)
Rein .328** .676*** .168* .211* .480*** .127
(.100) (.113) (.076) (.101) (.109) (.075)
N 96 27 96 27 96 27
Note: CAP = 12.164. Standard errors in parentheses. Average marginal effects capture the percentage
probability of experiencing an event, or 1EV E (i) = 1. FAVAG was omitted from the sample.
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset I “Gold Account”
model given that the magnitude of the effect increased with decreasing level of regulation.
In the particular case of the conditional model it is also necessary to take into account the nested
structure of the conditional events. This follows from the fact that a company can only default or
become discontinued if it has not been taken over previously. The associated schematic decision tree
takes the form
1EV E

0
1 if

1TAK = 1
1TAK = 0 ⇔ 1DEF+LIQ + 1DIS = 1
.
The events DEF+LIQ and DIS are thus not only conditional on EV E, but also on M&A. Conditional
average probabilities are provided in Table (21), which represents the probability of a company to
experience a particular event. Across all lines, older insurance companies of average size were most
likely to be taken over. This ranges from 92.3 (±7.4) for life insurance to 67.6 (±11.3) % for reinsurance.
Companies with less franchise value FRV were more likely to be taken over if they had been active in
supervised lines. Reinsurance, mixed and transport insurance companies were on average more likely to
be discontinued. The respective predicted probability ranges between 48.0 (± 7.4) % for the former and
60.9 (± 9.3) % for the latter. Predicted probabilities for the event DEF +DIS are not significantly
different from zero with the exception of reinsurance. It is nevertheless obvious that companies with
relatively higher franchise value FRV were more likely to default or become liquidated. This leads to
the conclusion that the franchise value FRV is most relevant for events that incorporate the active
decision-making process of either investors in the case of take-overs, or shareholders in the case of
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discontinuations.
3.7 Conclusion: the role of shareholder expectations in credit risk mod-
elling
The preceding chapter related the abandonment option of shareholders to the concept of “endogenous
survivorship bias” in credit risk modelling. Results of an unconditional model specification showed that
company taken-overs shared determinants with surviving companies. This suggested that purchasing
investors / companies were not “catching falling knives” during the market consolidation period of the
late 1920s. It was in addition evidenced that company size was an important determinant with respect
to shareholder actions. This, however, could also be due to the increased difficulty of aligning less
concentrated shareholdings in order to obtain the majority required for a voluntary liquidation. It was
shown that the franchise value of a company mattered as it significantly decreased the probability of
being discontinued across both model specification. It nevertheless did not reduce the probability of
default and therefore had little effect on the overall solvency of a company. Effects associated with
franchise value were identified as an important determinant for shareholders. This is consistent with
the observation of Ch.2 that the intention of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck to promote its reputation in 1924 directly
translated into an increased opportunity cost of shareholder compensation.
This analysis provided more general evidence for the applicability of the American put option
extension to structural credit risk models. This suggests that the findings are not only limited to the
specific case of the German Interwar insurance market. The underlying considerations apply to the
business structure of a private joint-stock company in general. The presence of “endogenous survivorship
bias” is therefore a potential source of bias in all portfolios that contain securities issued by private
joint-stock companies. Not taking into account possible discontinuations leads to bias in the definition
of a portfolio-specific credit model and should therefore be regarded as a relevant source of model risk.
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4 Risk shifting by dividend payout in the German insurance
market during the Interwar period
4.1 The relevance of risk shifting by dividend payout
The balance sheets of insurance companies feature specific characteristics that distinguish this industry
from others within the financial service sector. This is due to the uncertain nature of insurance liabilities,
given that their expected present value is dependent on a multitude of actuarial considerations. During
the Interwar period, shareholders placed particular emphasis on the dividend payout as an indicator for
the financial situation of a company. In general, however, companies are free to administer their dividend
payout. This in turn provides a direct channel for shifting risk from shareholders to policyholders
by releasing internal funds as dividend payout. The empirical evidence of the Interwar period allows
to investigate the influence risk shifting in both the Great Depression period as well as the Golden
Twenties. This chapter argues that although risk shifting occurred in two different ways, both were
realisations of the same underlying principles. Based on an econometric analysis of the dividend payout
dynamics, the chapter concludes that companies increased dividend payout during the late 1920s to the
disadvantage of overall solvency positions. Insurance companies therefore actively shifted risk from
shareholders to policyholders.
This chapter is structured as follows: the first part introduces the historical circumstances of the
Interwar period. It establishes that German joint-stock companies generally administered dividend
payout during the Interwar period. In addition, the case study of Schweizer Ru¨ck in 1931 exemplifies
how risk shifting occurred as a consequence of the Great Depression. The second case study identifies
the aggregate opportunity costs associated with dividend compensation in the German insurance market.
This leads to the hypothesis that companies risk shifting in periods of economic prosperity follows the
same rationale as during period of economic crisis. Second, the theoretical relationship between the
insurance business model and risk shifting by dividend payout is established. A dividend reserve process
is established in the context of ruin theory, which allows for a joint interpretation of both historical
case studies. Third, the empirical model is specified in line with the Lintner partial adjustment model
as per Lintner (1956). Fourth, the relevant data as taken from Dataset II “Company” is introduced
and historical idiosyncrasies are discussed. Fifth, the results of the empirical analysis are provided and
interpreted in relation to Interwar and Postwar benchmarks from the United States.
This analysis contributes to the existing literature theoretically as well as empirically. First, it
establishes the relevance of dividend payout for risk shifting in insurance. It additionally introduces
a new direction for actuarial research within ruin theory by introducing the dividend reserve process
based on the dual risk model. Major limitations of this chapter are the relative scarcity of available
68
comparative data especially of other business sectors in Germany. In addition, the dividend reserve
process is introduced theoretically without a detailed consideration in the context of ruin theory. This
is intentionally left for future research, given that it does not immediately contribute to the purpose of
the dissertation. Finally, the chosen empirical approach might not be appropriate for the analysis of
current business data due to the changed relevance of dividend payout cashflows. Lambrecht & Myers
(2012) together with observations from the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis nevertheless suggest that the
chosen framework remains valid when also taking into account, for example, share buyback programmes.
The deficiencies mentioned are assumed to motivate future research in economic history as well as
insurance economics.
4.2 Historical background: insurance accounting during the Interwar pe-
riod
This part investigates patterns of risk shifting in the insurance sector during the Interwar period. It
first identifies that the main paradigms of the seminal study Lintner (1956) also found application
by German non-life insurance companies. This also includes a detailed discussion of the nature of
hidden reserves in general and a dedicated dividend reserve in particular. Following on, the case study
of Schweizer Ru¨ck illustrates contemporary risk shifting during the Great Depression period. This
is based on the general availability of relevant source material. As a second aggregated case study,
potential risk shifting is identified in German market data for the Golden Twenties. This motivates the
hypothesis that risk shifting was present in this sub-period.
4.2.1 Dividend strategies of German non-life joint stock insurance companies
During the Interwar period, German non-life joint-stock insurance companies actively administered
dividend payout in order to reduce speculation and provide for a relative stability in shareholder
compensation. Lengyel (1927) provides relevant evidence for this:
Generally speaking, the dividend policy of joint-stock companies is conservative. This means
that the management of these companies is dedicated to, if possible, paying out a constant
or only mildly fluctuating dividend over the years. Jumps in the dividend level of individual
years could easily make insurance shares the focus of speculation. This reason motivates
companies to follow a conservative dividend payout policy and to maintain the normal
dividend level. It is, however, in the nature of things that success can vary between the
different years. In order to compensate for business results of good and bad years, to secure
dividend stability, a part of the surplus realised in good years is retained for the purpose to
raise dividends in bad years to the same level as in normal years. This earmarked reserve
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[. . . ] is the dividend reserve. Following the previous statements, it appears to be unnecessary
to state that based on the decision of the general assembly, any free reserve could also be
utilised for the purpose of the dividend policy like a dedicated dividend reserve that was
built up in advance for this purpose. It also has the same economic effect regardless of
whether the company utilises the dedicated dividend reserve or any other free reserve in the
interest of dividend stability.109
This quote first suggests that companies were generally pursuing a dividend policy with principles
similar to the main paradigms identified by Lintner (1956).110 Based on interviews of senior managers
at 28 firms chosen from an initial sample of 600 large companies in 1955, the study draws the following
four conclusions concerning of dividend payout strategies:
(i) Managers believe that firms should have some long-term target payout ratio.
(ii) In setting dividends, they focus on the change in existing payouts, not on the level.
(iii) A major unanticipated and non-transitory change in earnings would be an important
reason to change dividends.
(iv) Most managers try to avoid making changes in dividends that stand a good chance
of having to be reversed within the near future.111
Only paradigm (iii) does not find a corresponding match in the introductory quotation. It can
nevertheless be assumed that an unanticipated change in earnings, i.e. due to a low-probability
high-cost event, will motivate a reduction in dividend payout. It can thus be assumed that insurance
companies administered dividend payout cashflows in accordance with the findings of Lintner (1956).
4.2.2 Contemporary considerations regarding dividend administration from hidden re-
serves
Although Lengyel (1927) mentions the necessity to form a dedicated dividend reserve for the purpose of
administering shareholder compensation none of the joint-stock companies that had accounts published
109“Die Dividendenpolitik der Aktiengesellschaften ist in der Regel konservativ, d.h. die Leitungen sind bestrebt, von
Jahr zu Jahr womo¨glich gleichbleibende und nur ma¨ßig schwankende Dividende zu bezahlen. Sprunghafte Abweichungen
in der Dividendenho¨he der einzelnen Jahre ko¨nnen die Aktien der betreffenden Gesellschaft leicht zum Gegenstand der
Spekulation machen. Aus diesem Grunde verfolgen die Gesellschaften in der Regel eine konservative Dividendenpolitik
und suchen das einmal erreichte Dividendenniveau zu behaupten. Es liegt aber in der Natur der Dinge, daß der Erfolg
in den verschiedenen Jahren eben verschieden ist. Zum Ausgleich der Gescha¨ftsergebnisse guter und schlechter Jahre,
zur Sicherung der Dividendenstabilita¨t wird oft ein Teil des Reingewinns guter Jahre zu dem Zwecke im Unternehmen
zuru¨ckbehalten, um in Jahren mit ungu¨nstigen Gescha¨ftsergebnis aus diesen Ru¨cklagen die Dividende auf die Ho¨he
normaler Jahre zu bringen. Die mit dieser Zweckbestimmung aus zuru¨ckbehaltenen Gewinnen gebildete Reserve ist
die Dividendenreserve. Nach den bisherigen Ausfu¨hrungen ist es wohl u¨berflu¨ssig zu sagen, daß auf Beschluß der
Generalversammlung jede freie Reserve zu Zwecken der Dividendenpolitik genau so herangezogen werden kann, wie eine
von vornherein mit dieser Zweckbestimmung gebildete besondere Dividendenreserve. Es ist auch vo¨llig von der gleichen
wirtschaftlichen Wirkung, ob eine Gesellschaft im Interesse der Dividendenstabilita¨t die besondere Dividendenreserve in
Anspruch nimmt oder irgendwelche sonstige freie Reserve opfert.” Lengyel (1927, p.119)
110A general introduction to this study is provided by Baker (2009). See also Marsh & Merton (1987) and Marsh &
Merton (1986) and in general, Garrett & Priestley (2000) and Garrett & Priestley (2012). Lambrecht & Myers (2012)
provide an analytical proof of the model based on utility theory.
111See Marsh & Merton (1987, pp. 5-6 ) and Marsh & Merton (1986, p.488).
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in“Neumanns Jahrbuch fu¨r die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft”between 1926 and 1935 had disclosed
such a reserve. It was in contrast perceived to be one of the purposes of hidden reserves to be used
for dividend stability purposes. Lengyel (1927) was, in general, objective towards the use of hidden
reserves, given that undisclosed profit and loss caused bias in reported accounts:
In the normal course of a business, the periodic interim balance can certainly serve the
purpose of income recognition. Success is nevertheless a dynamic phenomenon of a business.
It is supposed to express the fluctuations of an undertaking. If, however, the business
results of the previous years are balanced internally by means of hidden reserves and the
balance sheet does not correctly mirror the actual variations of the business results due to
changing arbitrary valuation principles, the balance does not serve the offsetting of assets
and liabilities as well as the recognition of income and thus completely loses any reasonable
purpose.112
Hidden reserves especially enabled the executive management of a company to cover up bad business
decisions. This would limit the ability of shareholders to serve as a controlling instance as was postulated
by two leading German contemporary accounting textbooks, includingSchmalenbach (1919):
Although it is not legitimised by law but by custom and interpretation, it is considered to be
allowed to hide profits at will in order to release these in the case of decreasing profitability,
again at will. A corporation that experiences signs of decline and that – from a business
management perspective – should under all circumstances be prevented from tapping into
capital funds is not prohibited from pretending economic health by mean of releasing hidden
reserves.113
The second textbook, Berliner (1911), which is paraphrased by Lengyel (1927, p.120), came to a similar
conclusion:
Berliner, himself not in principle an adversary of hidden reserves, states that hidden reserves
provide the opportunity to cover unexpected losses that would otherwise have reduced
substantially the dividends of that year; shareholders therefore sometimes do not become
112(German original, translated by the author:) “Im normalen Verlaufe eines Gescha¨ftes kann die periodische Zwischenbi-
lanz sicherlich nur der Erfolgsermittlung dienen. Der Erfolg ist aber eine dynamische Erscheinung des Wirtschaftsbetriebes.
Er soll die Schwankungen des Wirtschaftsbetriebes zum Ausdruck bringen. Wenn aber durch latente Reserven die
Gescha¨ftsergebnisse der vergangenen Jahre intern ausgeglichen werden und die Bilanz durch wechselnde, willku¨rliche
Bewertungsprinzipien die tatsa¨chlichen Schwankungen der Gescha¨ftsergebnisse nicht richtig wiederspiegelt, so dient sie
weder der Vermo¨gensverrechnung, noch der Erfolgsermittlung und verliert vo¨llig jeden vernu¨nftigen Zweck.” See Lengyel
(1927, pp.119/120).
113(German original, translated by the author:) “Zwar nicht durch das Gesetz selbst, aber durch Gewohnheit und
Auslegung hinreichend legitimiert, gilt es als erlaubt, Gewinne nach Belieben zu verstecken, um sie bei nachlassender
Rentabilita¨t, wiederum ganz nach Belieben, als Gewinn auszukehren. Einer Unternehmung, bei der sich Niedergangser-
scheinungen melden und die, betriebswirtschaftlich gesehen, unter allen Umsta¨nden daran gehindert werden sollte, aus
dem Kapitaltopfe sich zu speisen, wird es nicht verwehrt, durch Auskehrung stiller Reserven Gesundheit vorzuta¨uschen.”
As quoted by Lengyel (1927, p.120, Fn.1) without page reference.
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aware of the losses. By doing so, a director who is responsible for bad deals can secretly
make up for the losses caused by him, but with funds that belong to shareholders. He could
present himself as an able business man whilst he would deserve to be judged differently.
That is the effect of hidden reserves, which has already been utilised by many a direction.114
This indicates that the administration of dividends based on hidden reserves could be used by companies
to provide false signals to investors and policyholders. In order to limit this practice Lengyel (1927,
pp.120-121) suggested the introduction of a dedicated dividend reserve:
If [. . . ] the principle of dividend stability is brought forward in favour of hidden reserves,
it has to be replied that the instrument for dividend stability should be a sufficiently
disclosed dividend reserve, which is earmarked to balance the dividend without disrupting
the recognition of income.115
4.2.3 Risk shifting during economic crisis: the example case of Schweizer Ru¨ck in 1931
There is no known source material regarding the considerations of a German insurance company with
respect to its dividend payout strategy. A case study with available primary sources is the Swiss
reinsurance company Schweizer Ru¨ck.116 In the course of the 1931 Financial Crisis, the then-largest
global reinsurance company found itself heavily exposed to price decreases at the securities in the
United States. In total, Schweizer Ru¨ck had to manage write-downs of CHF 40.9 million in 1931, or
approximately 10% of its total asset portfolio in 1930.117 These had to be accounted for by means
of mark-to-market principles, using market values of December 1931. The Swiss supervisory office
mandated the use of this approach in order to maintain the informative power of insurance balance
sheets.118 This approach differed approaches used in other countries, i.e. Germany or the United States.
This was also explicitly mentioned by Schweizer Ru¨ck in its 1931 annual statement:
114(German original, translated by the author:) ”Berliner, der kein grundsa¨tzlicher Gegner der stillen Reserven ist, sagt
selbst, daß stille Reserven die Mo¨glichkeit geben, unerwartete Verluste zu decken, die sonst die Dividende des Jahres um
ein erhebliches herabdru¨cken wu¨rden; die Aktiona¨re erfahren dann manchmal gar nichts von dem Verlust. Ein Direktor,
der schlecht Gescha¨fte auf dem Gewissen hat, kann auf solche Weise den von ihm angerichteten Schaden heimlich, aber
mit dem Gelde der Aktiona¨re wieder gutmachen, und als tu¨chtiger Kaufmann dastehen, wa¨hrend er ganz anders beurteilt
zu werden verdiente. Das ein ein Effekt der stillen Reserven, den sich schomanche Direktion zunichte gemacht hat.” As
quoted by Lengyel (1927, p.120) without page reference.
115(German original, translated by the author:) “Wenn [. . . ] fu¨r die stillen Reserven der Grundsatz der Dividenden-
stabilita¨t ins Treffen gefu¨hrt wird, so muß dem entgegengesetzt werden, daß das Instrument der Dividendenstabilita¨t
eine angemessene offene Dividendenreserve sein soll, die berufen ist, den Ausgleich der Dividende ohne Sto¨rung der
Erfolgsermittlung herbeizufu¨hren.” SeeLengyel (1927, pp.120-121).
In this context Lengyel (1927, pp.119/120 Fn.1) also provided a quote by a standard British accounting textbook to
back his argument: “The whole question (of the Secret Reserves) is a most difficult one, but in general it is thought
that the more straightforward practice of accumulating a substantial Reserve Fund, and having recourse to that Reserve
Fund for the equalisation of dividends, is to be preferred, as being considerably less liable to abuse.” See Dicksee &
De Montmorency (1911, p.268).
116See also Werner (2009) and Straumann (2013).
117See Straumann (2013, p.291) and, for a more detailed account, Werner (2009, pp.53-56).
118See Historical Archive of Swiss Re. Protokollbuch Ausschuss-Sitzungen der Schweizer Ru¨ck. Bd.10. Nr.10.107 960.
Protocol of the board meeting of 27 April 1932, p.178. See also Werner (2009, p.53).
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The extraordinarily strong decline in prices that occurred at the investment market and
that affected the best categories of obligations, has caused write-downs corresponding to
the size of our business operations. In conformity with legal accounting requirements and
in difference to simplifications granted to insurance companies in other countries, December
prices found application in the valuation of our assets as well as for foreign currency holdings
[...].119
At the board meeting held to discuss the matter of asset write-downs, the magnitude of disclosed
losses was addressed as well as the potential impact this had on the dividend payout. Regarding the
former issue the board agreed to not fully disclose the magnitude of necessary write-downs. It was
decided to use the financial reports of the Swiss non-life insurer Zurich as a benchmark for reporting
write-downs in the comparable magnitude of CHF 16 million.120 The remaining write-downs were
financed from various internal sources. The hidden reserves of the company were reduced from CHF 84
million in the previous year to CHF 46 million in 1931.121 The company also reduced the dedicated
“catastrophe” reserve from CHF 16 million to CHF 10 million, which was also published in the annual
balance statement. This reduced the ability of the company to refinance losses incurred by natural
catastrophes. General Director Emil Bebler argued that the current market condition resembled a
catastrophe:
We have to invest the premium as well as the loss reserve, part of which is the catastrophe
reserve; we have suffered losses on the investments offsetting the assets forming these
reserves. These investments have decreased, and [...] hence the use of a reserve dedicated
for catastrophes, and it is a catastrophe, is justified.122
At the same time the board also had to decide on the amount of cash dividend to be distributed. It was
in particular discussed whether the return on equity123 of 30% since 1915 was to be continued given the
119(German original, translated by the author:) ”Die ausserordentlich starken Kursru¨ckga¨nge, welche am Anlagemarkt
eintraten und wodurch die besten Kategorien von Obligationen in Mitleidenschaft gezogen wurden, haben der Gro¨sse
unseres Gescha¨fts entsprechende Abschreibungen zur Folge gehabt. In der Bewertung unserer Anlagen sind in Gema¨ssheit
der gesetzlichen Bilanzierungs-Vorschriften, abweichend von den in andern La¨ndern den Versicherungs-Gesellschaften
gewa¨hrten Erleichterungen, die Dezemberkurse zur Anwendung gelangt, desgleichen fu¨r die fremden Valuten [...].” Annual
Statement Schweizer Ru¨ck 1931, p.4.
120See Historical Archive of Swiss Re. Protokollbuch Ausschuss-Sitzungen der Schweizer Ru¨ck. Bd.10. Nr.10.107 960,
Protocol of the board meeting of 27 April 1932, p.179.
121See Guggenbu¨hl (1939, pp.369, 371-372), an internal financial account of Schweizer Ru¨ck. It should be noted that
the amounts published by Straumann (2013, p.292) are incorrect. It declares a reduction in hidden reserves from CHF
33.7 million to CHF 4.4 million. Whilst the former amount is correct, it represents dedicated reserves. The latter amount
is incorrect and given by Guggenbu¨hl (1939, p.372) as CHF 14.4 million. Other internal funds that were released in order
to refinance the incurred write-downs were the “Zillmer reserve” of nil (1930: CHF 15,160,000) “open reserves” of CHF
30,000,000 (1930: 33,500,000) and “balance carried forward” of CHF 1,590,000 (1930: CHF 826,000).
122(German original, translated by the author:)
”
Die Pra¨mien- sowohl als die Schaden-Reserve, zu welch letzterer die
Katastrophen-Reserve geho¨rt, mu¨ssen wir anlegen; auf diesen den Gegenposten der Reserve bildenden Anlagen haben
wir die Verluste erlitten. Diese Anlagen haben sich vermindert [...] [so]dass die Heranziehung einer fu¨r Katastrophen
vorgesehenen Reserve, und um eine Katastrophe handelt es sich, sich verantworten la¨sst.“ See Historical Archive of Swiss
Re. Protokollbuch Ausschuss-Sitzungen der Schweizer Ru¨ck. Bd.10. Nr.10.107 960, Protocol of the board meeting of 27
April 1932, p.182. See also Werner (2009, p.54).
123Nominal amount of dividends paid relative to capital employed.
73
adverse circumstances. The internal consensus went in favour of this in order to promote the prestige
of the company. This discussion was succinctly summarised by the member of the board Dr. Sulzer:
Given the realised large losses, a certain [dividend] reduction would, regardless of the amount
of reserves available, correspond to a natural feeling. In contrast the executive personalities
highlight the prestige of the company that would require maintaining the dividend. The
question of prestige is regarded only in so far as justified as it has an advertising effect for
the future. [...] If it is indeed to be assumed that a dividend reduction would limit us in
the development of our technical business, if cedents on the other hand confronted us with
greater trust, this aspect had to be assigned such a high relevance, then the request would
be to maintain the dividend.124
In conclusion, the case study of Schweizer Ru¨ck provides valuable insight into the shareholder-related
internal decision making at an insurance company during the Interwar period. A first conclusion is that
the executive management used the financial results of Zurich as a benchmark for their own publication.
Second, the company dealt with the extraordinary circumstances imposed by the 1931 Financial Crisis
by releasing CHF 6 million of internal funds associated with the loss reserve. This shows that any
reserve could be used for the purpose of dividend stabilisation. At the same time CHF 6.15 million
were distributed as dividends following a reported profit of CHF 9.28 million. Thus Schweizer Ru¨ck
effectively obscured to external investors that it actively shifted risks from shareholders to policyholders
by releasing internal funds.
4.2.4 Risk shifting during economic crisis: Dividend payout patterns in Germany during
the Interwar period
The most notable difference between the experiences of Schweizer Ru¨ck and German insurance companies
was that the latter did not have to use mark-to-market accounting principles following the 1931 Great
Depression period. Therefore German companies were not required to account for write-downs of
comparable magnitude. Apart from the release of internal funds, companies could also change the
utilisation of present income cash flows in order to refinance current shareholder compensation. In
contrast to the case study of Schweizer Ru¨ck, this pattern of behaviour would be observable on aggregate
from reported information on dividend payout and net earnings. An important indicator in this regard
124German: “Bei den eingetretenen großen Verlusten du¨rfte, auch wenn die Reserven noch so groß sind, eine gewisse Re-
duktion einem natu¨rlichen Gefu¨hl entsprechen, demgegenu¨ber wird von den leitenden Perso¨nlichkeiten in den Vordergrund
gestellt das Prestige der Gesellschaft, welches eine Beibehaltung der Dividende erfordert. Die Prestigefrage betrachtet
man nur insofern als berechtigt, als sie werbend fu¨r die Zukunft wirkt. [...] Wenn tatsa¨chlich anzunehmen ist, dass
eine Dividendenreduktion uns in der Entwicklung des technischen Gescha¨fts hemmen wu¨rde, dagegen die Zedenten bei
Festhalten am bisherigen Dividendensatz uns mit gro¨sserem Vertrauen entgegentreten werden, wenn dieser Punkt effektiv
ein so grosses Gewicht beizulegen ist, so wu¨rde die Forderung die Beibehaltung der Dividende sein.” See Historical
Archive of Swiss Re. Protokollbuch Ausschuss-Sitzungen der Schweizer Ru¨ck. Bd.10. Nr.10.107 960. Protocol of the
board meeting of 27 April 1932, p.189. See also Werner (2009, p.55).
74
Figure 4: Dividend payout pattern during the Interwar Period, 1926 to 1935
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Note: The dividend payout ratio is the ratio of dividends paid per unit of net earnings.
Source: Dataset II “Company”, see also Ch.4.5
is the dividend payout ratio DPR, which represents dividends paid per unit of net earnings. Figure
(4) provides the median125 and mean aggregate DPR per year for German insurance companies. The
indicator reached its maximum in the year 1928 with a median (mean) of 50.33% (44.33%). With the
onset of the recession in the German economy in 1928, the aggregate DPR started to decrease until
1935. The year of the 1931 Financial Crisis marked the minimum with a median of 31.0% (33.0%).
Although the mean aggregate DPR recovered to a value of 38.78% until 1935, the median remained
constantly low at about 32.5% during the years 1934 and 1935. This was due to bias from outliers in
the last two years. The reduction in medium DPR suggests that the share of non-paying companies
increased in the German market. The development of the aggregate dividend rate - as the ratio of
dividends paid per unit of capital employed - is shown in Figure (5).
Aggregate dividend rates peaked in 1928 with a median (mean) of 8.7% (8.8%). Results for 1930
were nevertheless of similar magnitude with a median (mean) of 8.0% (8.6%). A recovery during the
years 1932 and 1933 followed. For the years 1934 and 1935, this indicator developed in contrast to
DPR, as the median remained relatively constant between 7.25% and 7.5%, whilst the mean declined
from 7.5% to 6.5%. This suggests that the amount of non-paying companies did not increase but that
the dividend rate of paying companies decreased in average. Putting DPR and dividend rate in a
direct relationship allows to analyse the effective cost of capital from dividends. The cost of dividend
125The possibility that outliers might bias the mean requires the use of the robust median.
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Figure 5: Dividend rate during the Interwar period, 1926 to 1935
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Note: The dividend rate is the ratio of dividends paid per unit of capital employed.
Source: Dataset II “Company”, see also Ch.4.5
compensation is defined as the relative amount of income that companies had to utilise per dividend
rate, or as
Utilisation rate =
DPR
dividend rate
=
dividend paid
net earnings
dividend paid
capital employed
.
It represents the opportunity cost that insurance companies are facing when paying out dividends. It is
provided in Figure (6).
Both, median and mean aggregate values indicate a counter-cyclical pattern. The median (mean)
utilisation rate gradually decreased from a peak in 1926 of 4.82% (5.26%) to a through in 1931 of
2.57% (4.3%). Whilst mean values were again biased by outliers in the years 1934 and 1935, the median
utilisation rate recovered back to pre-crisis standards by 1934. The cost of dividend compensation was
therefore relatively low during the immediate years of the Great Depression, 1931 to 1933. It increased
back to pre-crisis levels in the years 1934 and 1935 that were marked by economic recovery.
Periods of a relatively increased utilisation rate are not necessarily associated with risk shifting
activities. It is ,for example, possible that an insurance company holds funds in excess of its calculated
reserve requirements. The associated investments expose the company to further risks such as for
example market, interest rate or credit risk. Under these circumstances, risk-averse companies with
sufficient reserves will cause an increase in the utilisation rate. Separating such activities from actual
risk shifting activities is the purpose of this chapter. The working hypothesis is therefore that German
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Figure 6: Utilisation rate during the Interwar period, 1926 to 1935
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Note: The cost of shareholder compensation is the dividend payout ratio per unit of dividend rate.
Source: Dataset II “Company”, see also Ch.4.5
insurance companies were shifting risk during the Interwar period.
4.3 Managing the dividend payout - risk shifting in insurance investor re-
lations
The internal dividend payout process of an insurance company needs to be modelled in order to analyse
differences in dividend payout patterns. This is necessary for clarifying the connection between the case
study of Schweizer Ru¨ck that shows risk shifting in an economic crisis period, and the experiences of
the German insurance sector during the “Golden Twenties”. The following part first introduces recent
contributions in relevant literature are discussed that are based on observations from the 2007/2008
Financial Crisis. Second, the profitability / stability trade-off inherent to the operations of a private
joint-stock non-life insurance company is presented. Third, the relevance of this trade-off is shown in
the context of investor-related risk shifting. Fourth, a theoretical dividend reserve process is introduced
that takes into account the characteristics of dividend strategies observed.
4.3.1 Basic non-life insurance cash flow decomposition
Insurance companies exchange the promise of taking over the financial costs of a realised uncertain
event in the future against the regular reception of up-front premiums. The insurance company reports
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Table 22: Schematic insurance income statement
Cashflow
Income Expenses
Gross premium
earned
Premiums ceded to
reinsurance
Net premium
earned
Operating cost
(net) losses
incurred
Underwriting
income
Investment income
Net operating profit
Added to surplus
Tax, depreciation
management
compensation, etc.
Dividends
the results of its business activity on an annual basis. The associated schematic accounting cashflow is
provided in Table (22). During the pre-defined accounting period the company uses premiums earned
net of reinsurance to offset operating costs and to pay for losses incurred in this period. Adding up
underwriting and investment income forms the net operating profit. Solvency - or stability - is one of
the main criteria of firm strength in insurance. Using earnings to form additional reserve funds reduces
the default or ruin probability. Net operating profit after transfer to reserves, taxes, depreciation and
management as well as supervisory board compensation is paid out as dividend to shareholders. The
ability to compensate shareholders defines the profitability from an investor perspective. It is important
to note that this profitability / stability trade-off in managing the allocation of funds to reserves or the
release to shareholders is inherent to the general business model of private joint-stock companies during
the Interwar period as well as the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis.
4.3.2 Risk shifting by dividend payout
The fundamental business strategy of an insurance company is to maximise profitability while maintaining
constant stability.126 A pareto-optimal solution to the profitability / stability trade-off is nevertheless
not straightforward to achieve. This is due to the fact that shareholder liabilities are limited to the
capital employed. On the contrary, policyholders - or debtors in general - face potential liabilities
that are only bounded by the specifications of the underlying insurance contract. This constitutes the
classical principal agent conflict between the “fixed claimant” policyholder, the principal “shareholder”
126Compare amongst others Schulenburg & Oletzky (1998), Oletzky (1998), Maguhn (2007) and Friese (2013).
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and the intermediary agent “insurer”.127 According to Smith & Warner (1979) risk shifting occurs from
four major sources of conflict of which two - claim dilution and asset substitution128 - are relevant
from a stability perspective only. Both sources are focused within the body of literature that especially
considers topics of business organisation.129
Risk shifting in the present context occurs directly from the conflict caused directly by dividend
payment and indirectly by underinvestment.130 The former describes the trade-off between increasing
dividend payout and maintaining sound reserve funds. This implies underinvestment in future funds
required for i.e. advancing business operations. The example of Schweizer Ru¨ck shows that insurers
could, on the one hand, increase dividend payout by releasing funds from reserves. This occurs
independently from current income in cashflows and therefore might not be observable. The example of
the utilisation rates of German insurance companies indicates, on the other hand, that companies could
tap into cash flows to reserves in order to increase the amount distributed to shareholders. In this case,
the company directly increase the utilisation of current net earnings and is therefore observable. So
far no study has considered the profitability perspective, i.e. the conflict between principal and agent
within the context of insurance.
4.3.3 Theoretical assessment of insurance dividend payout strategies
Insurance companies have discretion over gross premium income and dividend payout cashflows. Costs
associated with claims incurred are of stochastic nature. This is the basic specification of the Crame´r-
Lundberg model as developed131 by Lundberg (1903) / Lundberg (1909) and Crame´r (1930). The
basic interaction of the initial wealth or capital, deterministic premium income and stochastic claims
payments is analysed in the context of the surplus process of an insurance company. This model was
extended to include shareholder compensation in the form of dividend payout by De Finetti (1957).
This seminal study initiated extensive research into optimal dividend payout strategies in the context
of the Crame´r-Lundberg model and non-life insurance. An exhaustive literature review is provided by
Avanzi (2009).
A straightforward and well-documented dividend strategy in the Crame´r-Lundberg model is the
so-called barrier strategy. If the surplus surpasses a predetermined minimum amount, the excess will
be paid out as dividend. This strategy effectively prohibits risk shifting. The conditions necessary for
optimality of this strategy are exponentially exponentially distributed claims and a lower barrier than
127The agent is in stricter terms the “executive management of the insurer”. See in particular Jensen & Meckling (1976).
128See Smith & Warner (1979, p.118).
129Compare in particular Garven & Pottier (1995), Garven & Lamm-Tennant (2002), Abdul Kader et al. (2010) and for
a general overview Mayers & Smith (2013). This is discussed in detail in Ch.5.
130See Smith & Warner (1979, pp.118-119).
131Compare Borch (1967) for the history of the model and the field.
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the initial capital of the company.132 The main advantages of this strategy are its simplicity as well as
that it generates a dividend cash flow stream that is time-consistent and mathematically optimal in
the framework of mathematical optimisation. The main disadvantage is that the generated dividend
cash flow itself is a function of the stochastic claims process and is therefore not deterministic. The
unrealistic characteristics of this results are remarked by Borch (1967, p.450) / Borch (1974, p.284),
where a utility-based approach offered as an alternative. Motivated by the lack of realism of the
barrier strategy, Avanzi & Wong (2012) propose a deterministic mean-reverting dividend strategy that
compensates optimality for realism. This model, however, has the disadvantage that dividend payout is
not under direct control by the executive management.
4.3.4 Modelling the dividend reserve process
Let the administered dividend payout strategy of a private joint-stock insurance company be represented
by the so-called dual risk model .133 It has found recent application to dividend optimisation problems
by Ng (2007), Ng (2009) as well as Avanzi et al. (2007).134 Contextually, the dual risk model is generally
thought of as a representation of pension funds, annuity or venture capital firms135. Outside of actuarial
studies, the model is also commonly used in queueing theory136. The basic mathematical properties of
the dual risk model are readily available and are provided in Asmussen (2003, Section 5.2), Ng (2009)
and in detail in Ng (2007, Section 4.1).
Let the dividend reserve process Y (t) ∈ R+0 be defined by
Y (t) = y −Dt+ E (t) , (4.1)
where y = Y (0) defines initial funds at time t = 0 where t ∈ T . The stochastic income E (t) ∈ R+0
is added to the reserve and deterministic constant dividend payout cashflow D ∈ R+0 is paid out
simultaneously. Both cashflows are denominated in monetary units. The dividend growth rate
g ∈ R+0 represents the percentage change in relative dividend payout or
g (t) =
Dt
Dt−1
− 1 (4.2)
and is assumed to be normally distributed. In the present context it is a constant. Given that the
132Compare Borch (1963) (identical to Borch (1974, pp.225-234)), Gerber (1969), Bu¨hlmann (1970), Avanzi (2009),
as well as Gerber & Shiu (2004) for the Brownian motion model, and Gerber & Shiu (2006) for the compoung Poisson
model used to represent the claims process.
133Important theoretical introductions to this model are provided by Crame´r (1955, Section 5.13), Seal (1969, pp.116-119),
Taka´cs (1967, pp.152-154) and Bowers et al. (1997, p.424).
134A dual model perturbed by a diffusion process is furthermore used in Avanzi & Gerber (2008), whereas Albrecher
et al. (2008) considers tax payments when the surplus reaches a running maximum.
135See Bayraktar & Egami (2008).
136The first study is Prabhu (1960), see also Asmussen (2003). An early example for its application within the context
of fluid queue theory is Kendall (1957).
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company has full discretion over the dividend payout, it can utilise internal funds to increase D. This is
consistent with the case study of Schweizer Ru¨ck. The process relates to the Crame´r-Lundberg model,
as the latter can be tought of as the process generating E (t). Any further theoretical considerations
are not of relevance in the present context and are left for future research.
Y (t) and y are assumed to be unobservable internal reserves whilst cashflows D - in the following
generalised to be time-varying - and E (t) are available from profit and loss statements. It is also
assumed that companies adhere to the paradigms of Lintner (1956) and adjust dividend payout toward a
firm-specific target payout as the company matures.137 The target payout ratio θ?t puts both cashflows
into relation and is defined as the target internal DPR, or
θ?t =
D?t
Et
, (4.3)
where D?t denotes the target dividend distribution.
138 This variable can only be inferred indirectly
from the cashflow dynamics. In accordance with the fundamental business strategy of an insurance
company it is assumed that the long-run target dividend payout maximises profitability
E [θ] = max
D
E [D?]
E [E]
(4.4)
under the first-order condition that stability - and thus the target dividend reserve Y ? - remains
constant, or
∂Y ? (t)
∂D
= 0. (4.5)
This also requires assumptions regarding the actuarially fair long-run expected net earnings performance
of the company. Investor-related risk shifting is associated with the intentional decrease of stability
by reducing the target dividend reserve Y ? (t). This can occur by directly releasing funds as dividend
payout, which applies to the case of Schweizer Ru¨ck. Alternatively, companies can increase the target
dividend payout ratio and re-allocate net earnings cashflows from building up reserves towards the
target dividend reserve Y ?. This is assumed to have taken place in Germany and shows that both
historical case studies need to be associated to the same investor-focused risk shifting.
137See Powell (2009, p.367) for a detailed description of the model.
138The definition of the target is subject to the considerations of the company. Schweizer Ru¨ck for example used a
dividend rate of 30% as target indicator.
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4.4 Dividend signalling by insurance companies
4.4.1 The Lintner partial adjustment model in insurance literature
Two studies successfully apply the Lintner partial adjustment model to insurance-related questions.
Lee & Forbes (1982) analyse the dividend payout ratio of 61 U.S. non-life insurance companies between
1950 and 1976. The study finds that dividend payout is correlated with previous year’s dividends,
current earnings and the ratio of equity relative to total assets, called capacity ratio. Harrington (1981)
examines the effect of group affiliation on the dividend policy based on a sample of 68 U.S. life insurance
companies, also between 1950 and 1976. The study finds that group subsidiaries paid more dividends
in comparison to independent companies. This also confirms that insurance companies have a strong
interest in providing a consistent dividend cashflow.
4.4.2 Model specification based on Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator
The model provides a method to derive the target dividend payout D? from the intertemporal cashflow
dynamics. The absolute dividend change ∆Dt in period t relative to period t− 1 is formally defined as
∆Dt = γ (D
?
t −Dt−1) + ut, (4.6)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the speed of adjustment to the target payout ratio D?. The error term ut
remains to be defined. The speed of adjustment factor captures the velocity with which a company
seeks to adjust its payout to the target dividend D?t under the assumption that the company has not
yet reached it. Its magnitude represents the interest of the company in achieving the pre-defined target.
Substituting D?t with Equation (4.3) allows to represent the dividend payout Dt at time t as
Dt = γθ
?Et + (1− γ)Dt−1 + ut. (4.7)
This is transformed into a linear regression model by specifying the coefficients as
γθ? = βS1 (4.8)
and
1− γ = βS2 (4.9)
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in accordance with Lintner (1956, p.109). Together with the addition of the intercept β0, this yields
the econometric representation of the model for company i ∈ N as
Dt = β0 + β
S
1 Eit + β
S
2Di(t−1) + uit (4.10)
uit =
∑
t
(βtY EARit) + νi + it.
This approach takes into account year controls Y EAR and a control for idiosyncratic fixed effects
inherent to company i, νi. The state variable denoted by superscript S ∈ [0; 1] represents different
realisations of a binary factor variable that maps observations to the Golden Twenties or the Great
Depression period. This allows to compare results for the relevant realisations whilst ensuring the use
of a single intercept β0. The error term  is assumed to be normally distributed with E [] = 0.
The specified model features an unbalanced panel dataset of 161 individual companies covering
ten years of data. The properties of the panel as “large N small T”139 might introduce “dynamic
panel bias”, given that the lagged variable Di(t−1) is potentially correlated with the fixed effects ν in
uit.
140. In order to take this into account, the Arrelano-Bond two-stage generalised method of moments
(GMM) estimator141 is used. The following approach utilises a two-step system GMM to allow the
use of Windmeijer-corrected standard errors, small-sample adjustments and orthogonal deviations, the
latter to minimise data loss.142 Net earnings Et and time controls Y EAR are treated as predetermined
variables to allow for potential correlation with past errors. Regarding Et this takes into account
sudden income shocks, which were absent during the Interwar period and that companies could also
use internal funds to directly stabilise reported net earnings. Time controls are obligatory since the
used state variable S is also time-dependent given that it sub-divides observations based on annual
classification.143 Finally, the inclusion of an intercept implies that companies are more willing to
increase than decrease dividends.144
4.4.3 Classification of model results
The results of the econometric model serve to calculate implied values for the target dividend payout
rate θ?and speed of adjustment α based on Equation (4.9), respectively Equation (4.8). Due to the
necessary assumptions inherent to the model approach, results are not interpreted in absolute but in
relative terms. Relative differences between the estimates for the sub-periods of 1926 to 1929 and 1930
139See Roodman (2009, p.128).
140See Nickel (1981).
141See Arellano & Bond (1991).
142See Arellano & Bover (1995) and in general Roodman (2009).
143Interestingly, however, adding strictly exogenous variables, such as macro-economic performance data, does not lead
to substantial changes in the results.
144Compare especially Fama & Babiak (1968) for different specifications.
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Table 23: Summary statistics dynamic model
Variable Unit Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
Dividend RM 1,219 124.062 40.00 286.885 0 2,580
Net operating profit RM 1,220 283.54 88.00 673.880 -3,990 6,664
Nominal ROE % 1,219 7.527 8.000 6.556 0 80
DPR % 1,220 39.53 43.669 29.801 -58 126
Utilisation rate % 1,220 5.21 3.839 8.192 -14 200
Note: Reported negative values for DPR and DPR per nominal ROE are associated with
Source: Dataset II “Company”
to 1935 serve to identify potential differences of relevance. Furthermore, model results are compared
with benchmark results from studies on U.S. data, which are based on the same methodology. The
results in Lintner (1956), Fama & Babiak (1968) and Fama & French (1988) are chosen as benchmarks.
Since the studies feature overlapping coverage periods, differences in the individual results are assigned
to the sub-periods that are exclusively covered by each study. The first study analyses dividend payout
patterns of a sample of 28 U.S. companies from 1918 to 1941. Given that it exclusively covers the
period 1918 to 1926 for the speed of adjustment, it is used as benchmark for the U.S. Interwar period.
The second study considers 397 U.S. companies from 1950 to 1964. Due to its exclusive coverage of
the period 1957 to 1964 it is considered as a benchmark for estimates associated with the economic
stability of the U.S. 1960s. The third study provides only results for the speed of adjustment for the
period from 1927 to 1956 based on the extensive CRSP dataset. Given its exclusive coverage of the
years 1942 to 1949 it is used as benchmark for the immediate U.S. Postwar period.
4.5 Data
The sample consists of observations associated with dividend payments available from Dataset II
“Company”. Mutual companies are excluded due to the absence of dividend payout cashflows. A total of
161 companies were potential dividend payers. Table (23) provides the summary statistics. Potential
different forms of shareholder compensation were considered where indicated in the records. These
include the payment of dividends in company shares (Amisia, 1929), the reduction of shareholder
liabilities (Anker Transport, 1930; Berlinische Spiegelglas, 1932) and share-specific payout cashflows
(Deutsche Glas, 1932 - 1935). Negative values for DPR and the utilisation rate are attributed to
Norddeutsche Kraftfahrzeug, a specialised motor insurer founded in Hamburg in 1928. In the same year
the company reported a dividend rate of 4%, a dividend payout of 10,000 RM and a loss of RM 17,000.
The maximum observation for DPR relates to the fire / transport insurance company Iduna-Germania
Versicherung in 1932, when the company paid RM 340,000 in dividends whilst reporting earnings of
RM 270,000. The maximum value reported for the utilisation rate is associated with the transport
84
Table 24: Results dynamic panel model
Sub-periods
S AB OLS FE
Et
1 .342*** .321*** .164***
(.070) (.027) (.032)
2 .126** .140*** .077***
(.042) (.009) (.012)
Dt−1
1 .464* .500*** -.004
(.180) (.058) (.057)
2 .610*** .585*** .075*
(.098) (.024) (.034)
Intercept -15.29* 12.97 86.27***
(7.225) (10.99) (11.21)
(Pseudo-)R2 .875 .876 .826
AB1 z -1.60
AB2 z 1.12
Hansen J χ2 136.22
Instruments 108 108
Companies 161 161
Observations 1,028 1,028 1,028
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Observations are reduced due to differentiation. Variable S maps the
value “1” to observations from the period 1926 to 1929 and “2” to observations from 1930 to 1935. “AB” denotes
results obtained from the Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator, “OLS” results from the ordinary least squares
regression, and “FE” results from the fixed effects panel regression. Standard errors in parentheses.
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p< .001
Source: Dataset II “Company”
insurer Wikinger Lloyd in 1934. In this year, the company reported a very low dividend rate of 0.5%
with a DPR of 100% .
4.6 Results partial adjustment model
Table (24) provides the results of the Lintner partial adjustment model. Overall, the GMM estimator
provides results that are comparable to OLS regression estimates. The explanatory value of the
(Pseudo-)R2 statistic is limited by the inclusion of the lagged variable that causes large values, given
that relative differences of current to previous-year dividends were limited. As a robustness check for
GMM estimates, Roodman (2009) argues that results from the GMM estimator should be within or
sufficiently close to the range of results obtained from OLS and fixed effects regression. Although the
reported point estimates for E1t and D
2
t−1exceed this range, both results are sufficiently close as the
results of OLS regression lie within the standard deviation of both variables. The Arrelano-Bond test
for serial correlation furthermore reports the necessary absence of serial correlation in second differences.
Finally, the Hansen J-test confirms the exogeneity of the instrument set, thus suggesting that the
model is well specified. Lastly, all parameter estimates are statistically significant at a p-value of 5%.
Based on the estimated results, Equation (4.9) allows the inference of the implied speed of adjustment
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Table 25: Results GMM estimation, speed of adjustment and target payout ratio
Definition Golden Twenties Great Depression U.S. Interwar U.S. 1960s U.S.
Postwar
Period 1926 - 1929 1930 - 1935 1918 - 1941 1950 - 1964 1927 - 1956
Speed of
adjustment
γ .536 .390 .300 .400 .490
Target DPR θ? .638 .323 .500 .380 -
Observations N 161 161 28 397 CRSP
dataset
Note: Own calculations. Reference data provided for comparative purposes on different periods and covering
different datasets of U.S. companies.
Source: For Golden Twenties and Great Depression: Table (24); for U.S. Interwar: Lintner (1956); for U.S.
Postwar: Fama & French (1988); for U.S. 1960s Fama & Babiak (1968)
γ and Equation (4.8) the calculation of the implied target payout ratio θ?. Results are provided in
Table (25).
The speed of adjustment γ is estimated at 0.536 during the Golden Twenties and 0.390 during the
Great Depression period. The former period provides estimates that are closer to the results of 0.490
for the overall U.S. Postwar period from 1927 to 1956. The estimates for the later period fall between
the benchmark values and are closer to the results for the U.S. 1960s. The point estimates for target
dividend payout ratio θ? are 0.638 during the Golden Twenties and 0.323 during the Great Depression
period. The arithmetic mean of both estimates, 0.481, is similar in magnitude to the benchmark of 0.500
for the U.S. Interwar period, thus supporting the robustness of results. The estimates imply first that
insurance companies were targeting twice the dividend payout ratio during the first relative to Great
Depression period. Second, the former estimate was also in excess of the U.S. Interwar benchmark. The
estimate for the later period, however, is closer to the benchmark of 0.380 for the U.S. 1960s period.
Overall, the point estimates for the later period between 1930 and 1935 are comparable to the
benchmark results for the U.S. 1960s period. This implies comparable dynamics in the underlying
dividend reserve processes. A reason for this observation is that companies distributed funds that were
not required for stability purposes during both, the U.S. 1960s period of economic stability and the
Great Depression period in Germany. This helps to explain the increase in the aggregate utilisation
rate in the later years of the Great Depression in Germany. It raises the additional question as to
whether insurance earnings during the early 1930s were sufficient to enable companies the build-up of
sufficient reserves. The hypothesis of German insurance companies engaging in risk shifting has to be
rejected for the Great Depression period.
With respect to the earlier Golden Twenties from 1926 to 1929, the empirical evidence suggests
that companies were actively shifting risk. The excess estimated target dividend payout rate are not
comparable to the benchmark results. They are in addition consistent with the increased level of the
aggregate utilisation as the relative cost of dividend compensation. Additionally, the relatively high
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speed of adjustment is explained by the increased competition following the 1924 currency reform. As
companies sought to return to pre-war business operations they also sought to return to pre-war payout
levels. This is consistent with the benchmark of the U.S. Postwar period, which was also marked by a
recovery from the U.S. war efforts. It confirms the hypothesis of German insurance companies actively
shifting risk for the sub-period of the Golden Twenties.
4.7 Pro-cyclical dividend administration
This chapter showed that increased dividend payout of Schweizer Ru¨ck in 1932 as well as relatively
increased relatively cost of dividend compensation in Germany during the Golden Twenties from 1926
to 1929 were both indicators for risk shifting activities. This finding was based on a newly defined
dividend reserve process that contributed a new perspective to the discussion of optimal dividend payout
strategies in actuarial ruin theory. Within this process, the Lintner partial adjustment model was used
to analyse cashflow dynamics based on the Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator. Results indicated that
increased relative cost of dividend compensation was associated with risk shifting during the Golden
Twenties period. In contrast, likewise increased levels were found to be the consequence of sufficiently
available reserve funds at the end of the Great Depression period and not with risk shifting.
The key contribution of this chapter to the identification of endogenous risk is the observation
that the case studies of Schweizer Ru¨ck and the German market are based on similar dynamics. This
relates similar patterns witnessed during the recent 2007/2008 Financial Crisis to the same underlying
dynamics. During the recent crisis, banks and securities firms affected continued to pay dividends
regardless of the adverse circumstances. Overall, 45% of TARP funds received by banks145 and a
total of USD 81.458 billion 146 were redistributed to shareholders. Acharya et al. (2011) explain this
observation by the implied governmental guarantee for the institutions affected that were deemed “too
big to fail”. These companies were therefore able to maintain current profitability levels regardless of
stability-related concerns. Acharya et al. (2013) analyse the motivation to maintain profitability level
regardless of the business performance in a game theoretical setting. The study argues that, within
an integrated financial market, dividend decisions of financial institutions are highly interconnected.
Banks therefore do not unilaterally change dividend payout strategies, even although this would be
consistent with the four paradigms expressed by Lintner (1956).147 This shows similarity to the case
study of Schweizer Ru¨ck that the company considered the financial statements of Zurich prior to its
dividend decision. With respect to the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis, AIG also paid USD 1.6 billion in
145See Acharya et al. (2011, p.7).
146Own calculations based on data of quarterly dividend distributions by 13 U.S. banks in the period 2007 to 2009. See
Acharya et al. (2011, Appendix, Table 4a).
147This relates in particular to the paradigm (iii) of Lintner (1956) that “[a] major unanticipated and non-transitory
change in earnings would be an important reason to change dividends”.
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dividends over the three quarters of 2008 prior to the governmental bail-out that prohibited further
payout in September 2008.148 Interestingly, AIG even increased cash dividends from USD 0.20 per
share to USD 0.22 in the third quarter of 2008 when the share price fell from USD 30.10 to USD
2.05.149 By distributing funds from reserves as dividends, AIG as well as the other affected companies
actively shifted risk from shareholders to policyholders. The antecedent of the Interwar period suggests
that AIG engaged in similar activities prior to the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis, as is hypothesised in the
introduction of this dissertation.
148See AIG 2008 10-K p.319.
149See AIG 2008 10-K p.34.
88
5 Reinsurance demand in Germany during the Interwar pe-
riod
5.1 Reinsurance as financial derivative
Direct insurance companies - cedents - obtain reinsurance protection by passing on - or ceding - the
liability for financial costs associated with the occurrence of an insurance claim. In turn, premiums
originally earned on the accepted risk is passed on to the reinsuring party. This constitutes an important
element of insurance risk management. At the same time, reinsurance as a derivative of insurance risk
is actively traded on the secondary reinsurance market. During the Interwar period, Germany was
home to the oldest specialised reinsurance company and the company that invented modern quota
share reinsurance, Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck und Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck, respectively. It featured a historically grown
and well developed reinsurance market. Furthermore, the legal framework was historically unique
given that neither reinsurance transactions nor specialised reinsurance companies were subject to
governmental supervision. This suggests companies may have used reinsurance for purposes other than
risk management. The following analysis analyses the determinants of reinsurance demand in Germany
during the Golden Twenties and the Great Depression period between 1926 and 1935 in Germany.
The motivation to analyse reinsurance demand in the context of endogenous risk is motivated by
the finding of Abdul Kader et al. (2010) that joint-stock companies active in the Swedish fire insurance
market featured an increased demand for reinsurance demand during the 1920s. It is hypothesised
that this was due to risk shifting by means of reinsurance. The extended risk exchange model by
Borch (1986) is used to illustrate the theoretical interdependence between the reinsurance market and
shareholders. It establishes that changes in the investment opportunity set of investors may cause risk
shifting by means of reinsurance. The German reinsurance market of the Interwar period lends itself as
a natural experiment due to its beneficial idiosyncratic characteristics. The model assumptions are
tested empirically using a two-step panel model approach that advances the methodology introduced by
Mayers & Smith (1990) and by Abdul Kader et al. (2010). It is found that insurance companies were
shifting risk by reinsurance during the Golden Twenties and that residual insurance risk accumulated
at specialised reinsurers. It is also shown that young specialised reinsurance companies accumulated
residual risk.
The analysis contributes to the existing literature by introducing a new econometric two-step model
that explicitly takes into account the statistical properties of the variable for reinsurance demand. In
addition, a direct link between actuarial theory and empirical analysis is established that connects
principal agent with actuarial ruin theory. The main limitation of the analysis is that underwriting
portfolios of specialised reinsurance companies are not available for analysis due to a lack of reporting
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standards. In addition, lagged variables are not considered due to the relatively short period under
consideration.
The chapter is organised as follows: first, the characteristics of the “1901 Act on the Supervision of
Insurance Undertakings” in general and the contemporary consideration of reinsurance in particular
are provided. Second, the theoretical principles of reinsurance demand are discussed on the basis of
extended risk exchange model. Third, the empirical approach is introduced on the basis of a detailed
discussion of the statistical properties of the dependent variable. Fourth, the characteristics of the
dataset at hand are pointed out. Fifth, the empirical results are provided and discussed. The empirical
appendix provides additional robustness checks of the model assumptions.
5.2 Historical Background: reinsurance and the 1901 Act on the Supervi-
sion of Insurance Undertakings (VAG)
The codified insurance supervisory law for the German Reich, the “Act on the Supervision of Insurance
Undertakings” (German: “Gesetz u¨ber die Beaufsichtigung der Versicherungsunternehmen” (VAG)) of
12 May 1901 remained valid throughout the Interwar period. Its main motivation at inception was to
provide a “unified legal foundation for all territories of the [German] Reich.”150 Its core content remained
applicable until the end of World War II. As primary source material, the legal documentation preceding
the passing of the law together with the original May 1901 version of the law are available in the source
collection “Motive VAG (1963)”151. Additional insight is provided from the contemporary commentary
Moldenhauer (1903) and the concise analysis provided by Ruge (2001). A detailed discussion of the
principle of insurance line separation is the doctoral dissertation Rhode-Liebenau (1973).
The following part first introduces the scope and purpose of German insurance regulation. Second,
the treatment of reinsurance companies is discussed. Third, the code of conduct of reinsurance business
operations is presented.
5.2.1 The scope and purpose of the 1901 VAG
The German insurance sector is historically divided into private and public insurance companies. The
latter were subject to the legislation of the German federal states so that the 1901 VAG only applied to
private joint-stock and mutual companies.152Regarding the general purpose of insurance regulation
in general, the textbook Farny (2006, pp.108-125) lists four main purposes: first, micro-prudential
150(German original, translated by the author:) “[...] einheitliche Rechtsgrundlage fu¨r alle Gebiete des Reiches.” See
Manes (1935, p.163).
151This source collection also contains all relevant amendments to the VAG until World War II. In the following the
basic characteristics of the VAG are provided.
152“Public insurance companies, as incorporated under the directives of the federal states, are not subject to the
provisions of the law.” (German original, translated by the author:) “Die auf Grund landesgesetzlicher Vorschriften
errichteten o¨ffentlichen Versicherungsanstalten unterliegen den Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes nicht [...].) Art. 119 VAG,
Motive VAG (1963, p.302)
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consumer protection, second, guaranteeing the functionality of the insurance sector, third, preventing
and eliminating potential market deficits and forth, the promotion of general economic growth. The
need for the first purpose, consumer protection, arises from the information asymmetry between the
counterparties of the insurance contract. Since policyholders have full information about the insured
event, the reporting of false information is considered as fraud and is treated as a criminal offense.
Insurance companies, however, have detailed expertise with respect to the legal framework of the
insurance contract. This in turn puts policyholders with less legal expertise in a disadvantageous
position. For example, it might remain unnoticed by the policyholder that certain types of risk might not
be covered by the contract. This would cause a situation of unintentional lack of insurance protection.
It therefore falls to the supervisor to ensure consumer protection, which includes to guarantee that
insurance companies meet their liabilities towards policyholders.153
The 1901 VAG explicitly mentioned the purposes to protect consumers and to ensure the functionality
of the sector as main mission statements of the German supervisory office in Art. 64:
It is upon the German supervisory office to control the complete business operations of
insurance companies, in particular the adherence to legal provisions and the adherence
to the business plan in particular. It is authorised to make dispositions that are suitable
for aligning business operations and the business plan with legal provisions or eliminating
deficits that could either endanger the interests of the insured or put business operations in
opposition to proper conduct. [...]154
To ensure consumer protection, VAG Art. 64 defined the mission of the supervisory office as overseeing
companies on a continual basis. It had the right to repeal the concession for companies that had violated
particular principles, including their own individual business plan. This was the set of information
required in order to obtain the concession for starting business operations. Art. 4 specified the particular
set of information required for obtaining a concession:
Insurance companies require the approval of the supervisory office for conducting business.
The application for the approval of a concession has to include the business plan, which has
to disclose the purpose and the establishment of the company, the geographical coverage of
the intended operations as well as the conditions that are supposed to ensure the continuing
fulfilment of the company’s future liabilities.
153The general historical development of this solvency principle from an international perspective is provided in Sandstro¨m
(2007).
154(German original, translated by the author:) “Der Aufsichtsbeho¨rde liegt es ob, den ganzen Gescha¨ftsbetrieb der
Versicherungsunternehmungen, insbesondere die Verfolgung der gesetzlichen Vorschriften und die Einhaltung des Gescha¨ft-
splans, zu u¨berwachen. Sie ist befugt, diejenigen Anordnungen zu treffen, welche geeignet sind, den Gescha¨ftsbetrieb mit
den gesetzlichen Vorschriften und dem Gescha¨ftsplan im Einklange zu erhalten oder Misssta¨nde zu beseitigen, durch
welche die Interessen der Versicherten gefa¨hrdet werden oder der Gescha¨ftsbetrieb mit den mit den guten Sitten in
Widerspruch gera¨t.” Art. 64 VAG, Motive VAG (1963, p.296).
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Elements of the business plan should be:
1. the commercial arrangement or the charter if the corporation is based on such;
2. the insurance-related general terms of agreement and the insurance-technical documenta-
tion if the nature of the intended insurance business requires such.155
Conditions for the repealing of a concession were provided in Art. 7 (VAG):
The concession to conduct business may only be denied, if
1. the business plan violates legal provisions;
2. based on the business plan, the interests of the insured are not adequately ensured or the
continuing fulfilment of the company’s liabilities is not sufficiently provided for;
3. facts exist that justify the assumption that business operations will not take place in compliance
with legal provisions or proper conduct.
The concession can be made conditional on the provision of a suitable security deposit, for which
the purpose and the terms for return are to be declared.156 Both requirements indicate that the
supervisory office could exert its authority with a great degree of discretion. The efficiency of the
regulatory requirements thus substantially relied on the ability of the supervisory office to take objective
and informed action. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the German insurance regulation was indeed
efficient in providing consumer protection. Koch (2012, p.288) / Koch (2005, p.53) attest the German
supervisory office a “high reputation amongst politics, companies and the insured, [and] the general
public [...]”.157 The German supervisory office (German: Versicherungsaufsichtsbeho¨rde) was the main
regulatory body within the framework of the insurance supervisory law.
155(German original, translated by the author:) “Versicherungsunternehmungen bedu¨rfen zum Gescha¨ftsbetriebe der
Erlaubnis der Aufsichtsbeho¨rde. Mit dem Antrag auf Erteilung der Erlaubnis ist der Gescha¨ftsplan einzureichen,
welcher den Zweck und die Einrichtung des Unternehmens, das ra¨umliche Gebiet des beabsichtigten Gescha¨ftsbetriebs
sowie namentlich auch diejenigen Verha¨ltnisse darzulegen hat, aus denen sich die dauernde Erfu¨llbarkeit der ku¨nftigen
Verpflichtungen des Unternehmens ergeben soll.
Als Bestandteile des Gescha¨ftsplans sind insbesondere einzureichen:
1. der Gescha¨ftsvertrag oder die Satzung, sofern die Unternehmung auf solchem beruht;
2. die allgemeinen Versicherungsbedingungen und die technischen Gescha¨ftsunterlagen, soweit solche nach der Art der
zu betreibenden Versicherung erforderlich sind.” Art.4 VAG, Motive VAG (1963, p.289).
156German: “Die Erlaubnis zum Gescha¨ftsbetrieb darf nur versagt werden, wenn
1. der Gescha¨ftsplan gesetzlichen Vorschriften zuwiderla¨uft;
2. nach dem Gescha¨ftsplane die Interessen der Versicherten nicht hinreichend gewahrt sind oder die dauernde
Erfu¨llbarkeit der aus den Versicherungen sich ergebenden Verpflichtungen nicht genu¨gend dargethan ist;
3. Tatsachen vorliegen, welche die Annahme rechtfertigen, daß ein den Gesetzen oder den guten Sitten entsprechender
Gescha¨ftsbetrieb nicht stattfinden wird.
Die Erlaubnis kann von der Stellung einer angemessenen Sicherheit abha¨ngig gemacht werden, wobei deren Zweck und
die Bedingungen fu¨r die Ru¨ckgabe festzustellen sind.” Art.7 VAG, Motive VAG (1963, p.289)
157Koch (2012, p.288) / Koch (2005, p.53) rests this conclusion partly on the description of the supervisory office in the
novel Kleiner Mann - was nun? written by Hans Fallada in 1932. It describes the daily hardships of a sales clerk in
a department store in Berlin during the late 1920s. Following the birth of the protagonist’s son, the health insurance
company harshly denied any liability. Upon writing a letter to the German supervisory office he received a first reply by
postcard three days later, informing him that his case warranted a further investigation. The outstanding payment was
received shortly after. Only four weeks after the protagonist’s initial letter, the insurance supervisory office had informed
the protagonist in a “concise and graceful” manner that, following the received payment, it considered the case as closed.
Koch (2005, p.53) discusses the elements of this narrative and concludes that the prosaic descriptions are historically and
legally accurate.
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5.2.2 Limits of supervision
Not all private joint-stock companies were subject to supervision. Art. 116 VAG excluded joint-stock
insurance companies that were exclusively active in transport insurance and reinsurance:
Companies that conduct insurance against stock market losses or transport insurance or
exclusively reinsurance, excluding mutual companies, do not require a concession.158
Transport insurance and reinsurance were of particular relevance for the German insurance market.
Whilst the former was already featured in the first draft of the law, the latter was included in the
first reading.159 The German approach acknowledged that, unlike direct insurance, reinsurance was
transacted on a business-to-business basis. The fact that both counterparties are represented by
professional businessmen makes micro-prudential consumer protection redundant in reinsurance160.
This absence of direct control led to the development of informal institutions in the form of a special
code of conduct that ensured the functionality of the system. For example, the missing external
protection against fraudulent reporting by the ceding party led to the formulation of the principle of
“uberrima fides”, or “utmost good faith” (German: “Treue und Glauben”), which mandated the full
disclosure of all relevant information.161 Contracts generally included terms that gave the reinsurer the
right to conduct an audit of the covered insurance business.162 During the period under consideration,
reinsurers were nevertheless reluctant to make use of their right to audit the books, fearing that the
ceding party would interpret this as general mistrust. This general dilemma was concisely outlined in
an article in The Review of 24 November 1933:
[. . . ] [Primary insurance companies] state that they consider it an offence against their
dignity to be asked to let the re-insurers check points of dispute at their head office, and
again others think that the whole question should not arise at all, as re-insurers should not
transact business with companies they cannot implicitly trust.163
A second important principle that provided protection for the direct insurance company was the concept
of “pay-as-will-be paid” or German “Folgepflicht”, see Gerathewohl (1976, p.525). It clarifies that all
terms of the original insurance contracts covered by reinsurance also apply to the reinsurance company.
This principle was also already established during the Interwar period, as is exemplified by the following
court ruling in the United Kingdom:
158(German original, translated by the author:) “Unternehmungen, welche die Versicherung gegen Kursverluste oder
die Transportversicherung oder ausschließlich die Ru¨ckversicherung zum Gegenstande haben, mit Ausnahme von Ver-
sicherungsvereinen auf Gegenseitigkeit, bedu¨rfen keiner Zulassung.” Art. 116 VAG, Motive VAG (1963, p.302).
159VAG, Motive VAG (1963, p.238)
160See Hermannsdorfer (1931, pp.28-43; p.29) and Wyrsch (1957, p.129).
161See Gerathewohl (1976, p.510).
162This was especially debated during the Interwar period when adverse economic conditions led reinsurance companies
to fear potential fraud. See Kramer (1935) for the case of Germany.
163“The Checking of Treaty Accounts”. The Review, November 24, 1933, pp.1134-1135.
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Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. v. Colonial Mutual Fire Ins. Co. [1922] 2 K.B. 461. N. having
insured a ship, reinsured with C., the policy having the clause “subject to the same clauses
and conditions as the original policy and to pay as may be paid thereon.” The original
insurance contract between N. and the shipowner was varied by reducing the value and the
original policy endorsed accordingly. The variation was not communicated or known to C.
The ship then became a total loss. Held, that as the head policy had been altered without
the consent of the reinsurers the latter was not liable.”164
Finally, the enforcement of the reinsurance code of conduct was ensured by arbitration courts. These
were established in an ad-hoc basis and consisted of independent and neutral insurance experts. This
self-regulation proved highly successful within the market.165 It nevertheless remains to question as to
whether the informal control mechanisms served to prohibit companies from using reinsurance for other
means.
5.3 Risk shifting by means of reinsurance
The following part provides a theoretical identification of risk shifting in the context of the extended
risk exchange model, which is introduced. It is followed by a derivation of risk shifting potential in the
reinsurance market. In addition, the fundamental principles of reinsurance are covered in order to find
potential means of abuse. Finally, the current state of the relevant literature is provided that suggests
the hypothesis that joint-stock insurers engaged in risk shifting by means of reinsurance in the Golden
Twenties.
5.3.1 The reinsurance market as risk exchange model
Reinsurance provides liability insurance against claims arising from insurance contract obligations. It
allows companies to adjust the composition of underwriting portfolios in accordance with the company-
specific risk appetite. Borch (1960) and Borch (1962) show that a pareto-optimal equilibrium solution
does exist in a risk exchange market. This model of a reinsurance market assumes the exclusive use of
quota-share reinsurance, risk-averse individual investor-entrepreneurs as participants with continuous
utility functions, the absence of transaction costs including taxes and, more technically, only first and
second moments of underwriting returns. It is consistent with the closely related Sharpe-Mossin-Lintner
CAPM.166A simple market-consistent pricing method that arises from the risk exchange model is the
well-known actuarial Esscher pricing principle due to Bu¨hlmann (1980) and Bu¨hlmann (1984).167 It
164See Picard (1935, p.113).
165Gerathewohl (1976, p.584).
166The reinsurance model in fact predated the development of the CAPM, which was formulated independently in
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). The latter study, also published in Econometrica, makes clear reference
to Borch (1962). See also Lamm-Tennant & Garven (2002).
167See also Cummins (1990), Louberge` (1998) , Young (2006), Bernard (2013, p.621) and Bauer et al. (2013, pp.638-639).
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mirrors the principles of both the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM168 as well as the Black-Scholes option
pricing formula169. Nonnegative cashflows (losses incurred) arise from insured random events (insurance
risk) Xi ∈ χ, where χ denotes a set of nonnegative random variables given the probability space(Ω,P,F).
Every company i ∈ N features individual risk aversion represented by the factor αi ∈ R+0 or the
associated risk tolerance unit, defined as 1/α.170 Furthermore, Z =
∑N
i=1Xi denotes the aggregate risk
in the reinsurance market. The market-consistent price density (reinsurance premium) pi ∈ R+0 follows
from the well-known Esscher transform, also known as exponential tilting, by
pii =
E
[
Xie
αiZ
]
E [eαiZ ]
. (5.1)
This pricing principle suggests that the market price for reinsurance is related to overall market supply
of insurable risks together with the company-specific risk aversion. Increases (decreases) in risk aversion
α, aggregate market risk Z as well as company-specific insurance risk X lead to a likewise increase
(decrease) in the reinsurance premium pi.
5.3.2 Risk shifting in the risk exchange model
The simplifying and highly theoretical assumptions of the model limit its applicability to actual
reinsurance markets as noted by Garven & Lamm-Tennant (2002). The authors argue that the “[...]
most apparent “de-ficiency” of [Borch’s] model is that most insurers are not owned and operated by
individual entrepreneurs; rather, they comprise a complex set of (implicit and explicit) contracts among
various stakeholders, including policyholders, shareholders, managers, regulators, and tax authorities.”
171 This relationship between the company and its shareholders is explicitly addressed by Borch (1985)
and especially Borch (1986). The main argument is that the use of utility functions constitutes as
an unrealistic modelling device. The risk aversion of an insurance company - represented by the risk
aversion factor α - should be associated with the ability of the company to maximise shareholder value
under the first-order condition of a constant level of default risk.
Let the probability set be defined by (Ω,P,F). The nonnegative value of the company, denoted by
V (s) ∈ R+0 for state of the world s ∈ S that is adapted to the economic information set F = (Fs)s∈S , is
defined by the discounted net present value of expected dividend payout,
V (s) =
1
ν (s, α)
E [D] , (5.2)
168Compare Mu¨ller (1987) .
169This is derived in Gerber & Shiu (1994).
170The risk version α can for example be represented by any continuous utility function of the hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) class, see Bu¨hlmann (1984).
171See Garven & Lamm-Tennant (2002, p.165).
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where m = 1/ν (s, α) ∈ R+0 denotes the nonnegative state price density172 that is a function of s as
well as of α. The nonnegative dividend payout is denoted by D ∈ R+0 . The world can take two discrete
states S ∈ [1, 2] that represent relatively better (s = 1) and worse (s = 2) investment opportunity
sets leading to ν (1) > ν (2). Let the discount rate be further defined by a stochastic company-specific
discount factor
ν (s) = ϕ (s) + g (α) , (5.3)
where ϕ (s) denotes a state-dependent and company-specific stochastic discount factor and g (α)
the deterministic company-specific dividend growth rate. The latter is a function of α indicating
that decreasing risk aversion leads to increased dividend growth or ↓ α →↑ g.173 Substituting ν in
Equation (5.2) yields Equation (6.1) of Ch.4. It follows directly that the state transition represented by
ϕ (1) > ϕ (2) leads to V (1) < V (2). The company can control this change by adjusting its dividend
payout g, which implies a likewise adjustment of risk aversion α. More generally, the dynamics of the
discount rate require minimising the rate of change in the value of the company with respect to changes
in the investor opportunity set, or
arg min
α
∂V
∂s
. (5.4)
The business model of private non-life insurance, however, postulates that this maximisation of
shareholder value requires a constant level of default risk. This leads to the first-order condition
∂α
∂s
= 0, (5.5)
which shows that a company is violating this maximisation problem if it adjusts its value to changes in
the investment opportunity set represented by s. Any increase caused in risk aversion α therefore has
to be attributed to the company shifting risk from shareholders to policyholders.
In the context of reinsurance, risk shifting can occur due to three of four major sources for principal
agent conflict; claim dilution, asset substitution and underinvestment.174 Claim dilution arises from
the fact that premium levels are customarily fixed for a longer period in direct insurance contracts
than in reinsurance arrangements where conditions are renegotiated annually.175 Companies can
172This indicates that the approach is consistent with the Arrow-Debreu model that also forms the foundation for the
risk exchange model. See Borch (1962).
173This is the basic relationship within the dividend optimisation problem of the Crame´r-Lundberg model. A detailed
derivation is provided in Borch (1985) and especially Borch (1986) as well as Avanzi (2009, pp.218-219). Although Karl
Borch makes no reference to the Esscher Pricing Principle, the risk aversion factor α is explicitly defined in the context of
utility functions by Paragraph 3.6 of Borch (1986, p.106).
174See Smith & Warner (1979, pp.118-119).
175This is referred to as “renewal”. Compare Gerathewohl (1976) and Gerathewohl (1982) in general and Cruciger
(1926) regarding its contemporary application. See also Maguhn (2007), where a “market friction” model is designed that
especially takes into account the duration mismatch between direct and reinsurance arrangements as a potential source of
liquidity risk.
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use reinsurance to increase their exposure to risk whilst still earning premiums based on the pre-
reinsurance level of default probability. Closely related is asset substitution. It describes the possibility
of companies to sell shares of low risk-return underwriting portfolios in order to finance buying parts
of high risk-return underwriting portfolios via quota-share reinsurance. The circumstances of the
August 1929 FAVAG default illustrate the relevance of the joint of effect of both sources. Modert (2004)
states that the company “conducted business in transport reinsurance on a large scale as the company
intended to increase reported total premium volume by earning the associated relatively high premium
levels.”176 The third source, underinvestment, relates to the potential exposure to unexpected severe
loss experiences. Market-consistent insurance pricing does not only have to consider the actuarial
net present value of insurance risks but also present market conditions. Companies that consider, for
example, low-probability high-cost events in the calculation of the insurance premium might quote
prices that are too high in contrast to other competitors. Facultative or excess-of-loss reinsurance helps
to manage catastrophe risk or unexpected fluctuations in claim levels.
5.3.3 Use and potential abuse of reinsurance
Intentional risk shifting by means of reinsurance implies that its original purpose of risk management is
abused for other purposes. Harrison (2004, Ch.1.4-1.9) lists six principal functions of reinsurance. A
seventh follows from Gerathewohl (1976).
1. Surplus relief
One of two basic forms of reinsurance is proportional or treaty reinsurance. It involves direct
insurance companies passing on a share of a pre-defined risk portfolio to a reinsurance company.
The foundation of this business transaction is a single contract - or treaty - between both companies
that forms the foundation of the business relationship. Its terms can be renegotiated on an
annual basis.177 This function allows companies to substitute internal capital of their own with
external reinsurance protection. It is therefore relevant in the context of the claim dilution / asset
substitution conflict.
2. Stabilise the loss experience
An alternative to proportional quota is excess-of-loss reinsurance. By specifying a retention limit,
insurance companies cede the excess of the limit to the reinsurance company. This helps to reduce
the variance in insurance liabilities. It is therefore subject to the underinvestment principal agent
176(German original, translated by the author:) “Die Favag ta¨tigte im großen Umfang Gescha¨fte in der Transport-
Ru¨ckversicherung, weil sie an den dort anfallenden hohen Pra¨mien zur Steigerung der von der Statistik erfassten Werte
der Gesamtpra¨mieneinnahmen interessiert war.” See Modert (2004, p.30).
177See Gerathewohl (1976) and Gerathewohl (1982) in general and Cruciger (1926) regarding the contemporary
application.
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conflict. A potential problem in the present context is that excess-of-loss reinsurance was not a
common contract type during the Interwar period, see Gugerli (2013, pp.178-179).
3. Protection against low probability / high cost events
Another form of stabilising the loss experience is facultative reinsurance, or the protection against
the financial losses of low probability / high cost events such as natural and man-made catastrophes.
Given the rare occurrence of especially expensive events, direct insurance companies might favour
buying protection over forming specifically earmarked reserves. Facultative reinsurance is different
to treaty insurance as every random low probability / high cost event is underwritten independently.
The relevance of facultative reinsurance as a method to control risk exposure is underlined by
Winter (1988), Gron (1994), Meier (2006) and Maguhn (2007) for the insurance sector in general
and by Gerathewohl (1976) for the reinsurance sector in particular. Given the absence of low-
probability / high-cost events during the Interwar period, this function, which is relevant in the
context of the underinvestment problem, will not be considered.
4. Increase large line capacity
An insurer’s line, not to be confused with “line of insurance business”, is the maximum financial
loss associated with a single insured event. The ceding company can increase the capacity to
underwrite more expensive random events due to quota share or excess-of-loss agreements. This
relates directly to the principal agent conflict of underinvestment.
5. Provision of underwriting guidance
Companies that exclusively provide reinsurance protection are called specialised reinsurance
companies. The classical business model of reinsurance is to provide risk mitigation across lines of
insurance business, across borders and through time. Specialised reinsurance companies engage
with a number of direct insurance companies and thus access to detailed market information.
6. Withdrawal from market segment
Reinsurance allows companies a simple and cost-efficient alternative to withdraw quickly from
insurance lines of business. It is a special case of Function 1 “ Surplus Relief”, where the direct
insurer decides to cede a complete segment-specific underwriting portfolio.
7. Liquidity provision
The quality of the reinsurance arrangement crucially depends on the ability of the reinsurer to
meet existing liabilities. Therefore, reinsurance companies customarily provide collateral to cedent
direct insurers in order to limit counterparty risk. Such deposits are usually comprised of liquid
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assets to ensure that direct insurance companies have immediate access to liquid reinsurance
funds. Liquid reinsurance deposits allow the ceding companies to substitute cash reserves of their
own with higher yielding long-term alternative investments. This reduces the availability of liquid
funds of their own and leads to a principal agent conflict that is due to underinvestment.
This identifies Functions 1 “Surplus relief” to be of particular relevance in the present. The hypothesis
of this chapter is that joint-stock companies featured relatively stronger demand for reinsurance during
the Golden Twenties than during the Great Depression period. This is associated with the use of
reinsurance for the purpose of shifting risk from shareholders to policyholders.
5.3.4 Literature review on reinsurance demand by joint-stock companies
The present hypothesis is associated with the structural differences in principal agent conflicts between
forms of corporate organisation. A recent summary of the related literature is provided by Mayers
& Smith (2013). The first study to focus on reinsurance demand in this context is Mayers & Smith
(1990). It argues that investors have the opportunity to themselves hedge risk related to shares in
individual companies by holding well-diversified portfolios. Based on a dataset of 1,276 U.S. non-life
insurance companies in 1981, it is found that demand for reinsurance increases with less diversified
ownership structure. Additional factors that reduce demand are size, credit standing, geographic
location as well as per-line concentration, whilst group affiliation increases demand. The study also
argues that reinsurance allows to control managerial discretion due to the indirect control exercised
by reinsurance companies. Given the absence of shareholder control in mutual companies, this helps
to take into account potential informational assymmetries between owner-shareholders as principal
and corporate management as agents.178 That mutual companies demand more reinsurance than
joint-stock companies is confirmed by Adams (1996) based on the analysis of reinsurance demanded
by life insurance companies in New Zealand. Analysing non-life data on (between 240 and 251) U.S.
non-life insurance companies between 1980 and 1987, Lamm-Tennant & Starks (1993) find that, overall,
joint-stock companies feature relatively larger exposure to risk than mutual companies, indicating a
reduced demand for reinsurance.
Most importantly, Abdul Kader et al. (2010) conduct a panel data analysis of reinsurance demand
in the Swedish fire insurance sector during the period 1919 to 1939. This study considers the full period
as well as two sub-periods from 1919 to 1928 and from 1929 to 1939. With respect to the impact of
organisational form, the study hypothesises that mutual insurance companies feature relatively higher
reinsurance demand. It is however found that the parameter estimate for the 1920s is positive and
significant, “because in the interwar years, stock insurers were writing more (and potentially more
178See also Abdul Kader et al. (2010, pp.273-274).
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complex) fire risks nationally and, as such, they were more exposed to unexpectedly high losses (e.g.,
due to mis-priced underwriting risks) compared with more localised mutual fire insurers.”179 Estimates
for the 1930s are found to be comparatively small and insignificant. This observation directly points
towards the hypothesis of risk shifting by means of reinsurance during the Golden Twenties. This
motivates the present analysis on the basis of the more established, unregulated180 German reinsurance
market that in addition featured a consistent tax regime and the absence of exogenous shocks on
reinsurance prices.
5.4 Model specification: determinants for reinsurance demand
The contemporary German reinsurance market features optimal characteristics for the analysis of
risk shifting by means of reinsurance. The investment opportunity set is represented by the business
cycle decomposed into a set of two discrete states of the world. The period from 1926 to 1935 is
divided into the sub-periods 1926 to 1929, representing the Golden Twenties as a state with sound
investment opportunities, and 1930 to 1935, the Great Depression representing a state with limited
investment opportunities. The absence of changes in regulatory and taxation standards as well as natural
catastrophes avoids the introduction of exogenous bias. Company-specific investment performance as
well as the life insurance sector are therefore excluded from the analysis. In the following, the statistical
properties of the reinsurance ratio are discussed first. This motivates a two-step approach that separates
the structural discrete decision to not engage in reinsurance from continuous reinsurance demand. The
former is represented by a panel probit regression model as established second. Third, a mixed model is
specified that captures the continuous component of the reinsurance ratio. Fourth, the set of predictor
variables is introduced and discussed.
5.4.1 The reinsurance ratio as fractional variable
Neither the reinsurance premium pi nor the supply of reinsurance are directly observable. The reinsurance
demand as represented by the reinsurance ratio is the only observable measure. It is defined as
RINit = 1− NetPremiumsEarnedit
GrossPremiumsEarnedit
. (5.6)
Changes in the reinsurance premium pi reflect changes in the demand and supply of reinsurance. An
increase (decrease) of pi is, for example, associated with an increase (decrease) in the demand for
reinsurance given constant supply. This in turn is associated with an increase (decrease) either in
179See Abdul Kader et al. (2010, p.279).
180Abdul Kader et al. (2010) do not provide information on the contemporary Swedish regulatory framework.
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Figure 7: Distribution RIN
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exposure to insurance risk X or in the discount factor ϕ. These relationships directly follow from the
relevant reinsurance functions.
Figure (7) shows that RIN follows a mixed distribution. It is continuous for values 0 < RIN < 1
and features a discrete Bernoulli distribution if RIN = 0 and RIN = 1.181 Cook et al. (2008) shows that
treating the complete mixed distribution as coherent and continuous introduces bias. Two approaches
are provided in the econometric literature that take this into consideration: the first follows Papke &
Wooldridge (1996) in treating the limit values as infinitesimally small realisations of the continuous
distribution. Given the sigmoid shape of the distribution as seen in Table (7), they apply a logit or
probit link to transform the variable. A solution for balanced panel data is developed in Papke &
Wooldridge (2008). The second approach assumes that the components of the mixed distribution
originate from different data generating processes. Cook et al. (2008) develop a zero-inflated beta
regression model for the specific application to financial ratios. This approach assumes the continuous
component to follow a beta distribution as the precision parameter allows to specifically consider
possible heteroscedasticity for values close to the boundaries. The boundary solutions are modelled in
the form of a latent-variable model, usually a logistic regression.182 By following the second approach,
a zero-inflated beta model is approximated by a two-step approach: the discrete part of the distribution
181Fractional data is not censored given that values for RIN > 1 and RIN < 0 do not exist. This rules out the use of
the Tobit model, which interprets excess values as unobserved. See Maddala (1991).
182See especially Ospina & Ferarri (2012) for a general discussion.
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Table 26: Companies ceding full premium volume
Name Years Line Organisational Form
Hansa Bremen 1926-1929 Transport Joint Stock
Haftpflichtverband Zuckerfabriken 1929 Liability Mutual
Roland Bremen 1926-1929 Transport Joint Stock
Union Stettin 1927 Transport Joint Stock
Source: Dataset II “Company”
as to whether a company did or did not demand reinsurance is considered in the context of a discrete
choice model. The continuous part is represented by a mixed model. The latter approach parallels
Mayers & Smith (1990) and Abdul Kader et al. (2010).
5.4.2 Discrete choice model
It is assumed that the decision to not engage in reinsurance is dependent on structural determinants
and thus not dependent on sub-periods. A total of 221 observations is associated with RIN = 0. In
contrast, eleven observations are associated with RIN = 1, which is a direct application of Function 6
“Withdrawal from market segment”. Table (26) shows that this case is associated with ten observations.
All observations occurred between 1926 and 1929 and nine were associated with transport insurance.
This case is considered to be part of the continuous component of the mixed distribution. The discrete
choice of the company to refrain from reinsurance - or to become a non-cedent in the following - is
denoted by the indicator function 1¬RIN , so that
RINit =

= 0 ⇔ 1¬RIN (i, t) = 1
> 0 ⇔ 1¬RIN (i, t) = 0
and
1¬RIN (i, t) =

1 if zit ≥ 0
0 if zit < 0
,
where z ∈ R is a latent variable. The unbalanced dataset is analysed by a generalised linear model
employing a probit link function (“probit regression”) that controls for company-specific random effects.
The model takes the form
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P (1¬RIN (i, t) = 1) = P?(zit > 0)
= Φ
(
ui + βxit +
∑
l
(βLilt) +
∑
t
(βYit)
)
(5.7)
ui = β0 + µi + it.
The company-specific random variance is denoted by µ, assumed to be normally distributed with
E [µ] = 0 and uncorrelated with the equally normally distributed error term  with E [] = 0. The
variables L and Y denote the variables that control for insurance line and business year.
5.4.3 Mixed model
The continuous element of the mixed distribution 0 < RIN ≤ 1 is assumed to be normally distributed.
The potential existence of heteroskedasticity close to the boundaries warrants the use of cluster-specific
Huber-White sandwich standard errors. The model takes the form
RINSit = z
S
i + γ
SxSit +
∑
l
(βLilt)
S
+
∑
t
(
βY Sit
)
(5.8)
zSi = γ
S
0i + η
S
i + ξ
S
it,
where the normally distributed random effects component denoted by ηi with E [η] = 0 captures
company-specific variance. It is assumed to be uncorrelated (random-effects assumption) with the error
term ξ. Further fixed effects are used to control for exposure to individual insurance lines as well as
time effects. The Appendix provides alternative model specifications that confirm the robustness of
model results to relaxing the random-effects assumption. Two different specifications are used: the
first assumes a linear relationship and pools all years from 1926 to 1935 into one equation. The second
considers the possibility of a structural break after the 1929 FAVAG default. It uses two sub-period
clusters for the years 1926 to 1929 and 1930 to 1935. This is represented by the superscript S ∈ {1; 2; 0},
where
S =

1 if Y EAR ∈ {1926, 1927, 1928, 1929}
2 if Y EAR ∈ {1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935}
0 if P = 0 ∩ P = 1
and allows to analyse potential differences between both sub-periods conditional on equal company-
specific random effects and the same reference year - 1930. Additional Wald tests are further used to
test whether sub-period estimates can be pooled.
103
5.4.4 Variable definition
The selection of variables follows Mayers & Smith (1990) and Abdul Kader et al. (2010). Time-dependent
variables are not considered to allow for a clear distinction between the sub-periods. The variable of
interest is the indicator for organisational form.
Organisational form The organisational form is defined by the indicator function
1ORF (i) =

1 if Joint− Stock
0 if Mutual
. (5.9)
This variable is assumed to be time-invariant given that only one case of demutualisation occurred
during the period under consideration. In 1929, the mutual life insurance company Deutschnationale
Handlungsgehilfen GG, founded in Hamburg in 1913 , also operated as a fire insurance company under
the same name. It was merged into Deutscher Ring Sachversicherungs AG in 1929.
The hypothesis follows with the findings of Abdul Kader et al. (2010) by assuming that reinsurance
demand was positively related to reinsurance demand during the Golden Twenties and insignificant
during the 1930s. This implies an overall negative effect in the discrete choice model given that
joint-stock insurance companies were less willing to forfeit the ability to manage risk actively by means
of reinsurance.
Underwriting risk Underwriting risk is associated with the characteristics of the insured random
events. It represents the ability of the company to generate profits from its underwriting operations net
of reinsurance effects. The ratio of aggregate losses incurred to net premiums earned is defined as
CPRit =
Losses Incurredit
NetPremiumsEarnedit
.
A positive relationship indicates that reinsurance was purchased due to Function 1 “Surplus relief”.
Potential differences in the magnitude of the coefficient between sub-periods are to be expected from
the differing cost of capital, of which reinsurance is a substitute.183 This translates into a negative
relationship with respect to the decision to not reinsure.
Solvency risk Functions 2, 3 and 4 consider the ability of the company to grow without suffering
from constraints induced by its capital situation. The company is in particular exposed to solvency risk
183Compare Ch.7. It is also noted that capital increases were a rare event during the period under consideration as
shown in Ch.3.
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caused by earnings volatility in the case of increased leverage. This is defined as the amount of net
premiums earned relative to surplus so that
LEVit =
NetPremiumsEarnedit
Surplusit
. (5.10)
Abdul Kader et al. (2010) argue that companies use reinsurance to hedge against the agency problems
of underinvestment and asset substitution and suggest a positive relationship.184 In this context,
reinsurance provides protection against an unexpected shock to assets that might trigger shareholders to
exercise the limited-liability put option and discontinue the company. This, however, depends on other
factors that might introduce bias in the explanatory power of the variable LEV .185 It is nevertheless
probable that the absence of low-probability high-cost events and the fact that excess-of-loss reinsurance
was not yet practiced limits the relevance of this variable in the present context. It is therefore assumed
that insurance companies rather used leverage to diversify (net) premium income so that reinsurance
needs to be considered as a substitute. Therefore, a negative relationship is expected in the mixed and
a positive relation in the discrete choice model.
Size In accordance with the findings of Mayers & Smith (1990) and Abdul Kader et al. (2010)
it is assumed that size offers direct insurance companies the advantage of diversification effects. It
therefore serves as a natural substitute for reinsurance demand due to Function 1 “Surplus relief”. The
time-dependent size is defined by the natural logarithm of the total asset value so that
TAVit = ln(Total Asset V alueit). (5.11)
This transformation is necessary given the non-normal distribution of total asset value as exemplified by
the relatively large difference between the 95 % percentile of RM 29.6 million and the 99 % percentile
of RM 201 million. The distribution of total asset value is provided in Table (27). The relationship is
assumed to be negative in the mixed and positive in the discrete choice model specification.
Profitability Reinsurance companies charge a premium for taking over ceded risks, which is an
operating expense for the cedent. The demand for reinsurance is therefore also dependent on the ability
of the company to pay additional charges. In accordance, the return on assets is defined as
184See Abdul Kader et al. (2010, p.272 / Fn.10).
185Compare Ch.3 for an analysis of company defaults in the German insurance market during the Interwar period.
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Table 27: Summary statistics total asset value
Total Asset Value (in RM 1,000)
Obs Mean Std Dev Min
Quantile
Max
25 Median 75 95 99
1,704 10.469 35,132 16 810 3,220 8,215 29,647 204,022 486,909
Source: Dataset III “Company”
PFTit =
NetOperating Profitit
Total Asset V alueit
. (5.12)
This suggests a negative relationship in the mixed model, given that increasing (decreasing) reinsurance
demand leads to increased (decreased) expenses and thus decreased (increased) earnings. More profitable
companies are assumed to be less likely to not reinsurance. This implies a negative effect in the discrete
choice model.
Liquidity Function 7 “Liquidity provision” suggests that reinsurance demand is motivated by the
provision of liquid deposits. This suggests that overall company liquidity serves as a determinant for
reinsurance demand. It is represented by the ratio of assets invested in cash (and cash equivalents) to
total asset value that is
LIQit =
Cashit
Total Asset V alueit
. (5.13)
Function 7 implies that reinsurance serves as a substitute and that the relationship is therefore negative.
It is noted, however, that Abdul Kader et al. (2010) find a positive relationship which they attribute
to the interest of managers “to ‘protect’ accumulated cash resources for investing in future positive
[net present value] projects in more uncertain economic times.”186 This implies a negative effect in the
mixed and a positive effect in the discrete choice model.
Investment returns Insurance net operative profit consists of underwriting and investment income.
Abdul Kader et al. (2010) define the relative return on investment as the ratio of interest earned on the
total book value of assets, or
186See Abdul Kader et al. (2010, p.279).
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ROIit =
InterestEarnedit
Total Asset V alueit
. (5.14)
An increasing return on investments can be used to compensate for additional reinsurance protection.
This leads to assume a negative correlation to the reinsurance ratio in the mixed model. Increased
investment returns also imply that companies are less likely to not reinsure, this causing a negative
effect in the discrete choice model.187
Business concentration One of the purposes of reinsurance is to provide diversification to specialised
direct insurance companies. Cummins & Nini (2002) and Klein et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence
in favour of the hypothesis that operating in diverse lines decreases the insolvency risk. In accordance
with Mayers & Smith (1990) the dependence of a company on one particular line is defined by the
Herfindahl index in order to measure to what extent the net premium volume of a company was
concentrated in one insurance line, so that
CNCit =
L∑
l=1
(
NetPremiumIncomeilt
Total Net PremiumIncomeit
)2
, (5.15)
where l ∈ L denotes the number of insurance lines under consideration. Given this definition, better
diversified insurance companies are assumed to feature lower values of CNC. This implies a negative
effect in the mixed model. However, companies with higher values are assumed to be less likely to not
reinsure, thus implying a negative sign in the discrete choice model.
Group affiliation Powell & Sommer (2007) show that group affiliation of an insurance company is
an important determinant for reinsurance demand. In accordance, companies that were member of a
larger insurance group are identified by the use of an indicator function, or
1GRP (i, t) =

1 if affiliatedwith group
0 if independent
, (5.16)
where 1GRP (i, t) ∈ {0, 1}. Given that take-overs occurred frequently, this variable is assumed to
be time-dependent. In accordance with Mayers & Smith (1990) and Powell & Sommer (2007) it is
assumed that group membership is associated with a relatively lower cost for reinsurance due to internal
arrangements. The relationship is assumed to be positive in the case of the mixed and negative in the
187Compare also Oppenheimer & Schlarbaum (1983).
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case of the discrete choice model.
Franchise value The franchise value is defined as a proxy indicator variable that maps the value “1”
to companies that were found prior to 1914 and “0” to later foundations, or
1FRV (i, t) =

1 if company iwas founded before 1914
0 if company iwas founded after 1914
.
The franchise value represents the market perception of the company. This is in particular relevant in
quota-share reinsurance, where companies form long-term relationships on the basis of a general treaty.
A strong reputation in the market or long-standing business relationships are therefore associated with
a positive relationship with reinsurance demand. A negative effect thus follows for the discrete choice
model.
Line exposure It is necessary to control for the differences in characteristics across insurance lines
of business. Given that CPR measures the aggregate loss ratio, it is necessary to control for the
company-specific exposure to a particular insurance line. Following Mayers & Smith (1990) the ratio of
net premiums earned per line relative to the total net premium volume represents the relative per-line
exposure, so that
LINEilt =
NetPremiumIncomeilt∑L
l=1 (NetPremiumIncomeilt)
, (5.17)
where L denotes the set of all considered direct non-life and indirect insurance lines. This is an implicit
factor variable in the cases of hail and reinsurance, given that only specialised companies operated in
these lines.188 No particular assumptions are formulated with respect to the associated model effects.
5.5 Data
5.5.1 Dependent variables
The dependent variable of the discrete choice model is the indicator function 1¬RIN (i, t). Statistics
summary on the number of companies not using reinsurance - referred to as non-cedents in the following
- are provided in Table (28).
The ratio of non-cedents to cedents remained relatively constant at about 11% throughout the late
1920s. It increased to 15 % in 1931 and remained at the relatively higher level of about 16%. This
188Some companies such as Allianz reported hail insurance under the aggregate “miscellaneous lines”. Furthermore,
reinsurance provision by direct companies is unobserved
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Table 28: Summary statistics non-cedent, 1926 to 1935
Year Obs Mean Min Max
1926 193 .067 0 1
1927 197 .112 0 1
1928 198 .111 0 1
1929 184 .114 0 1
1930 161 .112 0 1
1931 158 .151 0 1
1932 156 .167 0 1
1933 157 .166 0 1
1934 149 .168 0 1
1935 152 .158 0 1
26-35 1,705 .130 0 1
Note: Standard deviation omitted for binary variables.
Source: Dataset II “Companies”
Table 29: Summary statistics reinsurance ratio, 1926 to 1935
Year Obs Mean Med Std. Min Max
1926 193 .391 .392 .273 0 1.00
1927 196 .399 .390 .285 0 1.00
1928 198 .401 .392 .282 0 1.00
1929 181 .402 .396 .282 0 1.00
1930 161 .382 .360 .283 0 .94
1931 158 .360 .363 .277 0 .94
1932 156 .353 .345 .276 0 .97
1933 157 .355 .347 .277 0 .97
1934 149 .355 .342 .270 0 .98
1935 152 .355 .348 .267 0 .90
Note: Minimum and maximum values rounded to the nearest real number.
Source: Dataset II “Companies”
suggests that a reaction to the Great Depression was to stop demanding reinsurance. Whether this was
due to a general improvement in profitability or due to a decreased risk aversion remains to be tested.
Year-specific summary statistics of the dependent variable are provided in Table (29). The mean
reinsurance ratio remained at relatively equal levels between the years 1926 to 1929, with about 39 to
40%, and, between 1932 to 1935, with approximately 35%. It experienced a sharp decline between the
years 1929 and 1930, when it fell by approximately 4%. Insurance companies thus became less risk
averse before the onset of the Great Depression.
5.5.2 Independent variables
Additional explanatory variables are calculated using company-specific income data and business
information taken from Dataset II “Companies”. Line-specific information for the variable LINE is
taken from Dataset II “Line”. Table (30) provides summary statistics. The negative minimum values of
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Table 30: Summary statistics Dataset II “Company” and III “Line”
Variable Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
overall between within
RIN 1,701 .377 .371 .278 .262 .100 0 1
CPR 1,690 .506 .463 .401 .347 .318 -.045 8.71
LEV 1,697 .768 .488 1.983 1.48 1.19 0 35.134
TAV 1,686 7.885 8.099 1.701 1.725 .345 2.772 13.096
ERN 1,684 .001 .023 .387 .209 .330 -11.167 1.136
LIQ 1,334 .205 .119 .478 .274 .405 0 1.137
ROI 1,333 .040 .036 .033 .025 .020 0 .491
1GRP 1,704 .417 0 1
CNC 1,704 .757 1 .322 .299 .105 0 1.
1ORF 1,704 .721 0 1
1FRV 1,704 .639 0 1
LIN
Hail 1,704 .028 .078 .088 .017 0 .91
Motor 1,704 .030 .120 .132 .051 0 1
Glas 1,704 .023 .052 .056 .013 0 .5
Burglary 1,704 .016 .122 .114 .041 0 1
Fire 1,704 .239 .360 .338 .063 0 1
Glass 1,704 .029 .149 .154 .024 0 1
Accident 1,704 .099 .233 .205 .073 0 1
Transport 1,704 .172 .330 .308 .133 0 1
Liability 1,704 .093 .290 .269 .0 0 1
Reinsurance 1,704 .152 .359 .375 .0 0 1
Note: Standard deviation and median omitted for binary variables. Median omitted for binary variables.
Source: Dataset II “Lines”, Dataset III “Companies”
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RIN , CPR and ROI are due to refunds from reinsurance companies. The maximum value for LEV of
351.3 % is found for Norddeutsche Hagel, a mutual hail insurance company that experienced record
losses of RM 10.49 million in 1928. This depleted the company’s technical reserves, yet did not lead to
default due to the recovering performance of hail insurance during the following years.
5.6 Model results
In the following, the results for the discrete choice model is provided first. It analyses the decision
to not engage in reinsurance. Second, the mixed effects model provides estimates for determinants of
reinsurance demand conditional on companies actively engaging in this practice.
5.6.1 Discrete choice model
Table (31) provides model diagnostics and coefficients for the panel probit model. A likelihood ratio
test supports the choice of the random effects assumption over a pooled probit regression that ignores
company-specific variation.189 In order to interpret model results, average marginal effects are calculated
that represent the relative increase in predicted probability due to a one-unit increase in the respective
variable, or dP (1¬RIN? = 1) /dx, where x is the set of regressors. This calculation further assumes
that the random-effects component µ is zero.190 The expected sign is inverted to the sign of the mixed
effects model, given that in P (1¬RIN = 1) = P (RIN = 0) .
Consistent with the prior assumption, organisation form 1OF is found to feature a negative sign.
Whilst the coefficient is significant at the 5%, level the marginal effect is nevertheless not found to
be significantly different from zero. Although estimates constitute weak evidence in favour of the
assumption that joint-stock companies were less probable to not reinsure, this can not be concluded with
certainty. With respect to time-varying variables, the marginal effect of the total asset value TAV is
found to be significant at the 1% level with a negative sign. A one-unit increase thus leads to a decrease
of 3.1 (±1.0)% in the predicted probability of being a non-cedent. Relatively larger companies were
therefore more likely to reinsure. A potential explanation is that relatively larger companies were more
concerned with overall exposure to unexpected loss events. In addition, estimates for underwriting risk
CPR are found to feature a positive sign, thus indicating that companies were more probable of being
a non-cedent with increased loss experience. The relatively large variance of the margin effect of 1.0
(±1.6)% nevertheless casts doubt on the significance of the result. The only time-invariant variable that
features a statistically significant marginal effect is franchise value FRV . The fact that a company was
founded before 1914 leads to a decrease in the predicted probability of 11.6 (5.2)%. A straightforward
189Alternative model specifications including interaction terms were rejected with respect to AIC / BIC statistics.
190The c-statistic is not available in panel probit models due to the random-effects component.
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Table 31: Results discrete choice model
1¬RIN Coefficient Marginal effect
Variable Expected
Sign
1OF
- -3.345* -.129
(1.511) (.068)
CPR
- .270 .010
(.401) (.016)
LEV
+ .024 .001
(.059) (.002)
TAV
+ -.790** -.031**
(.263) (.010)
PFT
- -.431 -.017
(.365) (.014)
LIQ
+ .031 .001
(.128) (.005)
ROI
- - 4.113 -.159
(3.868) (.150)
1GRP
- -.886 -.034
(.997) (.040)
CNC
- -.765 -.030
(1.669) (.066)
1FRV
- -2.997** -.116*
(1.139) (.052)
Intercept
5.397*
(2.550)
Year controls Yes
Line controls Yes
Pseudo-R2 .045
LL RE = 0 χ¯2(1) 418.26***
AIC 546
BIC 714
Obs 1,669
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The expected sign is inverted.
Source: Dataset II “Lines”, Dataset III “Companies”
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
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Table 32: Discrete choice model, line controls
1¬RIN
Random Effects Marginal effects
Variable
Accident
-182.3 -7.055
(97.95) (4.120)
Burglary
12.80* .495
(6.223) (.253)
Credit
-7.026 -.272
(6.858) (.271)
Fire
-1.033 -.040
(1.353) (.053)
Glass
1.628 .0630
(2.018) (.081)
Hail
-.551 -.021
(.682) (.027)
Motor
.843 .033
(2.302) (.089)
Transport
.204 .008
(1.757) (.068)
Liability
3.170 .123
(1.758) (.082)
Reinsurance
4.733** .183*
(1.518) (.072)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are the relative change in expected probability, assuming
µ = 0.
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset II “Lines”, Dataset III “Companies”
explanation is that relatively older companies featured established reinsurance arrangements whilst
relatively younger companies faced relatively higher cost of reinsurance.
Results for the line-specific control variables are provided in Table (32). Exposure to reinsurance
increased the marginal effect on the predicted probability by 18.3 (±7.2) % and is statistically significant
at the 5% level. It suggests that reinsurance companies were the most likely to not retrocede gross
premium volume. This means that residual risk accumulated at specialised reinsurance companies
during the Interwar period, suggesting an increased supply within the contemporary reinsurance market.
5.6.2 Mixed effects model
Several tests confirm the validity of the model specification. A Hausman test favours the null hypothesis
of random effects over a fixed effects model with χ2 (6) = 6.29 and a p-value of 0.39. That the
independent variables are uncorrelated with the random-effects component, or Corr (x, ν) = 0 , is
confirmed by a Sargan-Hansen test given χ2 (25) = 49.365???. A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier
test also supports the use of the random-effects assumption with χ¯2 (1) = 2.783???.
Table (33) provides results for the random effects model. Parameter estimates are directly comparable
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Table 33: Results mixed model
0 < RIN < 1 Pooled Unpooled
Variable Expected Sign Interwar Golden Twenties Great Depression Wald F -Test (1)
1OF
+ .121 .123* -.085
.89
(.063) (.061) (.063)
CPR
+ .027** .039*** -.001
8.25*
(.008) (.010) (.009)
LEV -
-.007 -.010 -.011*
.19
(.004) (.005) (.006)
LnTAV
- -.027 -.025 -.025
.00
(.019) (.016) (.016)
PFT
- -.007 .030 -.041
.64
(.009) (.015) (.095)
LIQ
- -.001 -.001 .026
.44
(.005) (.004) (.042)
INV
+ .137 .133 .376
.38
(.230) (.228) (.339)
1GRP
+ .074** .072** .101***
2.74
(.024) (.024) (.027)
CNC
- .013 -.002 -.025
.20
(.041) (.046) (.056)
1FRV
- -.050 -.054 .053
.00
(.039) (.039) (.041)
Intercept
.461*** 0.477*
(.122) (.230)
Year
controls
Yes Yes
Line
controls
Yes Yes
R2
(overall)
.125 .133
Comps. 219 219
Obs 1,458 (669) (789)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The Interwar period covers the full sample from 1926 to 1935. The
Golden Twenties period covers the years 1926 to 1929 and the Great Depression the years 1930 to 1935.
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset II “Lines”, Dataset III “Companies”
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between pooled und unpooled specifications due to the use of identical fixed as well as random effects
together with the same intercept and reference year. Individual Wald tests also indicate that all
parameters can be pooled between sub-periods with the exception of credit, glass, liability and transport
insurance lines. This causes the overall R2of the pooled specification to be relatively smaller. The
F-tests for LnTAV , CNC and 1FRV suggest that there are statistically negligible differences in the
per-period parameter estimates.
All parameters meet the expected relationship with reinsurance demand. The results with respect
to the organisation form 1OF show a pro-cyclical pattern with a positive sign - statistically significant
at the 5 % level - during the 1920s and a negative sign in the 1930s. This confirms the findings of
Abdul Kader et al. (2010) and thus the hypothesis. The loss ratio CPR features a positive sign during
the full period as well as the Golden Twenties, which is consistent with the assumption that reinsurance
was used for the purpose of risk mitigation. This finding is weakened by the insignificant result of the
Wald test, indicating that results could be pooled across both sub-periods. Leverage LEV is found to
be negatively correlated with RIN , with estimates close to the 5% significance level.191 This rejects
the assumption that the demand for leverage was pro-cyclical.
The fixed effects for individual line exposure is provided in Table (34). Wald tests indicate whether
estimates of the individual sub-periods can be pooled. Differences between the periods were most
pronounced in credit, glass, liability and transport insurance. Changes in credit and transport insurance
were directly related to the reduction in trade activity, causing an increase in the former and a reduction
of losses in the latter. In the case of glass insurance this can be associated with the public disorder of
the 1930s Great Depression. The increase in liability insurance suggests increased relative losses in this
line. This is confirmed in Ch.7. Although not statistically significant, the negative sign of reinsurance
suggests that specialised reinsurance companies were reducing retrocession during the Great Depression
period. This is consistent with the findings of the discrete choice model. Overall, the differences in the
significance of results between the sub-periods appear to be closely related to the effect of reinsurance
demand due to underwriting risk CPR. Whilst the latter played an important role during the Golden
Twenties, line-specific considerations became dominant during the Great Depression period.
5.7 Reinsurance as dynamic risk mitigation
This chapter concludes that joint-stock companies in particular demanded reinsurance during the
Golden Twenties. This was based on the connection between the shareholder value maximisation
problem and the risk exchange model by Borch (1962). It was shown analytically that changes in
the opportunity set of investors have the potential to cause risk shifting of insurance companies by
191The reported p-value for the Golden Twenties is 0.059 and for the Great Depression 0.041.
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Table 34: Mixed model, Line fixed effects
0 < RIN < 1
1926-1935 1926-1929 1930-1935 Wald F - Test (1)
Variable
Accident
.343 .225 .389*
2.90
(.189) (.124) (.158)
Burglary
.405 .312 .375
.19
(.244) (.240) (.252)
Credit
.063 -.051 .145**
8.09**
(.041) (.057) (.044)
Fire
.117 .092 .183*
2.98
(.076) (.073) (.089)
Glass
.030 -.078 .122
8.96**
(.061) (.055) (.074)
Liability
-.086 .002 .072
8.97**
(.076) (.090) (.087)
Motor
.007 -.095 .091
.76
(.054) (.058) (.058)
Transport
-.046 .006 -.057
4.51**
(.058) (.055) (.071)
Hail
.047 .016 .160*
.65
(.032) (.031) (.067)
Reinsurance
.021 -.003 -.098
2.30
(.066) (.066) (.085)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset II “Lines”, Dataset III “Companies”
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means of reinsurance. This motivated the empirical analysis at hand of reinsurance demand in the
German insurance sector, which featured optimal conditions during the Interwar period. Historical
evidence from the German supervisory act illustrated that the contemporary reinsuance market is an
example of an unregulated financial service sector. The further absence of changes in tax regulations, of
unproportional (e.g. excess-of-loss) reinsurance as well as of exogenous effects that might have caused
price movements (e.g. natural catastrophes) allowed to focus the analysis on the use of quota-share
reinsurance as a way of shifting risk. From an econometric perspective, the model took into account
that the variable representing reinsurance demand was biased by companies intentionally not using
reinsurance. Separating the discrete from the continuous part of the mixed distribution allowed for
analysing the structural interest in reinsurance as well as the time-dependent demand for reinsurance.
Whith respect to the analysis of the discrete choice to not use reinsurance it was found that size and
franchise value mattered. Both variables were associated with an an increased interest in demanding
reinsurance. Furthermore, specialised reinsurance companies were more likely to not use reinsurance,
or in this case retrocession. This allowed to conclude that residual risk - insurance risk unclaimed by
other companies - was accumulated in the reinsurance sector. This is consistent with the findings of
Ch.3 that reinsurance companies featured a relatively larger default risk.
With respect to the continuous demand for reinsurance, model estimates were consistent with
similar results by Abdul Kader et al. (2010). Joint-stock companies were found to feature a pro-cyclical
demand for reinsurance. Parameter estimates were statistically significant and positive during the
Golden Twenties, a period that was associated with increased opportunities. In contrast, the effect for
the Great Depression period was found to be relatively small and insignificant. Although a Wald test
could not conclude that effects were not due to two different data-generating processes, this confirmed
the hypothesis. Further factors that were found to be significant were underwriting risk as well as
group affiliation as consistent with Powell & Sommer (2007).
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Table 35: Appendix: BLUP random effects model
Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
1,581 0 0 .232 -.407 .465
Note: The full-period specification is used.
Source: Dataset II “Company”
Appendix
Robustness check random effects model
The applied mixed model is based on the random-effects assumption, namely that the set of regressors
x is uncorrelated with the random-effects component, or Corr (ν,x) = 0. The relatively large inter-
company variance in the sample, together with the result of a Hausman test, support the validity of the
assumption. The results of the discrete-choice panel model nevertheless suggest that exogenous time-
invariant variables were found to have a significant effect on the decision to not engage in reinsurance.
Following from this result it can be hypothesised that the same time-invariant regressors are correlated
with company-specific random effects. This model is based on the weighted average of inter-company
and intra-company variance, which requires zero correlation for estimates to be unbiased. A potential
correlation is first checked by analysing whether structural variables help to explain the variance of the
random effects component.
Analysing the random effects component
Although only the company-specific variance is observable, it is possible to approximate the point
estimate as the mean of the probability density cloud. This yields best linear unbiased predictors
(BLUPs) as provided in Table (35).
BLUPs are sample-specific approximations of the company-specific relative difference to the model
intercept or α0+η. A negative value indicates that unobserved company characteristics lead to relatively
smaller constant demand for reinsurance and vice versa. An ordinary least-squares regression is specified
that regresses the time-invariant variables 1ORF and 1FRV on ν, or
ηi = b0 + b11ORF (i) + b21FRV + e,
where e is the uncorrelated and normally distributed error term with E [e] = 0. Results are provided in
Table (36).
Both time-invariant variables explain 6.5 % of variation in η. Furthermore, 1ORF is correlated at a
significance level of 5%. The variable 1FRV is negatively correlated at the same level. This leads to the
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Table 36: Appendix: OLS regression results
Results OLS regression
1ORF .082*
(.038)
1FRV -.074*
(.032)
Intercept -.020
(.429)
R2 .065
N 220
Source: Dataset III “Line”
conclusion that joint-stock companies were on average assigned a relatively larger value of η, implying
that the coefficient of 1ORF does capture the full effect. The opposite is true for companies founded
before 1914. Furthermore, this casts doubt on the assumption Corr (ν,x) = 0, given that both
time-invariant variables are elements of x. The robustness of the full-period parameters to relaxing this
assumption is checked against a fixed-effects model. The results based on the pooled specification are
provided in Table (37).
The results indicate that the estimated correlation is negative. Sign, significance and magnitude of the
parameters are not substantially different. Results for line controls are also confirmed and omitted.
Intra-company variance is explained equally well by the fixed as well as the mixed model. This indicates
that the used random-effects parameter estimates are robust to relaxing the underlying assumption.
The Hausman-Taylor estimator
A disadvantage of the fixed-effects model is that time-invariant variables are differenced out. This
especially concerns the relevant parameter estimates for the structural variable 1ORF as well as 1FRV .
The Hausman-Taylor estimator, introduced by Hausman & Taylor (1981) and defined by Greene
(2012, pp.434-435), instruments known endogenous time-invariant variables with the set of time-varying
variables in x. This approach avoids potential bias arising from the endogeneity of the structural
variables that are correlated with the company-specific random effects. Following the results of the OLS
regression, the structural variables 1ORF and 1FRV meet this criterion. Model results are available in
Table (37). The Sargan-Hansen test of overidentification restrictions confirms the set of instruments.
This model provides full-period parameter estimates that are very similar to the ones obtained from
the random effects model. Differences in significance levels of variables are due to the fact that the
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Table 37: Appendix: Results fixed effects / Hausman-Taylor
0 < RIN < 1
Variable Random effects Fixed effects Hausman-Taylor
1ORF
.121 - .010
(.063) - (.095)
CPR
.027** .025** .026***
(.008) (.008) (.007)
LEV
-.007 -.006 -.007**
(.004) (.004) (.002)
TAV
-.028 -.033 -.032***
(.019) (.027) (.008)
ROA
-.007 -.007 -.007
(.009) (.009) (.013)
LIQ
-.001 .001 .001
(.005) (.006) (.007)
INV
.137 .084 .103
(.230) (.234) (.130)
1GRP
.074** .111*** .088***
(.024) (.028) (.023)
CNC
.013 .018 .021
(.041) (.049) (.025)
1FRV
-.050 - .105
(.039) - (.075)
Intercept
.461*** .551* .476***
(.122) (.228) (.091)
Random
effects
Yes No Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes
Line controls Yes Yes Yes
R2(intra) .091 .095
R2(overall) .124 .024 .922
Sargan-
Hansen
χ2
(23) .122
Corr(ν,x) 0 (fixed) -.202
Companies 219 219 219
Obs 1,456 1,456 1,456
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in the random and fixed effects model specifications are
Huber-White sandwich standard errors and conventional in Hausman-Taylor.
* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p< .001
Source: Dataset II “Company”, Dataset III “Line”
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Hausman-Taylor estimator does not use intra-company Huber-White sandwich standard errors. This
confirms that the assumption that regressors and random effects are uncorrelated does not bias results.
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6 Insurance investor sentiment in Germany during the Golden
Twenties, 1926 to 1931
6.1 The informational content of insurance dividend announcements
Insurance operations depend on highly sophisticated actuarial methods and complex mathematical
assumptions. This leads to an information asymmetry between internal managers and external investors.
Therefore the dividend payout is interpreted as a signal for the internal financial situation of the
company. A major limitation of this type of indicator is the relatively low quarterly or - in the case of
the Interwar period - annual reporting frequency. In the meantime, investors form expectations that
are validated by the later dividend announcement. Under the assumption of the semi-strong efficient
market hypothesis, this may lead to price reactions in the case that investors did not expect the newly
disseminated information. This contributes new insights into the relationship between changes in the
dividend growth level and associated changes in asset returns. The relationship described helps to
explain the observation that insurance share prices outperformed during the Interwar period prior
to the 1931 Financial Crisis. This contrasts with the finding of Voth (2003) that an intervention of
Reichsbank in May 1927 to reduce margin lending caused an artificial depression of share prices. It is
argued that insurance companies catered to an investor clientele that priced insurance shares on the
basis of dividend payout information.
The chapter is organised as follows: first, the historical relevance of dividend payout for insurance
investors is established. In addition, the insurance share price and dividend performance is introduced
in general and contrasted to the Berlin stock index as well as the effect of the May 1927 Reichsbank
intervention. Second, the theoretical implications of dividend catering on the formation of asset prices
is discussed on the basis of the Gordon growth model. Third, event study methodology is established
that allows to test contemporary market sentiment. Fourth, the newly compiled dataset at hand is
introduced. Fifth, the results of the empirical analysis are provided. It is found that investors used
dividend information in the formation of market prices on the basis of an optimistic sentiment.
This analysis contributes new insights with respect to equity valuation under the assumption of
heterogenous investor preferences. This establishes a theoretical explanation for the general observation
that dividend growth rates do not predict asset returns. In addition, the to the knowledge of the author
first empirical analysis of disaggregated equity price data is presented for German companies during the
Interwar period. This provides a new perspective on the effect of the May 1927 Reichsbank intervention.
There are two important limitations connected to this chapter that lend themselves for future
research: the only benchmark stock market index available for this period, the Berlin stock exchange
index, is based on monthly observations. The availability of weekly data would allow the construction
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of a new index on a smaller time grid. In addition, both the focus on individual share classes rather
than companies as well as the diversity of different insurance lines covered limits the ability to make
cross-sectional inferences. This may motivate the extension of the dataset to include other sectors, such
as banking or manufacturing.
6.2 Historical background: investor dividend perceptions and the May
1927 Reichsbank intervention
There is little historical evidence for the shareholder composition of German insurance companies.
Based on extensive archival research, Froehlicher (2013) identifies the general characteristics of the
shareholder base of the Swiss non-life joint-stock insurance company Zu¨rich for the period from 1910 to
1940. Shareholders of the company were in particular identified as long-term investors to the point that
the investment in a share was regarded as a form of pension plan192. This points towards a particular
clientele of investors that was interested in purchasing insurance equity, which is in the following part
inferred from relevant contemporary secondary literature. It derives that dividend payout by insurance
companies served as an important signal for contemporary investors. Following on, the effect of the May
1927 Reichsbank Intervention is put into perspective with insurance stock performance and dividend
announcements.
6.2.1 The perception of dividend payout by investors during the Interwar period
During the Interwar period, insurance dividend payout conveyed important information on the prof-
itability of an insurance share to shareholders. This was due to the uniqueness of the insurance business
model and its inherent complexities. Lengyel (1927)193 provided the following passage as an introduction
to insurance accounting:
The nature of insurance business is idiosyncratic and different from other trade businesses.
Insurance is not a monetary or credit business, but it is rather a socio-economic institution
based on a mathematic-statistical foundation [. . . ]. The reading and analysis of statements
of accounts therefore requires additional specific knowledge in addition to basic business
knowledge.194
It was also generally known to contemporaries that the nature of insurance liabilities introduced
uncertainty into the accounts of companies:
192See Froehlicher (2013, p.76).
193Froehlicher (2013, p.25) remarks that this textbook was also in use at Zu¨rich.
194(German original, translated by the author:) “Die Natur des Versicherungsgescha¨fts ist eine eigentu¨mliche und von
der anderer Handelsgescha¨fte verschieden. Die Versicherung ist auch kein Geld- oder Kreditgescha¨ft, sie ist vielmehr eine
auf mathematisch-statistischer Grundlage aufgebaute sozial-o¨konomische Institution [...]. Das Lesen und die Analyse ihrer
Rechnungsabschlu¨sse bedingt somit außer allgemeinen kaufma¨nnischen Kenntnissen noch besonderes weiteres Wissen.”
Lengyel (1927, p.1)
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Whilst liabilities are certain in all other types of business corporations and it is in particular
the valuation of assets that causes difficulties, conditions are reversed in the case of insurance
companies. The most important liabilities of insurance companies, the so-called technical
reserves, can not be determined in a numerically exact way, but can only be estimated
technically. Every bank, every thrift knows exactly the sum of entrusted saving deposits
and the liabilities that are associated with it.195
Business analysists required specific insurance-related expertise to fully comprehend the content of
insurance balance sheets and this was further complicated by the presentation of content - especially in
Germany. After the collapse of FAVAG in 1929, the internationally renowned insurance newspaper
“The Review” commented on the complexity of published German insurance accounts. It suggested that
even external experts with an intimate knowledge of insurance operations found it hard to objectively
interpret insurance accounts:
Dealing as we do with the accounts of companies of all nations the verifying forms of
accountancy in which they are presented often come under consideration. Generally one can
very easily accommodate oneself to the national form. Recent events in Germany brought
to attention a weakness there which had not been realised. German accounts, generally
speaking, are very informative, indeed they are often subject to the comment that they
are too formally detailed, so that one “cannot see the wood for the trees” – the general
result is lost or obscured in a maze of detail, however, one naturally gave to the accounts
for similarly precise and detailed verification, and that we find does not exist. They are in
general merely office accounts, unverified by outside independent and expert authority. It
is the old, old tale. Things may be most securely and formally arranged, but somewhere
at the rear there is a screw loose, and the credit of the whole thing collapses. It is one of
the most serious results of the Frankfurter General collapse that it has thrown doubt on
German accountancy. And in insurance, which rests so greatly on the basis of trust and the
utmost good faith – uberrima fides [sic!] is of the essence of insurance and of re-insurance
in externals as well as internals – that is a very serious flaw. [. . . ]”196
The complexity of published information was also noted by Lengyel (1927) who specifically noted that
the access to internal information necessitated a different valuation of large share packages relative to
individual shares:
195(German original, translated by the author:) “Wa¨hrend bei allen anderen Arten von Wirtschaftsunternehmen die
Passiven in der Regel feststehen und vor allem die Bewertung der Aktiven Schwierigkeiten bereitet, liegen die Verha¨ltnisse
bei den Versicherungsgesellschaften gerade umgekehrt. Die wichtigsten Verbindlichkeiten der Versicherungsgesellschaften,
die sogenannten technischen Reserven, ko¨nnen ziffernma¨ßig exakt nicht ermittelt, sondern nur technisch abgescha¨tzt
werden. Jede Bank, jede Sparkasse kennt genau die Summe der ihr anvertrauten Spareinlagen und ihre aus diesem Titel
bestehenden Verbindlichkeiten.” Lengyel (1927, pp.1)
196The Review, 08 November 1929, p.1093
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In general the effective profitability can only be derived from internal accounts, not rarely
even on the basis of additional analyses. Generally, it is available from internal balances and
therefore also known to the supervisory board or the exponents of the major shareholders.
The profitability for a major shareholder, who is aware of these facts and who can accom-
modate to them, therefore is or can be different than to that of the small-scale shareholder,
who is only in a loose relationship with the company and for whom the actual share return
is constituted by the distributed cash dividend. In practical terms this difference leads
to a different standard used for the valuation of large share packages (share majority or
qualifying minority) in comparison to an individual share.197
Based on this evidence it is to be assumed that the profitability of an individual share was valued
using the dividend payout performance over a longer period198 , which suggests that insurance titles
were of particular interest for long-term investors. This is further supported by the observation that
the majority of insurance shares were partly paid-in name shares that required the registration of
shareholders in company-specific share registers.199 It is also compatible with the statement that
insurance companies especially applied “conservative” dividend payout policies in order “to prevent
insurance shares from becoming the focus of speculation.”200
6.2.2 The effect of the May 1927 Reichsbank intervention on insurance share perfor-
mance
The 1924 currency reform initiated the return to normality for the German economy. The speed
of this process caused concerns about the potential build-up of a speculative bubble in asset prices.
Hjalmar Schacht, President of the German central bank Reichsbank, decided to intervene in May
1927. This action was motivated by the fast increase in share prices, the concern that this rally could
divert funds required in productive investment and the influx of foreign capital predominantly used for
speculative activities. 201 German banks were required to reduce lending against securities as collateral.
197(German original, translated by the author:) “Die effektive Rentabilita¨t kann in der Regel nur aus den internen
Bilanzen, nicht selten sogar nur auf Grund besonderer Untersuchungen festgestellt werden. In der Regel wird sie aus den
internen Bilanzen zu entnehmen, folglich auch dem Aufsichtsrat, d.h. den Exponenten der Großaktiona¨re bekannt sein.
Die Rentabilita¨t fu¨r den Großaktiona¨r, der alle diese Tatsachen kennt, und sich darauf einrichten kann, ist oder kann
demnach eine andere sein als die fu¨r den Kleinaktiona¨r, der zum Unternehmen nur im losen Verha¨ltnis steht und fu¨r den
die ausgeschu¨ttete Dividende die tatsa¨chliche Rentabilita¨t seiner Aktie darstellt. Praktisch wirkt sich diese Verschiedenheit
darin aus, daß fu¨r die Bewertung eines großen Aktienpakets (Aktienmajorita¨t oder qualifizierte Minderheit) ein anderer
Maßstab angelegt wird, als fu¨r die einzelne Aktie.” Lengyel (1927, pp. 219-220).
198See Lengyel (1927, pp.220).
199This nevertheless restricted the fungibility of insurance shares due to the lengthy registration process and motivated
German stock exchanges to define special “house rules”. For example, the Berlin stock exchange issued special regulations
for the first time in 1925 in order to organise and speed up registration processes. For further information, see Berman
(1930). This, however, substantially reduced the reliability of shareholder liabilities as a certain source of capital. Attempts
by insurance companies, such as the requirement of collateral posting for shareholder liabilities, was objected by German
courts. See Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r Versicherungswesen, 1 October 1930, p.1027.
200See Lengyel (1927, p.119) and compare Ch.4.2.1.
201See James (1985, p.39) as well as Voth (2003, p.68).
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Noncompliant institutions were threatened with reduced or no access to rediscount facilities. On 12
May 1927 Berlin banks announced measures to reduce margin lending.202
Analysing the contemporary circumstances, Voth (2003) rejects the hypothesis of an asset bubble and
calls the actions of Reichsbank “misguided”203. The perceived rapid increase in share prices especially
in the year 1926 was attributed to the economic normalisation following the hyperinflationary period.
Voth (2003) attributes the rally to an increase in aggregate dividend payout, which continued well
after the May 1927 intervention. As a consequence, Germany would not have experienced the build-up
of a speculative bubble such as in the United States.204 Voth (2003) furthermore argues that the
Reichsbank intervention limited company in raising capital at financial markets and thus contributed to
an underinvestment and the onset of an economic recession in 1928.
With respect to insurance prices, the weekly published insurance magazine “Neumanns Zeitschrift
fu¨r das gesamte Versicherungswesen” for instance reported similar adverse effects of the Reichsbank
intervention but expectations in a future recovery of prices:
Unfortunately, the price development did not show consistency. Even insurance shares
were not spared by the “black days at the stock exchange” and by the associated volatility.
The same picture was provided by the second half of the year, yet the general price level
increased again. In December 1927, the share prices were the highest of the whole year [...].
205
Insurance share prices indeed recovered from May 1927 onwards as shown in Figure (8). Prior to the
intervention, insurance shares had participated in the general rally caused by the normalisation of
business conditions. This is illustated by the likewise decrease of the interest rate on daily money as
shown by Voth (2003, p.79, Fig.5). Overall dividend payout nevertheless increased from 1927 onwards as
evidenced by Voth (2003, p.75, Fig.3). Following on from May 1927 the insurance index outperformed
the Berlin index and peaked in mid-1929. The gap between both indices increased to about 50 points
from January 1928 onwards and remained at this level until the August 1929 FAVAG default. This
trend reversion also predated the October 1929 Wall Street Crash that also affected the trade activity
at German stock exchanges.
With respect to the main reason for the post-intervention recovery of the insurance index, the article
in “Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r das gesamte Versicherungswesen” suggested expectations in dividend
increases for the year 1927, paid out in the year 1928:
202See Voth (2003, p.68).
203See Voth (2003, p.84).
204Compare DeLong & Shleifer (1991) and Rappoport & White (1993) .
205(German original, translated by the author:) “Die Kursbewegung zeigte leider keine Stetigkeit. Auch die Ver-
sicherungsaktien wurden von den “schwarzen Bo¨rsentagen” und den Zuckungen nicht verschont. Im zweiten Halbjahr
ergab sich das gleiche Bild, doch hat sich das Kursniveau weiter gehoben und im Monat Dezember 1927 waren die Kurse
[...] die ho¨chsten des Jahres 1927.” See “Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r das gesamte Versicherungswesen” February 1928, p.130.
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Figure 8: Comparison insurance to Berlin stock exchange index, January 1926 to July 1931
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Note: The insurance index is a weighted average of market prices taken from all actively market-traded
insurance shares listed at every German stock market per 100 GM paid-in capital. The base month is January
1926. The Berlin stock exchange index is rescaled to January 1926 as base month as well.
Source: Dataset IV “Share Price”, Reichsamt (1927 - 1932).
In line with price increases in December, the [dividend] yield decreased likewise, which leads
to the expectation of further dividend increases for the year 1927.206
Figure (9) shows the percentage of discrete changes in dividend announcements per increase, decrease
or no change between 1926 and 1931.
Dividend increases started to become more frequent from the reporting year 1927 (for the business
year 1926) onwards. Its total share increased to 60.9% in 1928 (business year 1927), before it corrected
to 44.8% in 1929 (for the business year 1928), the year the German economy went into recession. In
this year the majority of announcements occurred prior to the August 1929 FAVAG default. This small
consolidation preceded the decrease to 8.6 % in 1930 (business year 1929) was not immediately related
with the onset of the Great Depression in Germany.
The close interplay between insurance stock prices and dividend is illustrated by the performance of
the aggregate dividend yield as shown by Figure (10). It shows the decrease from 9.09% in January
1926 to 5.18% in January 1927 that was mentioned in the magazine article. From then onwards,
the increases in share prices did not affect the insurance dividend yield, which remained relatively
206(German:) “Infolge der Kurssteigerung im Dezember hat sich die Rendite entsprechend gesenkt, wodurch sich die
Aussicht auf eine weitere Steigerung der Dividende fu¨r das Jahr 1927 ergibt.” See “Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r das gesamte
Versicherungswesen” February 1928, p.130.
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Figure 9: Percentage dividend changes per year, 1926 to 1931
Note: Relative dividend announcements are aggregate changes in the dividend level relative to all dividend
announcements. Dividend increases are defined as an increase / decrease / no change in the dividend rate
relative to a relatively smaller / larger / equal rate in the previous year. The given year is the year of the
dividend announcement for the previous business year. Dividend announcements of 1926 relate to the business
year 1925 and so forth.
Source: Dataset IV “Share Price”, see Table (40).
Figure 10: Dividend yield insurance index, January 1926 to July 1931
Note: Aggregate dividend yield is the ratio of the mean dividend rate relative to the aggregate monthly
insurance stock price per RM 100 paid-in capital.
Source: Dataset IV “Share Price”
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constant at approximately 4% until January 1929. It reached its minimum in July 1929 at 3.30%,
but recovered to 4.83% in January 1930 after a short rally starting after the August 1929 FAVAG
default and continuing until the end of 1930. This relative stability in dividend yield suggests that the
aggregate dividend rate was developing in close connection with the share price.
This shows that insurance stock prices were not affected by the May 1927 Reichsbank intervention
and were based on market fundamentals. This contrasts with the finding of Voth (2003), for which a
possible explanation is that the Reichsbank intervention explicitly targeted margin lending activities.
Titles not bought on margin were less likely to be affected persistently by the intervention. Given that
insurance especially targeted a generally optimistic non-speculative clientele of long-term investors, it
is probable that insurance titles were less likely to be bought on margin. This asset class was hence
less affected by the intervention. Other dividend-paying companies that attracted different investor
clienteles would have nevertheless been affected by the intervention. This leads to the hypothesis that
insurance investors indeed formed expectations on the basis of information provided by the dividend
payout. In addition, it is hypothesised that aggregate clientele sentiment was unaffected by the May
1927 Reichsbank intervention and continued to be optimistic due to the improved macro-economic
conditions.
6.3 The demand for dividend payout
The assumption that companies cater to specific investor clienteles is part of the catering theory of
dividends, which is introduced as a first step. Second, a valuation approach on the basis of the Gordon
growth model is provided. This includes providing a new interpretation on previous empirical findings
with respect to dividend growth rates. Third, these results are put into the perspective of the dividend
catering model. This suggests using event study methodology to test the hypothesis empirically on the
foundation of the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis. Fourth, a review of relevant studies is provided
that establish the compatibility of event study methodology with insurance business operations.
6.3.1 The catering theory of dividends
The classical Modigliani-Miller Theorem attests under certain assumptions, that the value of a company
is independent of its capital structure. Paying out dividends directly leads to a decrease in the value of
the company. The distribution of dividends therefore does not add immediate value to the shareholder.
That companies nevertheless distribute cash payment was coined as the “dividend puzzle” by Black
(1976a). Modigliani & Miller (1961, p.431), however, clarify that the Miller-Modigliani Theorem does
not take into account certain preferences of investor clienteles:
If, for example, the frequency distribution of corporate payout ratios happened to correspond
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exactly with the distribution of investor preferences for payout ratios, then the existence
of these preferences would clearly lead ultimately to a situation whose implications were
different in no fundamental respect from the perfect market case. Each corporation would
tend to attract to itself a ‘clientele’ consisting of those preferring its particular payout ratio,
but one clientele would be entirely as good as another in terms of the valuation it would
imply for the firm.207
This observation motivated the definition of the catering theory for dividends by Baker & Wurgler
(2004), see also de Rooij & Renneborg (2009). The theory formulates three relevant assumptions: it is
first argued that investors have an uninformed and potentially time-varying demand for shares that
pay dividends. This corroborates the finding that insurance investors were relying on dividends as a
signal for insurance business operations. Information conveyed by dividends were more relevant as
signals to investors than as predictors for future earnings performance.208 The second assumption is
that arbitrage does not prevent price differences between dividend paying and non-paying shares. This
is the assumed explanation for the gap between the insurance index and the Berlin stock exchange
index from 1927 onwards. Third, managers cater rationally to investors and pay dividends especially in
periods of pronounced demand for dividend payments. This third assumption would suggest that the
increased dividend payments were due to managers catering to investor expectations.209 This serves as
further motivation to analyse the actual status of contemporary investor sentiment.
The basic assumptions of Baker & Wurgler (2004) inspired a substantial number of empirical studies
that tested the validity of the catering theory of dividends. An overview of results is provided by
de Rooij & Renneborg (2009, pp.226-229). Most studies are based on large macro-economic datasets of
Postwar observations. A main topic in recent literature is the declining propensity to pay dividends.
6.3.2 The valuation of insurance companies
The effect of dividend changes on asset prices is part of the more general analysis of excess return
volatility.210 This academic discussion was mainly based on the dividend discount model of Williams
(1938) and Gordon & Shapiro (1956). The model interprets the value of a dividend-paying joint-stock
company V ∈ R+0 as the present value of expected dividend payout E [D] ∈ R+0 discounted by the a
company-specific discount factor ϕ ∈ R+0 , which is not necessarily equal to the risk-free rate and the
dividend growth rate g ∈ R+0 assumed to be constant. The formal definition in the single period setting
207Modigliani & Miller (1961, p.431).
208This relates to dividend signalling hypothesis that is based on the observation of Lintner (1956) that “a major
unanticipated and non-transitory change in earnings would be an important reason to change dividends.(Paradigm (iii) )”
See Baker & Wurgler (2004, p.1130, fn.7). This is consistent with the observation of Benartzi et al. (1997) that dividends
are not a reliable signal for future earnings.
209See Baker & Wurgler (2004, pp.1125-1126).
210LeRoy (2006) provides an informative literature review.
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is
V =
1
ϕ− gE [D] . (6.1)
A necessary mathematical condition is 0 < g < ϕ in order for the model to be well defined. In the
present context the discount rate is defined more generally on the basis of an alternative investment
opportunity set instead of the more widely used risk-free rate. This takes into account that investor
clienteles can have varying definitions of risk-free assets.
Generalising the single-period model into a multi-period setting underlines the relevance of the
semi-strong efficient market hypothesis in the present context. It assumes that all prices are formed
on the basis of publicly available information. This also suggests that the expected future dividend
payout is conditional on the information available at present, or time t ∈ T . Given the probability
space (Ω,F ,P,F), the dividend payout expected by investors is conditional on the ca´dla´g filtration
set F = (Ft)t∈T so that the expectation becomes time dependent, Et [D|Ft]. Under the semi-strong
efficient market hypothesis assuming the absence of arbitrage further implies that the market price
P ∈ R+0 captures new information instantaneously. No arbitrage arguments lead to a conversion of
the intrinsic value of the company and its market price so that V ≡ P . Under the assumption that all
other variables are time dependent, Equation (6.1) then becomes
Pt =
1
ϕt − gtEt [D|Ft] . (6.2)
The non-linearity of this model motivated Campbell & Shiller (1988) to develop a dynamic version
based on a Taylor approximation. Research especially focused on the dynamics of the dividend yield
defined as expected dividend payout per market value of the company, or
Et [D|Ft]
Pt
= ϕt − gt,
as for example Equation (2) in Fama & French (1988, p.5)211. Changes in the dividend yield are caused
by changes in the discount factor or in the dividend growth rate.212 Fama & French (1988) and Fama
& French (1989)213 find that, in the long run, changes in the dividend yield predict changes in returns,
defined as R = ln (Pt/Pt−1). Changes in the dividend growth rate g are not found to predict changes
in the dividend yield.
211There, observations of the previous period t−1 are used to predict current estimates at t without taking expectations.
212Compare LeRoy (2006) for the contemporary academic discussion that took place during the 1980s but did not take
into account discount factor variability.
213See also Cochrane (2011).
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6.3.3 The endogeneity of dividend growth rate and discount factor
Investors bought or sold shares following changes in the expected dividend payout E [D|Ft] due to the
arrival of new information Ft+1. This new information could either be introduced by changes in the
discount factor ϕ or in the dividend growth rate g. The results of Fama & French (1988) and Fama
& French (1989) suggest the former as primary source given the absence of any predictive power of
the latter. However, these findings are based on aggregated continuous dividend information. This
introduces bias, given that the dividend payout D for the business year t is of discrete nature and
usually announced at the annual general meeting that takes place some time later - in the present
context during the following business year t + 1. Therefore, there is no instantaneous reaction of
the dividend growth rate to g i.e. to observable earnings shocks. For example, directly observed
unanticipated exogenous discount rate shocks ϕt in business year t, such as for example caused by
a natural catastrophe, may lead to instantaneous changes in the market price Pt. This is caused by
investors anticipating the associated future reduction in dividend payout. Maintaining the previous
dividend growth g for period t as reported in business year t + 1 would signal to investors that the
company was able to absorb the exogenous shock. This could have for example been due to the release
of dedicated internal reserve funds, reinsurance arrangements that were unknown to external investors
or the fact that the company had not been exposed to the shock. In this case, investors would re-adjust
expectations that cause positive returns Rt+1. The reported change in the dividend growth rate g in
this example would nevertheless be nil. This explains that changes in g are of relevance in contrast to
the results by Fama & French (1988) and Fama & French (1989).
6.3.4 Literature review: dividend signalling in insurance operations
An insurance company is able to intentionally signal relevant information to investors by means of
dividend payout. Previous findings in the context of insurance include Lee & Forbes (1980), who analyse
the relationship between non-life insurance share prices and dividend payout from 1955 to 1975 based
on a sample of 34 companies. They focus on the dividend yield as a measure for the realised return
on investment for the stock of an insurance company. They find a statistically significant correlation
for the sub-period from 1955 to 1968. This relationship nevertheless disappears between 1969 to 1975.
Akhigbe et al. (1993) analyse the informational content of 253 dividend increase announcements in the
U.S. non-life sector between 1969 and 1991. They confirm positive abnormal returns in the stock price
of a company following the announcement of increased dividend payout. Motivated by methodological
issues in Akhigbe et al. (1993), Zhong (1999) improves their approach by taking into consideration the
lines of insurance business a company was active in. Based on a sample of 161 U.S. insurance companies
between 1976 and 1994, the study confirms the occurrence of abnormal returns in the case of increased
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dividends. A survey of relevant empirical studies is provided in Baker (2009, p.473 / Table 26.1, p.466).
The only study based on non-U.S. data is Reddemann et al. (2010), who utilise aggregated data from
insurance sector indices, information on earnings-per-index-share and dividends-per-index-share taken
from Bloomberg Data Services from 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q4. It is the only study to apply time series
methodology. By exclusively focusing on dividend decreases, they conclude that cutting dividends
during periods of economic turmoil, in this case the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis, does not have negative
effects.
With the exception of Reddemann et al. (2010), results on the relationship between dividends and
the share price of an insurance company are empirically associated with periods of relative economic
stability. This contrasts with the pronounced cyclicality of the Interwar period. Following previous
utilisation in comparable studies, event study methodology214 is employed to examine the causal
relationship between dividends and stock price performance.
6.4 Testing informational content and clientele sentiment
It is hypothesised that investors were using dividend announcements as signals to validate expectations
in future dividend payout. In addition, the catering theory of dividends suggests that companies
were adjusting dividend payout to the interests of its investor clientele. This would require a positive
sentiment towards future dividend increases. In the following, an empirical model is specified first that
captures changes in the discount factor as well as in the dividend growth rate. Second, the characteristics
of dividend announcements are illustrated. Third, abnormal and cumulative abnormal share price
returns are defined as a measure for investor reactions. Fourth, potential results are categorised into
different states of clientele sentiment.
6.4.1 Share price and return definition
Following from Equation (6.2) it is assumed that insurance companies can provide new information to
financial markets by changing the dividend growth rate g.
Let the monthly cum-ex price of a insurance share P ∈ R+0 of a class j ∈ J at the counted month
t = m ∈ T with T = R+ be defined as the discounted present value of future dividends per per-share
capital, or
Pj,m =
1
ϕm
T−m∑
m=1
E [ϕj,mDj,m]
ujm
, (6.3)
where Dj,m ∈ R+0 denotes the monetary value of distributed cash dividends, ϕj,m is the time-dependent
214Regarding the use of monthly data, see Brown & Warner (1980) in particular and Henderson (1990) and MacKinlay
(1997) in general.
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and class-specific discount factor and u ∈ R+ the monetary value of paid-in share capital scaled to
RM 100. Given that one company can have issued different share classes simultaneously, the identifier
variable is the individual share class. The relative change in the share price between months m and
m+ 1 defines return R ∈ R , or
Rj,m = ln
(
Pj,m+1
Pj,m
)
, (6.4)
, which is assumed to be log-normally distributed.215 Expected returns are calculated by the so-called
market model in accordance with MacKinlay (1997). It is defined as
E [Rj,m] = β0 + β1(RA,m) + jm, (6.5)
where RA,m = ln (PA,m+1/PA,m) is the log-normally distributed market return based on the index
return RA, which is represented by the Berlin stock exchange. For the uncorrelated error term a normal
distribution, with E [], is assumed. The market model does not explicitly consider a risk-free rate. This
is appropriate in the present context given that it is not possible to define an risk-free asset that was
regarded as an alternative investment opportunity by the investor clientele under consideration.
6.4.2 Dividend announcement definition
A dividend announcement of share class j at time t is denoted by the indicator function 1E(Dj,t). It
represents the change in the dividend growth rate associated with share class j in month m relative
to the previous month m− 1. The only time a change can occur is the month of the annual general
meeting. Three possible types of dividend announcements are defined, i.e. “increase” denoted by +,
“decrease” denoted by −, and no change denoted by 0, so that E ∈ [+,−, 0]. Increases occur if the
dividend of the current reporting period - where individual months m are associated with the respective
reporting periods - is larger relative to the dividend of the previous reporting period, decreases if smaller
and no change if equal. The formal definitions are
1+(Dj,t) =

1 if Dj,m > Dj,m−1
0 if Dj,m ≯ Dj,m−1
1−(Dj,t) =

1 if Dj,m < Dj,m−1
0 if Dj,m ≮ Dj,m−1
. (6.6)
215This follows Merton (1973) and Cochrane (2005) and allows to interpret Rh as a percentage change of Pj;(m+1)
relative to Pjm.
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10(Dj,t) =

1 if Dj,m = Dj,m−1
0 if Dj,m = Dj,m−1
6.4.3 Classification of normal and abnormal returns
The reaction of investors is measured in terms of abnormal returns ARj,m, defined as the percentage
difference between the observed return ˆRjm in month m and the expected return E [Rjm]if no dividend
announcement hat been taken place, so that
ARj,m = ˆRj,m − E [Rj,m|1E (¬D)] . (6.7)
E [Rjm] is approximated by integrating over a period without new information, or 1E(¬D) = 1E(D) = 0,
and is called estimation window. Bootstrap procedures are applied in order to take into consideration
the limited number of observations. This is possible due to the basic assumption that returns are
log-normally distributed and that no exogenous shocks occur. A minimum of six observations from a
nine month period is used to allow for gaps between observations. This means that July 1926 is the
earliest announcement date for which it is possible to calculate normal returns. Observations are taken
from the period from twelve to three months prior to the announcement, or mest = {−12, . . . ,−3} .
1,000 bootstrap samples are drawn with replacement from this sample to calculate error bands. The
observed return ˆRjm is measured within a pre-specified event window, or the period in which new
information arrives that is chosen to be mevent ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The relatively long interval is chosen
to take into account possible early information dissemination prior to the announcement as well as
potentially delayed trade activity.216It is assumed that abnormal returns occur in the month of the
dividend announcement, represented by the annual general meeting. Additionally, the months prior
and after are also included since announcements could have be disseminated earlier than the actual
annual general meeting - especially if it had been scheduled at the beginning of a month. Averaging
over all assets J yields the average abnormal return AAR per event E and month m, or
AARE,m =
1
J
 J∑
j=1
ARj,m
 , (6.8)
which allows for interpreting the general effect of dividend announcements on share price performance.
In order to test whether abnormal returns are persistent across the whole event window q, cumulative
216Throughout the period under consideration, insurance companies especially relied on partly paid-up name shares
that required the purchaser to be listed in the company-specific register. This act was necessary to track shareholder
liabilities. At the same time, it limited the fungibility of shares, given that a new entry was required for every transaction.
German stock exchanges published special “house rules” to ensure fluent trading. The most important German market
place in Berlin issued such special regulations for the first time in 1925 in order to regulate, for instance, the liabilities of
shareholders who had failed to register appropriately and to speed up the process of registration. See Berman (1930) for
a contemporary discussion of this issue and a description of the house rules provided by the Berlin stock exchange.
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Table 38: Definition clientele sentiment
Clientele sentiment state Optimistic Normal Pessimistic
Announcement Variable Abnormal returns
Increase 1+(Dj,t) 0 + +
No change 10(Dj,t) - 0 +
Decrease 1−(Dj,t) - - 0
Note: Abnormal returns are classified in increases, denoted by “+”, decreases, denoted by “-” and no
changes, denoted by “0”.
Source: See text
average abnormal returns per event E are considered, which are defined as
CAARE =
∑
q
1
J
 J∑
j=1
ARj,m
 . (6.9)
The metric allows that abnormal changes can cancel each other out across the full event window.
Two test statistics are used to assess the statistical significance of the measured abnormal returns:
first, a parametric test statistic is used as proposed in Boehmer et al. (1991) that uses a standardised
definition of variance to control for potential event-induced volatility. Second, the non-parametric
Wilcoxon W -test217 is used to take into account that the calculated average abnormal returns are not
necessarily normally distributed, which rules out the use of the standard t-statistic. This Wilcoxon test
takes into account the calculated magnitude by ranking observations as well as using the median value
as well as the sign of the parameter estimates.
6.4.4 Categorisation of clientele sentiment
Investors are assumed to expect that companies follow long-term dividend strategies as detailed in
Ch.4. Only the arrival of previously unexpected information leads to an abnormal price reaction as
investors adjust expectations. Under the hypothesis of semi-efficient markets abnormal returns indicate
that markets incorporate all publicly available information into the formation of market prices. The
characteristics of this change categorise the set of clientele sentiment states s ∈ S ∈ {1; 2; 0} with s = 1
denoting “optimistic”, s = 2 “pessimistic” and s = 0 “normal”, which is schematically summarised in
Table (38).
The clientele sentiment state “normal” is confirmed by the mentioned studies that analyse data
from periods of relative economic stability. It is assumed that investors do not anticipate any changes
to dividends. Dividend increases (decreases) are followed by a positive (negative) aggregate price
reaction as investors interpret them as an indication for a persistent positive (negative) earnings shock.
The clientele sentiment state “optimistic” is based on the assumption that investors expect dividend
217The null hypothesis is H0 : AARjm = 0.
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increases. This suggests that the announcement of no change or dividend decrease leads to a negative
aggregate price reaction. The clientele sentiment state “pessimistic” is accordingly based on investors
anticipating dividend decreases. In this state, the aggregate price reaction is positive in case of both,
no change and dividend increase.
6.5 Data
Dataset IV “Share Price” consists of monthly insurance stock market prices as well as the market
index of the Berlin stock exchange. The dataset was collected for all relevant German stock exchanges
from “Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r das Versicherungswesen”: Berlin, Breslau, Frankfurt, Cologne, Leipzig,
Magdeburg, Mannheim, Munich and Stuttgart. For share classes that were traded at different stock
exchanges the arithmetic mean was calculated. Price quotations for a total of 64 different shares classes
was collected during the chosen period from January 1926 until June 1931. Table (39) provides a
general overview over the included exchange markets, companies and associated share classes. The
arithmetic mean of the quotation was used in case that the same share class was traded at different
exchanges. The starting date was chosen in order to avoid introducing bias from the hyperinflation
period up until 1924. Given that the dividend announcements for the year 1925 occurred in 1926, the
relative change in dividend payout announced depended not on the year 1924 either. The ending date
was attributed to the fact that trading was discontinued at German stock exchanges between 12 July
and 2 September as well as between 19 September and 31 December 1931 due to the financial crisis in
Germany. The frequency was chosen to be monthly and follows Voth (2003) and Gielen (1994). For the
period under consideration both studies use data taken from Reichsamt (1927 - 1932), which is only
available monthly.218 The date of ordinary annual general meetings are interpreted as the date of the
dividend announcement. Dates were collected from the announcement section of “Neumanns Zeitschrift
fu¨r Versicherungswesen” for the period under consideration. 6.02% (24 out of 399) of all possible dates
were missing in the source.
The distribution of monthly dividend announcements is provided by Table (40) and illustrated in
Figure (9).
6.6 Empirical results
The empirical analysis of model estimates requires an initial examination as to whether results are
biased by potential changes in the discount factor. The following part starts by analysing potential
market-wide effects on the formation of market prices. This is followed by the discussion of the estimated
218This official annual publication also disclosed disaggregated prices but started to include insurance as late as in 1931
and limited itself to the Berlin stock exchange.
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Table 39: Stock exchanges, companies and share classes covered by Dataset IV “Share Price”
Name
Share
class
Traded at the stock exchange?
Berlin Breslau Frankfurt Cologne Leipzig Magdeburg Mannheim Munich Stuttgart
Aachener - Mu¨nchener Yes Yes Yes
Aachener Ru¨ck Yes Yes
Agrippina Yes
Albingia Lit.A Yes
Albingia Lit.B Yes
Allianz Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Allianz Leben Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Assekuranz-Union alte Yes
Assekuranz-Union neue Yes
Badische Assek. Yes
Berliner Hagel Lit. A Yes
Berliner Hagel Lit. B Yes
Berlinische Feuer alte Yes
Berlinische Feuer neue Yes
Colonia Feuer groß Yes Yes
Colonia Feuer klein Yes Yes
Colonia Ru¨ck 10 Yes
Continentale Yes
Dresdner Allgemein alte Yes
Dresdner Allgemein junge Yes
Frankfurter Allgemeine alte Yes Yes Yes
Frankfurter Allgemeine junge Yes Yes Yes
Frankfurter Ru¨ck alte Yes
Frankfurter Ru¨ck junge Yes
Frankona Ru¨ck Lit. A Yes Yes Yes
Frankona Ru¨ck Lit. D Yes Yes
Gladbacher Feuer Yes Yes
Hermes Kredit 100pc Yes Yes
Hermes Kredit 25pc
Ko¨lner Lloyd Yes
Ko¨lnische Hagel Yes Yes
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck alte Yes Yes
Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck neue Yes Yes
Leipziger Feuer I, alte Yes Yes
Leipziger Feuer I, junge Yes Yes
Leipziger Feuer II, alte Yes Yes
Leipziger Feuer II, junge Yes Yes
Leipziger Feuer III, alte Yes Yes
Leipziger Feuer III, junge Yes Yes
Magdeburger Feuer große
Magdeburger Hagel alt Yes Yes
Magdeburger Hagel neu Yes
Magdeburger Leben Yes Yes
Magdeburger Ru¨ck alt Yes Yes
Magdeburger Ru¨ck neu Yes Yes
Mannheimer Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck alte Yes
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck junge Yes
National Allgemeine Yes
Nordstern Allgemeine Yes
Nordstern Leben Yes
Rheinisch-Westf. Lloyd Yes Yes
Sa¨chsische VAG alte Yes
Sa¨chsische VAG neue
Schlesische Feuer alte
Schlesische Feuer neue Yes Yes
Su¨ddeutsche Ru¨ck Yes
Thuringia junge Yes
Transaltantische Gu¨ter Yes
Vaterla¨ndische und Rhenania Yes Yes
Victoria Allg. Yes
Victoria Feuer Yes
Wu¨rttemberg. Feuer Yes Yes
Wu¨rttemberg. Transport Yes Yes
Note: “Neumanns Zeitschrift fu¨r Versicherungswesen” provided monthly data until 1927. From this year
onwards the source changed its data reporting practice and published weekly data.
Source: Dataset IV “Share Price”
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Table 40: Summary statistics dividend announcements 1926 - Jun 1931
Period Jan 1926 - Jun 1931 Jan1926 - Dec 1926 Jan 1927 - Dec 1927
Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev
10(D) 251 .327 .470 61 .328 .473 62 .258 .441
1+(D) 251 .442 .497 61 .459 .502 62 .629 .487
1−(D) 251 .231 .422 61 .213 .413 62 .113 .319
Period Jan 1928 - Dec 1928 Jan 1929 - Dec 1929 Jan 1930 - Dec 1930
Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev
10(D) 69 .130 .339 58 .259 .442 58 .397 .493
1+(D) 69 .609 .492 58 .448 .502 58 .086 .283
1−(D) 69 .261 .442 58 .293 .459 58 .517 .504
Period Jan 1931 - Jun 1931 Jun 1927 - Jul 1929 Not Jun 1927 - Jul 1929
Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev
10(D) 43 .558 .502 139 .187 .391 212 .382 .487
1+(D) 43 .349 .482 139 .561 .498 212 .363 .482
1−(D) 43 .093 .294 139 .252 .436 212 .255 .437
Source: Dataset IV “Share Price”
average abnormal returns AAR as well as the cumulative abnormal returns CAAR.
6.6.1 Potential bias from discount rate shocks
It is assumed that abnormal returns are independent from potential discount rate shocks. This also
integrates over the dynamics of a risk-free rate that is not considered in the present context. There
are nevertheless two potential sources for bias: on the one hand, exogenous shocks to the benchmark
Berlin stock exchange index could have occurred during overlapping estimation windows. On the other
hand, the general decrease in insurance share prices caused by the August 1929 FAVAG crisis could
have also affected returns during estimation windows. Figure (11) plots the returns of the index against
the histogram of dividend announcements.
It illustrates that the relative Berlin stock index return experienced pronounced variation during
the run-up of the May 1927 Reichsbank intervention and immediately after. This might introduce bias
that the majority of event windows falls in the immediate period surrounding the intervention. Since
dividend increases constituted the relative majority of 69% in this year, this might lead to a downward
bias in parameter estimates associated with this type of event. The index dropped also substantially
during the stock market crash in October 1930. In contrast, only four dividend announcements in
October and November 1929 coincided generally with the Wall Stress Crash and the FAVAG crisis.
This leads to conclude that dividend increases might experience downward bias.
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Figure 11: Frequency of dividend announcements per month and Berlin stock index
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Note: Dividend announcements are associated with annual general meetings and provided as per-month count
data. The relative return Berlin stock index is the standardised return of the Berlin stock index relative to the
previous month.
Source: Dataset IV “Share price”
6.6.2 Results average abnormal returns model
Summary statistics for average abnormal returns are provided in Table (41). The robustness of the
model is validated in accordance with Brown & Warner (1980) by analysing potential false-positive
results. This refers to occurrences of abnormal returns outside of the event window q = −1, 0, 1.
False-positive results are defined as months that feature statistically significant results for both, the
Z and the W statistic. The only potential false-positive estimate is reported for dividend increases
in m = −2. This does not bias the overall model, given that the observation is not within the
estimation window. It suggests that dividend increases might have been communicated earlier than
other announcements. Statistically significant negative abnormal returns are reported for one month
after the dividend announcement across all types of announcements. Negative changes after dividend
increases can be interpreted as market corrections following purchases in earlier months.
The statistical significance of results first supports the hypothesis that investors used dividends as
am indicator. This is shown in all three types of announcements. The results for dividend increases,
however, might be biased downward by potential bias from changes in the discount factor. The negative
average abnormal returns for no changes and dividend decreases provide evidence for an optimistic
clientele sentiment. Negative price reactions imply that investors were adjusting expectations in future
dividend payout downwards. The positive abnormal returns in m = −1, however, appear to cancel
each other out with the negative results in m = 1. This motivates the analysis of cumulative average
abnormal returns.
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Table 41: Average abnormal returns per type of announcement
Increase Stable Decrease
q AAR Z W N AAR Z W N AAR Z W N
-5
-.003
-0.54 1.653 98
.009
0.71 1.657 59
-.031
-2.44** -1.828 40
(.015) (.006) (.015)
-4
.019
0.89 .725 98
.017
1.55 2.389** 59
.036
1.20 1.048 40
(.015) (.008) (.026)
-3
-.011
-1.40 -.725 98
.016
1.13 1.544 59
-.007
-1.21 -.215 40
(.012) (.009) (.010)
-2
.026
2.61* 2.706** 98
.009
0.36 1.612 59
.008
0.13 .524 40
(.008) (.012) (.017)
-1
.030
2.21* 2.826** 98
.007
0.24 .525 59
-.049
-1.76 -1.465 40
(.011) (.010) (.031)
0
.011
0.42 1.132 98
-.014
-1.97 -1.936 59
-.009
-1.06 -1.116 40
(.013) (.009) (.013)
1
-.013
-2.21* -2.032* 98
-.029
-3.57*** -2.759** 59
-.053
-3.69*** -2.930** 40
(.008) (.009) (.016)
2
.006
.13 .683 96
.001
-0.39 -.151 55
.012
0.17 -.819 38
(.008) (.010) (.039)
3
.006
.05 .810 92
-.006
-0.88 .187 51
-.080
-1.60 -2.309** 36
(.009) (.012) (.053)
4
.006
.03 -.319 92
-.003
-0.92 -.568 43
.002
-0.15 .707 36
(.013) (.009) (.023)
5
-.003
-.54 -.108 89
.007
0.13 .229 43
-.001
-0.25 .524 35
(.015) (.013) (.023)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset IV “Share Price”
Table 42: Cumulative average abnormal returns
Event Type Increase Stable Decrease
CAAR .028 -.035 -.110
(.017) (.016) (.043)
Wilcoxon - W 1.805 -2.163** -2.997**
BMP - Z 19.89*** -10.99*** -9.04***
N 98 59 40
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p< .05 ** p< .01 *** p< .001
Source: Dataset IV “Share Price”
6.6.3 Results Cumulative average abnormal returns
The summary statistics of the random variable CAAR are provided in Table (42). It is confirmed that
the signs of decreased and stable dividend announcements are significant at a minimum level of 1%.
This supports the previous finding that dividends were used as a signal. For dividend increases it is
confirmed that positive and negative abnormal returns cancelled each other out. The final CAAR of
2.8(±1.7)% is not statistically significant considering the W -test but significant at the 0.1% level based
on the Z-test. This suggests that estimates are due to event-induced variance, which might be caused
by the reported bias due to the share price reactions on the May 1927 Reichsbank intervention.
The announcement of a constant dividend rate led to an aggregate return of about -3.5(±1.6)%
that is statistically significant. Finally, dividend decreases caused a statistically significant pronounced
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CAAR of -11.0(±4.3)% as expected. Both findings confirm that clientele sentiment was optimistic
during the period under consideration. This supports the assumption that insurance companies were
not affected by the May 17 Reichsbank intervention, since the target investor clientele continued to
react optimistically to company-specific dividend signals.
6.7 Optimistic clientele sentiment during the Golden Twenties
The chapter analysed the observation that German insurance share prices increased after the May
1927 Reichsbank intervention to limit speculation during the period from 1926 until summer 1931.
This development contrasted with the general decrease in the Berlin stock index and differed from the
findings of Voth (2003). Contemporary source material suggested that this spread was due to the fact
that a specific wealthy long-term investor clientele was especially active in the trade with insurance
shares, which was in line with the catering theory of dividends. On the basis of the Gordon growth
model, it was argued that dividend announcement information conveyed relevant information for this
particular clientele. In addition, it was questioned as to whether reactions to dividend announcement
allowed to make inferences on the clientele sentiment during the Golden Twenties. The chapter applied
event study methodology to analyse the reaction of German insurance share price returns on associated
dividend announcement information. This was based on a novel dataset hand-collected share price
information. It proved the hypothesis that investors interpreted dividend announcements as a relevant
signal for valuation purposes. The results was interpreted as an indicator for optimistic clientele
sentiment. This confirms the hypothesis that insurance shares were not affected by the May 1927
Reichsbank intervention due to its lack of impact on its investor clientele.
The findings of this analysis also relate to the third assumption of the catering theory of dividends
that companies were catering to investor expectations especially in periods of increased demand.
Discount rate shocks could also occur from endogenous sources, for example due to overall positive
market conditions. In the present case, the rally in share prices that occurring in 1926 was driven by
a general return to normalisation. The quoted statement in “Neumanns Versicherungszeitschrift” of
February 1928 suggested that the observed decrease in the dividend yield led to expectations in future
dividend increases. Following on, dividend increases outweighed other forms of announcements until
the second discount rate shock, the August 1929 FAVAG default. From this period onwards, the share
of dividend increases became smaller. The evidence confirms the observation of Ch.4 that insurance
companies were actively catering to dividend expectations during the Golden Twenties.
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7 Cost of capital and the German underwriting cycle during
the Interwar Period
7.1 The correlation between underwriting and business cycle
A non-life insurance company can be regarded as the sum of different interconnected internal portfolios.
Profit and loss cashflows associated with the provision of insurance protection against financial losses
arising from the materialisation of uncertain events are collected within underwriting portfolios. A
standard common denominator to classify different underwriting portfolios is the type of risk covered.
Composite non-life insurance companies conduct business in different lines of insurance business in
order to diversify the exposure to individual risk types. In addition, premiums are earned up-front
and invested in asset portfolios until being reclaimed. The fluctuations of cashflows in asset portfolio
are governed by other market forces than insurance-technical portfolios. Periods of relatively low
market prices for insurance risk are colloquially termed “soft markets” and associated with decreased
profitability and a higher rate of insolvencies and mergers. In contrast, periods of relatively high
market prices are known as “hard markets” and feature sound conditions for profitability and solvency.
The stage transition dynamics form the underwriting cycle, which is characterised by an idiosyncratic
occurrence that remains an open field of research. Evidence from the Interwar period, for instance,
suggests a pronounced effect of the business cycle on insurance-technical cost performance. This was
explicitly stated in the 1930/1931 annual report of the then-second largest global reinsurance company
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck.
The year 1930 was marked by the steadily increasing economic crisis that has experienced
its propagation across almost all countries and its catastrophic intensification in the year
1931. In contrast, insurance business development was not unsatisfactory. Insurance has its
own cyclicality. General economic conditions certainly do play a role in the production of
premiums; revenue and commodity prices influence property insurance, levels of income, the
development of life insurance as well as the appetite for insurance in all sectors. However,
the fluctuations in business acquisitions are not too substantial in relation to the existing
insurance portfolio, especially given that increases in premium income do not immediately
represent additional profit due to the associated costs and required reserve depositions. The
claims development is much more crucial and it is - exclusively in hail insurance and to a
certain degree in transport but also fire insurance - dependent on elements and a number
causes, the impact of which is yet unknown. It is nevertheless a fact that the German fire
insurance featured a better development in the crisis years 1930 and 1931 than in the more
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beneficial year 1929. In a number of other lines, such as casualty, liability and life insurance
- if not considering suicide and fraud - it is not possible at all to find indubitable connections
between the claims development and the business cycle. Credit insurance, however, is
completely dependent. 219
One year later the company concluded in its annual report that the negative economic circumstances
had indeed led to a positive claims development:
The beneficial claims development continued in the year 1932 as well; it has to be feared
that it will experience a turn-around as soon the economy has been successfully put back
on track to a greater degree.220
This observation suggests that insurance lines were correlated differently with overall market conditions.
This interdependence between underwriting and business cycle was examined by the contemporary
dissertation Kurtz (1937). The availability of disaggregated data allows to test the results of this study
within a line-specific cost-of-capital framework. This approach allows to aggregate results to analyse
the dependence of the market aggregate per-company internal cost of capital on the business cycle.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature a new perspective on the properties of the standard
model to calculate cost of capital, the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM. It additionally provides the first
empirical analysis of an underwriting cycle during a major economic crisis. The current approach is
limited in scope by the relatively short period under consideration. The comparative calculation of
beta coefficients within the CAPM is not conducted due to the sensitivity of results to the choice of a
risk-free interest rate and a market portfolio. There is no generally accepted definition, especially of the
former, whilst the latter is potentially biased by the effect of the 1931 Financial Crisis on market prices.
In addition, this chapter does not inquire into the causes of underwriting cyclicality, given that the
associated econometric examination would require data that are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
219(German original, translated by the author:) “Das Jahr 1930 stand unter dem Druck einer sta¨ndig zunehmenden
Wirtschaftskrise, die im Jahr 1931 ihre Ausbreitung u¨ber nahezu sa¨mtliche La¨nder und ihre katastrophale Verscha¨rfung
erfahren hat. Demgegenu¨ber ist das Versicherungsgescha¨ft nicht unbefriedigend verlaufen. Die Versicherung hat ihre
eigene Konjunktur. Wohl spielt in der Pra¨mienproduktion die allgemeine Wirtschaftslage eine Rolle; Umsatz und
Warenpreise beeinflussen die Sachversicherung, die Einkommensverha¨ltnisse, die Entwicklung der Lebensversicherung
sowie die Versicherungslust in allen Branchen. Indessen sind die Schwankungen des Gescha¨fts-zuwachses im Verha¨ltnis zum
bestehenden Versicherungsstock nicht allzu erheblich, zumal eine Pra¨mienmehrung wegen der mit ihr verbundenen Kosten
und Reservestellungen nicht ohne weiteres einen Mehrgewinn bedeutet. Entscheidend ist vielmehr der Schadenverlauf,
und dieser ist in der Hagelversicherung ausschließlich, in der Transportversicherung und auch in der Feuerversicherung
zu enem wesentlichen Teile von den Elementen und von einer Reihe nach dem Grade ihrer Wirkung noch unerforschter
Ursachen bedingt. Tatsache ist jedenfalls, daß die deutsche Feuerversicherung in den Krisenjahren 1930 und 1931 einen
wesentlich besseren Verlauf aufweist als in dem wirtschaftlich gu¨nstigeren Jahre 1929. In einer Reihe anderer Branchen,
wie der Unfall-, Haftpflicht- und Lebensversicherung aber sind, wenn man von Selbstmord und Versicherungsbetrug
absieht, unzweifelhafte Zusammenha¨nge des Schadenverlaufs mit der Konjunktur u¨berhaupt nicht zu finden. Vo¨llig
abha¨ngig ist allerdings die Kreditversicherung.” See Annual Report 1931 Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck, p.4; see also Gerathewohl
(1982, p.798).
220(German:) Dieser gu¨nstige Schadensverlauf hat auch im Jahr 1932 angehalten; es muss befu¨rchtet werden, daß er
in das Gegenteil umschlagen wird, sobald es gelungen sein wird, die Wirtschaft wieder in sta¨rkerem Maße in Gang zu
bringen.” Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck annual report 1932, p.4. See also Ba¨hr & Kopper (2015, p.139).
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The chapter first discusses the contemporary analysis of the underwriting cycle during the Interwar
period. Second, the CAPM is introduced and the differences between insurance-technical and financial
cost of capital are highlighted. The factor-structure of underwriting returns is shown to provide a
relative indicator for the cost-of-capital level. Third, the combined ratio as key performance indicator
is aggregated from its components. The new compiled datasets at hand are introduced fourth. Fifth,
the results of the empirical analysis are provided, which includes the descriptive discussion of plotted
results as well as of calculated correlation coefficients.
7.2 Historical background: the German underwriting cycle during the In-
terwar period
The experiences made during the Great Depression period motivated contemporary research into the
relationship between underwriting performance and economic conditions. In the following, the findings
with respect to the U.S. insurance sector are presented. Furthermore, the results of Kurtz (1937), a
contemporary doctoral dissertation that analysed the German insurance sector during the Interwar
period, is provided.
7.2.1 Quantitative evidence from the U.S. insurance market
This unprecedented effect of the Great Depression on insurance operations was also a topic of particular
interest in the United States. The first issue of the Journal for Risk and Insurance, for example,
published in 1932221 and titled “The Record of Insurance during the Depression” was dedicated to
this issue. It collected the proceedings of a “round table on insurance”, jointly held by the American
Economic Association and the American Statistical Association. Presented papers considered investment
and underwriting returns of life as well as fire and casualty insurance companies. The basic conclusions
are summarised in Table (43).
It was found that companies had aligned their investment strategies to the crisis and focused on
low-risk public debt as well as high-quality equity. Kulp (1932) noted that only 5.3% of emergency funds
provided by the Reconstruction Finance Association had been successfully requested by life insurance
companies. This line of insurance was especially successful in providing investment alternatives to savers
during the banking crises of the 1930s. Non-life companies, in contrast, were able to offset investment
losses with a generally beneficial development in underwriting results. In general, insurance companies
experienced a substantial decrease in premium volume together with an increased number of surrenders
in the case of life insurance. This was nevertheless partially offset by decreased mortality as well as a
221The American Risk and Insurance Association was also founded in 1932 under the designation American Association
of University Teachers of Insurance. See Weiss & Qiu (2008).
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Table 43: Key findings in The Journal of Risk and Insurance Vol.1 (1932)
Investment Underwriting
Life Substantial shift towards government
securities in investment portfolio; life
insurers benefited from the relative
weakness of banks; only 5.3 % of
Reconstruction Finance Association
loans provided to insurance companies
of all kinds in 1931.
(Kulp (1932))
Decreased mortality, but also decreased
premium volume; substantial increases
experienced in surrenders and lapses.
(McCahan (1932))
Non-life Higher quality of equity held by
insurers lead to above-average
investment returns, yet realised
substantial investment losses due to
depressed market values of assets; fire
and marine insurers were able to offset
investment losses by underwriting
profit.
(Bowers (1932))
Substantial decrease in premium
income, both in fire and casualty lines,
which outperformed the decrease in
cost and losses. This especially led to
only modest (aggregated) underwriting
losses for casualty insurance companies.
(Michelbacher (1932))
Note: The collective term “non-life insurance” is associated with fire and property / liability insurance
companies in the United States.
Source: see table
general reduction in costs on losses in the case of non-life insurance.
7.2.2 Quantitative evidence from the German insurance market
The doctoral dissertation Kurtz (1937) provided a detailed contemporary assessment of German
insurance companies in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression. So far, it has not found
consideration in the relevant literature. The conclusions regarding business volume are summarised in
Table (44). The study separated lines into three categories indicating the differences in exposure and
assumed lines that directly relied on commercial activities to experience a strong correlation to the
business cycle. In addition, only credit and hail insurance were considered as negatively correlated,
the former due to increased risk aversion of creditors and the latter due an increased risk appetite
of farmers. Interestingly, the study argued for a less diverse development in claims incurred, which
is provided in Table (45). All lines apart from hail insurance were reported to feature a negative
correlation. The analysis by Kurtz (1937) thus confirmed the statements of Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck in 1931
that - with the noted exceptions - the Great Depression period did not immediately cause adverse
conditions for insurance companies. The results of the contemporary study motivate to validate the
results the underwriting cycle during the Interwar period on the basis of an econometric analysis. In
line with Kurtz (1937) it is hypothesised that the Great Depression period did not have an aggregate
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Table 44: Effect of business cycle on premium income, Kurtz (1937, p.54)
Proportionality of
reaction relative to
business cycle
Insurance line Correlation to business cycle
Strong
Transport (incl. Marine) Positive
Credit Negative
Medium
Hail Negative
Liability Positive
Motor Positive
Weak
Fire Positive
Accident Positive
Burglary Positive
Glass Positive
Note: Health and life insurance are not included.
Source: Kurtz (1937, p.57)
Table 45: Effect of business cycle on claims development
Proportionality of
reaction relative
business cycle
Insurance line of business Correlation to
business cycle
Fire Negative
Significant, yet not
necessarily strong
Credit Negative
Liability Negative
Accident Negative
Motor Negative
Weak
Burglary Negative
Glass Negative
Transport (incl. Marine) Negative
None Hail None ( potential
mediate effects such
as increased costs
incurred due to
changes in price
level)
Note: Health and life insurance are not included.
Source: Kurtz (1937, p.57)
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adverse effect on the underwriting performance.
7.3 The internal cost of capital of non-life insurance operations
This chapter identifies the correlation between the underwriting and the business cycle as an important
determinant of insurance cost of capital. It first provides a review of relevant literature and establishes
that previous methodological approaches are not an option in the present context. Second, internal
insurance cost of capital calculation on the basis of the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossing CAPM is contrasted
with the market-consistent valuation of insurance liabilities. This provides important insights into the
aggregate performance of insurance companies.
7.3.1 Literature with respect to underwriting and business cycles
Literature reviews focusing on the research of underwriting cycles are provided by Harrington & Niehaus
(2001) and Weiss (2007). Whilst there is no single explanation for the occurrence of this phenomenon,
one explanation of immediate relevance is the potential effect of general business conditions that is
usually approximated by the Gross National Product (GNP). Webb (1992) argues that underwriting
cycles do not necessarily have to be perfectly correlated with business cycles and indeed appear to
be more regular than the latter. In their analysis of underwriting cycles in 12 developed countries
for the period from 1965-1987, Lamm-Tennant & Weiss (1997) find that general economic conditions
are a relevant determinant for insurance cycles. In accordance, Grace & Hotchkiss (1995) prove a
long-run correlation in the United States for the period 1974-1990, but reject this for shorter periods.
Based on data from the period 1970-1995, Chen et al. (1999) confirm that economic growth is the
main explanatory variable for the insurance cycles in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and
Taiwan. Eling & Luhnen (2009) consider the German non-life insurance market and find a statistically
significant effect of GDP on the underwriting cycle for the period 1957 to 2006. The above mentioned
studies apply time series methodology to long-run periods and are concerned about the significance
of explanatory variables as well as the duration of underwriting cycles. The mentioned studies are
based on aggregated data from prolonged periods following World War II. Hence, these studies do not
include years of pronounced recessions or even depressions. The relatively short period from 1926 to
1935 rules out the use of advanced time-series methodology in the present context. The availability of
disaggregated company data, however, motivates to consider the relevance of the correlation between
the underwriting and the business cycle in a corporate financial setting.
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7.3.2 The insurance CAPM and insurance-technical returns
The Sharpe-Mossin-Lintner CAPM A standard model for representing the (internal) cost of
capital of a company is the Sharpe-Mossin-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)222. It defines
the expectation of insurance returns ϕ ∈ R+0 as
E [ϕ] = r + β (rm + r) , (7.1)
where r ∈ R+0 is the risk-free return on an alternative investment opportunity, rm ∈ R+0 the return
on a market portfolio and β ∈ [−1; 1] = Cov [ϕrm, ] /σ2m the beta factor representing systematic risk.
In order to take into account the fact that insurance companies consist of different underwriting
portfolios (alternatively: different exposures to insurance lines), Cummins & Phillips (2005) use per-line
full-information industry data so that
β =
J∑
j
βjωj + ν,
where associated portfolio weights are denoted by wl ∈ R+0 for lines l ∈ L and ν is an error term.
An alternative representation of the Sharpe-Mossin-Lintner CAPM considers the Sharpe ratio or
expected market price of risk, E [λϕ] = (E [ϕ]− r) /σϕ, which measures the return relative to a unit of
standard deviation and represents the market price of risk. The model is rearranged to
E [λϕ] = %ϕmλm, (7.2)
where %ϕm denotes the correlation between the insurance company and the financial market. Any
moments higher than the second are not considered in this model.223 The returns of the market portfolio
are usually constructed from a financial benchmark, such as a stock market index. This definition
does not take into account that an insurance company is an aggregated collection of different financial
and insurance-technical operations. The expected cost of capital therefore needs to consider both the
investment and underwriting portfolios of the company. Whilst volatility of the former can be put into
relation with financial benchmark returns, it is questionable whether this is appropriate for the latter.
A straightforward problem that features the same issue is the market-consistent valuation of
insurance liabilities, see Wu¨thrich et al. (2010) and Wu¨thrich & Merz (2013). Given that insurance
protection is not traded at secondary financial markets - disregarding the reinsurance market - there are
222Cummins (1990) and Bauer et al. (2013) provide overviews over different financial pricing methods in an insurance-
related setting.
223This is problematic in the context of insurance cashflows, which are not necessarily log-normal. The so-called Wang
transform by Wang (2002) takes this into account.
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no directly observable market price quotations. If, for example, an insurance company is to be taken
over, the calculation of its fair value also has to take into account the individual future cashflows arising
from investment as well as insurance-technical operations. There is nevertheless a close relationship,
given that investment returns are also generated from insurance-technical reserve funds.
Decomposing insurance cost of capital Let the probability space be defined as (Ω,F ,P,F). The
expectation of the cost of capital ϕ is redefined accordingly into a product structure, or
Et [ϕ|Ft] = Et
[
ϕA|At
]× Et [ϕT |Tt] , (7.3)
where the cost of capital ϕ is defined by a financial discount factor ϕA ∈ R+0 that explains the price
formation at financial markets.224 The insurance-technical density process ϕT ∈ R+0 with ϕT ≡ 1
denotes a probability distortion that represents loadings for non-hedgeable insurance-technical risks.
Both components are adapted to two specific information sets, or sigma fields, that capture insurance-
technical as well as financial information. Let the former be denoted by the filtration set T = (Tt)t∈T ,
which contains all relevant insurance-technical information and is based on the real-world probability
measure. The latter is represented by the filtration set A = (At)t∈T , which contains all relevant
financial information. It is based on the risk-neutral probability measure.225 Following Wu¨thrich &
Merz (2013, p.163), it is assumed that both filtrations are absorbed by the set of all relevant economic
informationF = (Ft)t∈T , so that
Ft ⊂ As+1
and
Fs ⊂ Ts+1.
This indicates that At and Tt are independent but conditionally given by Ft−1 for all t ∈ T . This is
Assumption 6.8 in Wu¨thrich & Merz (2013, Formula (6.13), p.164):
At
↗
Ft−1
↘
Tt

At+1
↗
Ft
↘
Tt+1

. . .
↗
Ft+1
↘
. . .

.
224See Wu¨thrich & Merz (2013, p.165, Eq.(6.14)).
225Compare the discussion of probability measures in the context of insurance in Mildenhall (2000).
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In other words, the ex-post reported cost of capital of a non-life insurance company can be separated
in costs associated with financial investments and those associated with insurance operations. Future
realisations nevertheless depend on the full set of information that takes into account both financial
as well as insurance-technical information. The components can only be analysed from an ex-post
perspective. Wu¨thrich & Merz (2013, p.164) give as an example the impact of an insurance-technical
event, such as a catastrophe, on financial prices. This can nevertheless also work in the opposite
direction. A substantial increase in financial prices might as well affect insurance-technical performance.
Insurance companies can for example engage in so-called “cashflow underwriting” during financial boom
periods. This involves the maximising the volume of premiums earned for investment purposes with the
intention to refinance associated insurance-technical losses with generated asset returns. This underlines
the relevance of the business cycle especially during the Golden Twenties and the Great Depression
period.
Analysing the correlation of underwriting and business cycle Non-life insurance companies
can be active in more than one line of insurance business. This means that the aggregate probability
distortion is itself the average of individual per-line distortions with associated portfolio weights wl and
line-specific filtrations, or
ϕT =
1
L
L∑
l=1
wlE
[
ϕTl |Tlt
]
.
There is no generally accepted definition of the insurance-technical probability distortion ϕT ∈ R+0
and the associated filtration set T = (Tt)t∈T . In the present context the former is chosen to be the
so-called combined ratio, which is an indicator of the costs associated with insurance operations. In
accordance, T is chosen to contain all data relevant for the definition of the ϕT .226 This motivates the
use of the general economic performance as a benchmark for the economic information set F. It is
assumed that financial information are correlated with the general economy, which allows to focus on
the insurance-technical performance and its correlation with the business cycle given that
Et
[
λTϕ |Tt
]
= %TEt [Et [λm|At]Ft] (7.4)
due to the law of iterated expectations. The insurance-technical correlation coefficient %T is therefore
in itself an immediate indicator for relative required loadings. It is assumed that increased (decreased)
relative correlation indicates increased (decreased) internal insurance-technical cost of capital. This
motivates the following empirical analysis of market conditions in the German insurance sector. Different
226The definition deviates from the one of Wu¨thrich & Merz (2013, p.160), where it is interpreted as “more detailed
information on the level that it provides a regulatory solvency model which contains all insurance technical information
available to the supervisor.” The present choice can be regarded as a sub-set of this more general definition.
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per-market and per-line indicators for insurance-technical performance are used that allow comparisons
with the results provided by Kurtz (1937).
7.4 The interdependence of business and underwriting cycle
The following econometric analysis considers aggregate market information on the basis of the market
median value, is necessary to avoid potential bias introduced by outliers. This implies that the
correlation is defined in the following on the basis of a deterministic trend model of the underwriting
cycle. The company-specific correlation coefficient is thus defined as
ˆ%Tit =E [φM |Ft] + ηi,
where φ ∈ [−1, 1] denotes the deterministic median trend adapted to the economic information set F
and ηi a company specific error term with E [ηi] = 0. The following analysis addresses the deterministic
trend component.
The basic key performance indicator for insurance operations is the so-called combined ratio,
calculated per company and per year. Disaggregating the combined ratio allows to measure different
market-wide insurance performances on different levels of aggregation. This approach is followed in
the empirical analysis of the correlation between the business cycle and individual insurance measures,
which sum up to the combined ratio as main indicator. Market-wide aggregates are formed by using
the median value in order to avoid bias from outliers. Cashflows from net premium income as well as
from losses incurred are observable from annual profit and loss statements on a per-company as well as
a per-line of insurance business level. Given that the combined ratio was not used by contemporary
practitioners, potential bias from managers smoothing associated information can be assumed as
absent.227 Company-specific market aggregates are defined as simple sums across all companies, or
NetPremiumIncomeN =
N∑
i=1
NetPremiumIncomei (7.5)
and respectively
Losses IncurredN =
N∑
i=1
Losses IncurredN . (7.6)
Line-specific aggregate information is constructed in accordance. Putting both cashflows into relation
forms the ratio of losses incurred after reinsurance per unit of net premum income. It represents the
227See Harrington & Niehaus (2001, p.652) and, more generally, Cummins & Outreville (1987).
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cost associated with insurance claims. The company-specific loss ratio is therefore defined as
LossRatioi =
∑L
l=1 Losses Incurredil∑L
l=1NetPremiumsEarnedil
. (7.7)
Given that regulated companies were required to disaggregate premium and claims information per line
of insurance business, it is possible to form line-specific market aggregates. Line-specific aggregate loss
ratios are formed by summing over disaggregate line-specific information, so that
LossRatiol = MEDIAN
[ ∑N
i=1 Losses Incurredil∑N
i=1NetPremiumsEarnedil
]
. (7.8)
This is used as a proxy to measure the correlation of individual insurance lines with the business cycle.
The aggregate company-specific alternative follows as
LossRatioN = MEDIAN
[ ∑N
i=1 Losses Incurredi∑N
i=1NetPremiumsEarnedi
]
. (7.9)
Operational expenses are usually reported on the firm-level instead of the portfolio level. This also
includes commissions to insurance brokers or reinsurance companies. The ratio of operational expenses
incurred per unit of total net premium income is represented by the cost ratio. Its market-wide aggregate
is defined as
ExpenseRatioN = MEDIAN
[
N∑
i=1
Operational Expensesi∑L
l=1NetPremiumsEarnedil
]
. (7.10)
The combined ratio is a key performance indicator that measures the amount of losses and cost
incurred per unit of net premium income on a per-company level. It is the sum of the aggregate
company-specific Expense Ratio and the aggregate company-specific Loss Ratio and is defined as
CombinedRatioi = ExpenseRatioi + LossRatioi, (7.11)
where i ∈ N is the company indicator and l ∈ L the indicator for the individual line of insurance
business. The market aggregate is
CombinedRatioN = MEDIAN
[
N∑
i=1
Costi +
∑L
l=1 Losses Incurredil∑L
l=1NetPremiumsEarnedil
]
.
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Table 46: Summary statistics Dataset II “Company”
Variable Unit Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
Foundation year 1,700 1887 1895 34.9 1781 1935
Organisational
form
binary 1,705 .72 1.00 .45 0 1
Income
Gross
premiums
earned
1,000 RM 1,705 7,857 2,076 21,746 0 248,549
Net
premiums
earned
1,000 RM 1,704 4,657 1,251 15,780 0 205,829
Interest
earned
1,000 RM 1,704 322 73 1,175 0 16,734
Expenses
Losses
incurred
1,000 RM 1,705 2,060 534 6,144 -102 80,560
Cost 1,000 RM 1,704 1,778 434 6,002 -59 80,347
Dividends 1,000 RM 1,670 91 11 251 0 2,580
Assets
Equity 1,000 RM 1,671 2,384 1,000 5,292 0 60,000
Paid-in
Equity
1,000 RM 1,675 1,915 600 4,186 0 42,648
Surplus 1,000 RM 1,339 9,350 29,301 0 326,081
Total Asset
Value
1,000 RM 1,704 10,470 35,133 0 486,909
Cash and
Cash
Equivalents
1,000 RM 1,704 884 1,897 0 41,110
Note: RM = Reichsmark. Standard deviation omitted for binary variables. Negative expenses imply
reinsurance transfer refunds. Losses paid are net of losses reserved of the previous year.
Source: Dataset II “Company”
7.5 Data
Datasets II “Company” and III “Line” provide the foundation of contemporary data for this analysis.
In addition, quantitative information with respect to the overall German business cycle is used in the
following empirical analysis.
7.5.1 Dataset II “Company”
Dataset II “Company” provides company-specific information taken from P&L statements as well as
balance sheet information. It covers an unbalanced panel data of a total of 242 German private non-life
insurance companies for the period between 1926 to 1935. Summary statistics are provided in Table
(46).
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Table 47: Summary statistics, Dataset III “Line”
Variable Unit Obs Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
Accident
Net Premium Income RM 482 799 270 2,050 0 16,366
Claims paid RM 482 643 161 1,634 0 15,245
Relative share % 1,704 .028 0 .779 0 .91
Burglary
Net Premium Income RM 553 329 153 624 0 5,335
Claims paid RM 553 2,248 43 210 -80 2,248
Relative share % 1,704 .023 0 .052 0 .50
Credit
Net Premium Income RM 90 799 75 1,305 0 4,645
Claims paid RM 90 1,008 53 1,994 -50 9,745
Relative share % 1,704 .015 0 .122 0 1
Fire
Net Premium Income RM 639 2,269 1,269 3,353 0 25,327
Claims paid RM 639 971 464 1,473 -8 11,880
Relative share % 1,704 .240 0 .360 0 1.27
Glass
Net Premium Income RM 282 384 195 580 0 2,958
Claims paid RM 282 164 72 253 0 1,125
Relative share % 1,704 .028 0 .149 0 1
Liability
Net Premium Income RM 517 1,330 482 3,656 0 30,782
Claims paid RM 517 1,278 488 2,749 0 23,262
Relative share % 1,704 .099 0 .233 0 1
Motor*
Net Premium Income RM 405 471 169 954 -1 6.504
Claims paid RM 361 264 73 576 0 2,248
Relative share % 1,359 .314 0 .123 0 2.074
Transport
Net Premium Income RM 621 1,171 409 1,982 0 1
Claims paid RM 621 1,072 322 2,281 -22 23,154
Relative share % 1,704 .172 0 .330 0 1
Hail
Net Premium Income RM 158 2,185 1,110 4,223 0 29,970
Claims paid RM 158 1,586 504 3,686 0 27,102
Relative share % See comments
Note: Summary statistics of Reichsmark-denominated variables are conditional on the fact that a company was
active in the respective line. Values in RM rounded to the next full digit. * indicates that values are omitted
for the years 1926 and 1935 due to methodological reasons.
Source: Dataset III “Line”
7.5.2 Dataset III “Line”
The second dataset, Dataset III “Line”, provides information for the following company-specific line of
business activities: accident, burglary, credit, fire, glass, hail, liability, motor and transport insurance.
Summary statistics are provided in Table (47). Reinsurance is omitted due to the changes in reporting
standards in 1931. Livestock, life and health insurance as well as smaller specialist lines are not
considered. Within the source, 1926 information for motor insurance was aggregated with reinsurance
and is thus not comparable to later years. For the year 1935, net premiums earned and claims paid in
motor insurance are aggregated with liability and accident insurance. Motor insurance is thus omitted
for the years 1926 and 1935. Information on hail insurance was not published in disaggregated form
but taken from aggregate information of companies registered as operating in hail insurance. The
155
Figure 12: GNP index Germany
FAVAG Default Financial Crisis
75
80
85
90
95
10
0
G
NP
 In
de
x 
(19
13
=1
00
)
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Year
Source: Ritschl & Spoerer (1997, Table A.1, pp.53/54)
maximum motor insurance share of 2.074 is an outlier. The respective company, Kraft, was a specialised
motor, accident and liability insurer that was a full subsidiary of Allianz. This company seems to have
undergone a substantial restructuring process between the years 1934 and 1935, which might have
included changes in the declaration of results. The maximum fire share of 1.266 is associated with a
mutual fire insurance company, Schwerdtfeger Brandgilde, which reported RM 138,000 net premium
income in fire insurance in 1927, but only a total net premium income of RM 109,000 for reasons
unknown.
7.5.3 Business cycle information
In order to consider the effect of deflation on absolute Reichsmark values, 1913 prices are used as
provided in Bundesbank (1976, Tab. A.1.02). The indexed real gross national product (GNP) of
Germany is used to represent the business cycle. Data is taken from Ritschl & Spoerer (1997, Table
A.1, pp.53/54) and presented in Figure (12). The period under consideration features a pronounced
business cycle. Two events of particular relevance to the insurance sector were the FAVAG default in
1929 and the financial crisis of 1931. The years from 1931 to 1933 are defined as the period of the
Great Depression in Germany and the subsequent years 1934 and 1935 as recovery period.228
228Compare Ritschl (2002).
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Figure 13: Total net premium volume
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Source: Dataset III “Line”, Ritschl & Spoerer (1997, Table A.1, pp.53/54)
7.6 Empirical analysis of underwriting and business cycle correlation
The following empirical analysis first provides a description of the individual market-wide indicators.
Second, correlation estimates are provided and compared against results obtained from Kurtz (1937).
7.6.1 Descriptive results
Net premiums earned Aggregate nominal net premiums experienced a pronounced cyclicality
between the years 1926 and 1935, which is shown in Figure (13). Having peaked at approximately RM
950 million, total net premiums earned decreased to about RM 662 million before recovery started
following 1933. It is interesting to note that the rapid decrease in net premium volume did not start
between 1928 and 1929, but after 1929 - the year FAVAG defaulted - and accelerated until 1933.
Comparing nominal and real net premium volume expressed in Goldmark with the purchasing power of
1913 shows that the latter was far less volatile. This is explained by the fact that financial conditions
expressed in insurance contracts are usually quoted in nominal terms. The currency deflation starting in
1931 had the effect that its effect on the premium income during the Great Depression period served as
a natural hedge against the economic turmoil of the 1930s. Nominal net premium income furthermore
featured a stronger correlation with (real) GNP.
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Figure 14: Aggregate losses incurred
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Source: Dataset II “Company”, Ritschl & Spoerer (1997, Table A.1, pp.53/54)
Net losses incurred Whilst the volume of premium income depends on the business strategy an
insurance company follows, it has no direct influence on the amount of claims net of reinsurance that
arise from its liability to existing insurance contracts. Figure (14) indicates that total losses incurred
net of reinsurance experienced a strong increase until 1929, followed by a decline during the crisis period
1931-1933. The local minimum was reached in 1933 followed by a recovery for the years 1934 and 1935.
Contrasting nominal with real values illustrates the effect of the deflation on insurance companies. The
real value became relatively more expensive in 1932 when the overall net premium volume was the
lowest of the period. This suggests that the devaluation of the currency did not lead to substantial
problems due to the beneficial claims development of the crisis years. The change in trend, however,
happened in both cases after 1929, the year of the FAVAG default.
Line-specific loss ratio Aggregate and line-specific loss ratios illustrate the overall effect of the
business cycle on the underwriting performance of German insurance companies. Figure (15) shows the
effect of outliers on the mean aggregate loss ratio. This supports the decision to use the median instead
of the mean. In addition, the aggregated loss ratio reached its maximum of 56% in 1929, the year of
the FAVAG default. It decreased substantially between 1931 and 1932 and dropped below 40% in 1934,
but recovered subsequently. This suggests a correlation with the business cycle.
158
Figure 15: Aggregate loss ratio
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Source: Dataset III “Line”, Ritschl & Spoerer (1997, Table A.1, pp.53/54)
Company-specific expense ratio Figure (16) indicates a persistent expense ratio of approximately
39% before 1929 and after 1932. The abrupt decrease to less than 37% from 1928 to 1929 was followed
by a slow but gradual increase until 1935. This indicates that insurance operations became relatively
cheaper during the crisis years. Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly measure the share of
provisions in total operating expenses. One possible explanation for this particular development might
have been changes in the reinsurance price. Assuming that reinsurance prices were low during the 1920s,
companies decided to buy more reinsurance protection. Increasing prices in the 1930s were matched by
a proportional decrease in demand.229
Combined ratio The per-year median development of the aggregate combined ratio is shown in
Figure (17). It indicates that German non-life insurance operations remained relatively expensive until
1931. The initial 1928 recession as well as the FAVAG crisis had little impact on the combined ratio
due to the development of the expense ratio. The trend reversed sharply in 1931 and started to slowly
increase back to 89% until 1935. This suggests that, overall, underwriting returns were low for the
economic boom of Golden Twenties and high for economic crisis of the Great Depression.
229This hypothesis will not be followed up since reinsurance prices are unobserved.
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Figure 16: Median Expense Ratio
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Source: Dataset II “Company”, Ritschl & Spoerer (1997, Table A.1, pp.53/54)
Figure 17: Median combined ratio
75
80
85
90
95
10
0
G
NP
 In
de
x
80
85
90
95
Co
m
bi
ne
d 
ra
tio
 (in
 pe
r c
en
t)
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Year
combined_ratio GNP Index
Source: Dataset II “Company”, Ritschl & Spoerer (1997, Table A.1, pp.53/54)
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Table 48: Line-specific correlation
Correlation with
(stylised) business
cycle
Net
Premium
income
Losses
incurred
Loss Ratio
Accident .468 -.020 -.180
Burglary .236 -.325 -.623
Credit .663 .177 -.556
Fire .552 .414 .139
Glass .322 .350 .157
Liability .147 .270 -.213
Motor .040 .158 .274
Transport .703 .601 -.204
Hail .412 .526 .490
Aggregate .619 .637 .458
Note: Differences to Kurtz (1937) are indicated in bold.
Source: Dataset III “Line”
7.6.2 Empirical results
Table (48) provides correlation coefficients for market data on net premium income, losses incurred and
line-specific loss ratios. The results for the net premium income are generally consistent with the findings
of Kurtz (1937). The only differences are found for credit and hail insurance. The pro-cyclicality of the
former is consistent with the assumption that credit insurance depended on general trade activities.
Information on the latter, however, is problematic, given that the occurrence of insured events was
not related to the general economy. The correlation coefficients need to be interpreted as spurious
and are not supported by theory. In general, however, premium income was positively correlated with
the business cycle. With respect to losses incurred, results were generally not negatively correlated as
suggested by Kurtz (1937). With the exception of transport and hail insurance - the former being also
dependent on trade activity and the latter subject to exogenous weather conditions - the magnitude
was overall relatively small.
Correlation of the underwriting cycle with the line-specific loss ratio needs to be interpreted as a
pro-cyclical development of cots. The estimates find negative correlations for accident, burglary, credit,
liability and transport insurance. Positive correlations are found for fire, glass and motor insurance.
Table (49) provides results for aggregate indicators on the per-company level; there are no benchmark
results from Kurtz (1937). It shows that the cost ratio displayed only little correlation with the business
cycle. Aggregate insurance cost of capital was more strongly correlated with the business cycle. This
indicates that the insurance-technical loading was largest in relative terms during the Golden Twenties
and decreased with deteriorating business conditions. The reported correlation coefficient is relatively
large in comparison to line-specific results. This is due to relatively large portfolio weights for the
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Table 49: Correlation of key performance measures
Ratio Correlation with GNP
Cost Ratio None .087
Combined Ratio Positive .766
Source: Dataset II “Company”
pro-cyclical fire and transport insurance lines. This overall finding of pro-cyclical insurance costs is
consistent with the observations expressed in the 1931/1932 annual report of Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck.
7.7 Underwriting profitability and the business cycle
The present chapter has provided an estimate for the internal cost of capital rate of German non-life
insurance companies during the Interwar period. It was argued that the market price for insurance
risk depends on both financial as and insurance-technical aspects, which are not directly separable.
The latter directly affect the aggregate cost level and thus qualify as indicators for the internal cost
performance. This allowed to interpret the correlation between the underwriting and the business cycle
as an indicator for an insurance-technical relative cost loading per line as well as for the aggregated
insurance market. The results were compared against contemporary results provided by the dissertation
Kurtz (1937).
It was shown that total net premium income generally decreased with deteriorating macroeconomic
conditions as suggested by Kurtz (1937). The results for aggregate claim payments showed differences
in their perceived relationship with the business cycle. Line-specific aggregate loss ratios indicated
pronounced differences, with lines depending on economic activities generally indicating pro-cyclical
patterns of profitability. An important exception was the largest German insurance line, fire insurance.
This helped to explain why the aggregate company-specific insurance-technical loading showed a clear
correlation of costs with the business cycle. Generally, German insurance companies were least profitable
during the economic boom period of the 1920s and most profitable during the crisis years of the Great
Depression.
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8 Conclusion: endogenous risk in non-life insurance
Endogenous risk in the German insurance sector during the Interwar period
It follows from the individual findings of this dissertation that insurance companies shifted discontinu-
ation risk from shareholders to policyholders by catering dividend payout to meet investor clientele
expectations. Ch.2 identified concerns with respect to the reputation of a company as a potential
motivation. Ch.3 indicated that companies with a better reputation - represented by the franchise value
associated with being founded prior to 1914 - were less likely to be discontinued by shareholders. This
highlighted the close relationship between franchise value as the perception of and the expectations in
a company by the market. This chapter established the relevance of voluntary discontinuation as a real
risk for companies.
Ch.4 analysed the relationship between the company earnings performance and the dividend payout
strategies of non-life insurance companies. It identified the Golden Twenties period as in particular
characterised by companies targeting increased dividend payout ratios. This was understood as an
indicator for active risk shifting by distributing internal funds to shareholders. That the sub-period
coinceded with an increased level of company discontinuations provides further support.
Also during the Golden Twenties period, Ch.5 found that private joint-stock companies were
featuring increased demand for reinsurance relative to mutual insurers as well as own demand during
the Great Depression period. This also pointed towards the use of reinsurance as leverage in order to
increase the distributable income. It was also suggested that specialised reinsurance companies were
demanding overall less reinsurance or retrocession during the Interwar period. This was consistent with
the finding of Ch.3 that these unregulated companies faced the highest default risk.
From the perspective of investors, the years prior to the 1931 Financial Crisis were identified as
a period of optimistic market expectations by Ch.6. It was shown that a specific clientele of wealthy
long-term investors were on aggregate selling company shares if the company had failed to announce
dividend increases. This was consistent with the observation of increased company discontinuations
during the Interwar period, which can also be regarded as the interest of shareholders investments.
Ch.7 demonstrated that investor expectations were not in line with the actual insurance-technical
profitability of companies. Figure (18) shows that the dividend payout ratio was relatively high (low)
when the combined ratio was also high (low). This comovement was solely based on the fact that
insurance companies catered to relatively higher investor expectations during the Golden Twenties.
Following a decrease in the latter after the 1929 FAVAG default due to endogenous causes, the dividend
payout ratio decreased in accordance.
This leads to the final conclusion that the increased dividend payments had to be provided for by
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Figure 18: Comparison dividend payout ratio and combined ratio, 1926 to 1935
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shifting risk, given that the internal earnings performance did not provide sufficient funds to refinance
the associated cash expenses. The case study of Ko¨lnische Ru¨ck provides a historical example of how
the market pressures during the 1920s finally culminated in the 1930s without being rooted in the
simultaneous Great Depression.
A generalised representation of endogenous risk
Apart providing empirical evidence the presence of endogenous risk in the German insurance sector
during the Interwar period, the theoretical considerations of the individual chapters offer the framework
to derive endogenous risk from established models of finance and actuarial science.
Endogenous risk is created by shocks or changes within the financial markets. This is represented
by transitions in the states of the world denoted by s ∈ S ∈ {1, 2, (0)}. During the Interwar period the
states s = 1 represented the prosperous conditions during the Golden Twenties and s = 2 the crisis
conditions associated with the Great Depression. Ch.5 provided a mapping of these on the stochastic
returns of alternative investment opportunities. With respect to the valuation of individual insurance
companies, Ch.6 showed that the Gordon growth model provided a suitable foundation that reflected
how investors valued insurance shares. Its time-dependent definition by Equation (6.2) is identical to
the state-dependent definition by Equation (5.2) via Equation (3.8), where the latter is given as
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V (s) =
1
ν (s, α)
E [D] .
under the assumption of the probability space (Ω,P,F). The state price density ν (s, α) was assumed
to depend on the state of the world s as well as the risk aversion of the company denoted by α as per
Equation (5.3) or
ν (s, α) = ϕ (s)− g (α) ,
where ϕ (s) denotes the state-dependent company-specific discount factor and g (α) the deterministic
dividend growth rate. This equation provided the necessary interdependences for the transmission of
changes in states s as found in Ch.6 into the risk aversion of companies α as per Ch.7. The alternative
investment return process defining ϕ (s) was represented by Equation (3.7), which is generalised into
the objective measure in order to incorporate the company-soecific cost of capital by including the
company-specific market price of risk due to Equation (7.2) so that
dϕt = [κE [ϕ]− (κ+ λσϕ)ϕt] dt+ σϕWP (t) , ϕ (0) = ϕ0
as per Brigo & Mercurio (2006, p.60 Eq.3.11 ). A continuous-time discrete-state representation as used
in Ch.5 allows to map the dynamics of the state system on the level of ϕt. Following Equation (3.8) it
is defined that
s =

0 if rt ≡ E [ϕ]
1 if rt  E [ϕ] .
2 if rt  E [ϕ]
The market price of risk λ combined financial as well as insurance-technical information as was discussed
in Ch. 7 and took the form
λϕ = %λm =
E [ϕ]− ϕ
σϕ
,
where the expectation was modelled on the basis of the single-period Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM
E [ϕ] = r + βϕm (rm − rf ) .
The argument of Ch.7 was that the dynamics of ϕ could not be as clearly separated as assumed
in the single-period CAPM. This motivated the definition of factor-components for financial market
information ϕA, and for the insurance-technical cost of capital level ϕA, to yield Equation (7.3)
E [ϕ|F ] = E [ϕA|A]× E [ϕT |T ] .
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With respect to the former, Ch. 6 showed that the Golden Twenties were associated with a more
optimistic investor sentiment represented by ϕA (1) > ϕA (2). Ch. 7 in turn confirmed that ϕT (1) >
ϕT (2), or that insurance operations were relatively more risky during the Golden Twenties than during
the Great Depression period. This allowed to infer that - all else equal - the value of an insurance
company was relatively lower during the late 1920s than during the early 1930s in comparison to
investment opportunity assets that were for example only responding to innovations in ϕA.
Endogenous risk was realised if the insurance company decided to act against this relative decrease
in its assumed value. In other words, the risk of being discontinued was shifted by the company to its
policyholders. This dissertation investigated different methods of risk shifting that are available to the
management of an insurance company. The dividend reserve process defined by Ch.4 provided a first
theoretical model that allowed to represent how managers administered dividend payout from internal
reserves as represented by Equation (4.1), or
Y (α, t) = y −Dt+ E (t) ,
where the subscript α is added to exemplify that the amount of internally available funds Y is a direct
function representation of risk aversion - the more internal funds a company keeps, the smaller is its
default risk. Ch. 5 provided a direct model representation of the underwriting decision of insurance
companies based on their demand for reinsurance. On the basis of the Esscher pricing principle it was
shown that decreases (increases) in reinsurance demand could be directly associated with decreased
risk aversion given Equation (5.1),
pii =
E
[
Xie
αiZ
]
E [eαiZ ]
,
where increased reinsurance demand was associated with an increase in the reinsurance premium pi.
Furthermore, Ch.7 argued that in order to bring down cost of capital, the company could directly
control the individual exposure to different types of cashflows represented by the relative weights of
internal portfolios.
Overall, insurance companies faced an endogenous maximisation problem as it depended on the
states of the world. Ch.5 exemplified that this provided the insurance company with a dilemma:
maximising time-varying shareholder value did on the one hand minimise state-dependent changes
in the value of the company and thus discontinuation risk. It on the other hand necessitated the
absorption of discontinuation risk by other means, represented by a decrease in risk aversion. This was
formalised in Equation (5.4)
arg min
α
∂V
∂s
(8.1)
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as the control problem to reduce the variation in the value V introduced by state transitions by means
of risk aversion α. For the latter, however, the general insurance business model implied that
∂α
∂s
= 0,
or that the default risk of a company is supposed to be held constant.
This trade-off represents the principal-agent conflict that is inherent to the general concept of
endogenous risk. It showed that the overarching theme could not only be identified based on the
empirical analysis of the German insurance sector during the Interwar period, but also followed from a
combination of established models and concepts from finance and actuarial science.
Concluding remark: endogenous risk and risk shifting at AIG
The hypothesis that endogenous risk is present in insurance operations was motivated by the finding
that AIG conducted the business operations that ultimately required the intervention of the U.S.
government in 2008, during a period in which the company was relatively underperforming against
a self-defined peer group. As shown in Table (1), the corporate management of the company itself
was admitting that the alternative investment opportunities for its shareholders were becoming more
appealing. The model of endogenous risk suggests that this motivated the company to shift risk from
shareholders to policyholders in order to improve its shareholder compensation. That the company
was in general engaging in risk shifting was evidenced by Ch.4, given that the company increased its
dividend payout even immediately before receiving governmental support in late 2008. This allows to
believe that the company also actively administrated its dividend during the period before 2008. With
respect to the preferences of its investor clientele, anecdotal evidence suggests similarities to the ones
identified in the German insurance market during the Interwar period: “AIG, after the so-called Decade
of Greed in the 1980s merged away dozens of blue-chip stocks, had thus become a ’widows and orphans‘
stock, a core holding for those interested in long-term safety of their investments.”230
The London-based subsidiary AIGFP played an important role in the events leading to the company’s
distress in 2007/2008. It was this company’s business operations that caused substantial write-downs
and margin calls. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the fundamental motivation of AIG to establish its
subsidiary AIGFP in 1987 was to provide for diversification in earnings performance.231 Then-CEO
Maurice R. Greenberg was said to be particularly concerned with this topic during the mid-1980s, a
period of booming financial markets. His alleged motivation was to find “something that could be a
sustainable business, where capital could be responsibly deployed to generate solid returns and yet was
230See Boyd (2011, pp.44-45), a non-fictional description of the historical engagement of AIG with financial markets.
231Compare Boyd (2011, pp.22-44).
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Table 50: Combined ratio of AIG, 2000 to 2006
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Overall 102.93% 103.60% 104.93% 92.68% 100.30% 104.69% 89.06%
Excluding catastrophes 102.66% 98.95% 104.67% 92.41% 97.56% 97.63% 89.06%
Source: AIG Restated financial supplement 2005 for years 2000 to 2005,p.11. AIG Annual Report 2006 for year
2006.
totally unconnected to insurance cycles. The capital markets were the natural answer [. . . ].”232 Based
on this motivationg, AIG incorporated AIGFP in 1987.
Fully consistent with the findings of Ch.7, the structural purpose of AIGFP was to provide pro-
cyclical diversification, yet ultimately exposed AIG to systemic risk in doing so. This became especially
evident during the period from 2000 until the financial crisis in 2008, which was marked by increased
insurance-technical costs especially caused by catastrophes, such as 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina. This
was reflected in the combined ratio of AIG, presented in Table 3, which shows that the company made
losses on its non-life business for all years except 2003 and 2006. Apart from the well-known activities
of its subsidiary, even AIG itself substantially expanded its business in securities lending operations
with assets outstanding increasing from USD 30 billion in 2003 to USD 88.4 billion in the third quarter
of 2007. AIG lent on average more than 15% of its life insurance assets and even 19% in 2007, whilst
competitors such as MetLife never lent more than 10%.233 AIG used the freed-up liquidity to make
long-term investment in the booming U.S. real estate market, which led to a substantial exposure to an
asset-liability mismatch in the run-up to the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis.234
This course of events suggests that endogenous risk played a relevant part in the case study of AIG,
which can be concluded from the findings concerning the German insurance market during the Interwar
period. This can serve as a motivation for both further studies of endogenous risk in the context of
principal-agent theory and future research on historical insurance markets.
232See Boyd (2011, p.34).
233See McDonald & Paulson (2015, pp.9-10).
234Ibid.
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